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Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections. (2004). Gersbach, Hans.
In: Public Choice.
RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:121:y:2004:i:1:p:157-177.

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  1. Voters’ Distance, Information Bias and Politicians’ Salary. (2023). Zazzaro, Alberto ; Scalera, Domenico ; Sacchi, Agnese ; Bartolini, David.
    In: Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti.
    RePEc:spr:italej:v:9:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s40797-022-00183-6.

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  2. Incentive pay for policy?makers?. (2022). Gersbach, Hans ; Ebrahimi, Afsoon ; Britz, Volker.
    In: Journal of Public Economic Theory.
    RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:24:y:2022:i:2:p:259-275.

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  3. OPTIONS TO THE REALM: A COST NEUTRAL PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE POLITICAL INCENTIVES. (2020). Hendrickson, Joshua ; Salter, Alexander William.
    In: Contemporary Economic Policy.
    RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:38:y:2020:i:3:p:515-529.

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  4. Human capital and energy consumption: Evidence from OECD countries. (2019). Smyth, Russell ; Inekwe, John ; Ivanovski, Kris ; Yao, Yao.
    In: Energy Economics.
    RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:84:y:2019:i:c:s0140988319303299.

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  5. Can Human Development Bonds Reduce the Agency Costs of the Resource Curse?. (2019). Luke, Sperduto.
    In: The Law and Development Review.
    RePEc:bpj:lawdev:v:12:y:2019:i:1:p:191-245:n:7.

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  6. Consolidated democracy, constitutional stability, and the rule of law. (2018). Pech, Gerald ; Naqvi, Nadeem ; Neumarker, Bernhard .
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:86316.

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  7. The Optimal Duration of Contracts. (2017). Poutvaara, Panu ; Wagener, Andreas ; Takalo, Tuomas.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6808.

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  8. Policy Choices by an Incumbent - A Case with Down-Up Problem, Bias Beliefs and Retrospective Voting. (2013). Seixas, Carlos ; Brandao, Antonio ; Brando, Antonio ; Costa, Manuel Luis.
    In: FEP Working Papers.
    RePEc:por:fepwps:485.

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  9. Policy persistence and rent extraction. (2013). Friedrich, Silke.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:157:y:2013:i:1:p:287-304.

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  10. Biased beliefs and retrospective voting: why democracies choose mediocre policies. (2013). Siemers, Lars-Hinrich ; Bischoff, Ivo ; Lars-H. Siemers, .
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:156:y:2013:i:1:p:163-180.

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  11. Policy Persistence and Rent Extraction. (2013). Friedrich, Silke.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4325.

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  12. Libertad y desempeño económico. (2012). Mejia, Javier.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:37939.

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  13. Endogenous enforcement of intellectual property, North-South trade, and growth. (2011). Schneider, Maik ; Schafer, Andreas.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:leiwps:96.

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  14. Endogenous Enforcement of Intellectual Property, North-South Trade, and Growth. (2011). Schneider, Maik ; Schafer, Andreas.
    In: CER-ETH Economics working paper series.
    RePEc:eth:wpswif:11-150.

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  15. Information Markets, Elections and Contracts. (2011). Gersbach, Hans ; Muller, Markus .
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3327.

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  16. Political short-termism: a possible explanation. (2010). Garri, Iconio.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:145:y:2010:i:1:p:197-211.

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  17. Flexible pensions for politicians. (2010). Gersbach, Hans ; Muller, Markus.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:145:y:2010:i:1:p:103-124.

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  18. Vote-Share Contracts and Learning-by-Doing. (2009). Muller, Markus .
    In: CER-ETH Economics working paper series.
    RePEc:eth:wpswif:09-114.

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  19. Contractual Democracy. (2008). Gersbach, Hans.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6763.

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  20. Motivation of politicians and long-term policies. (2007). Muller, Markus.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:132:y:2007:i:3:p:273-289.

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  21. Candidate quality. (2007). Takalo, Tuomas ; Poutvaara, Panu.
    In: International Tax and Public Finance.
    RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:14:y:2007:i:1:p:7-27.

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  22. Incentives for budget discipline in the presence of elections. (2007). Candel-Sanchez, Francisco .
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:23:y:2007:i:4:p:863-884.

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  23. Policy myopia and economic growth. (2007). Dutta, Jayasri ; Aidt, Toke.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:23:y:2007:i:3:p:734-753.

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  24. Vote-share Contracts and Democracy. (2007). Gersbach, Hans.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6497.

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  25. Do elections lead to informed public decisions?. (2006). Visser, Bauke ; Swank, Otto.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:129:y:2006:i:3:p:435-460.

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  26. Human capital and growth under political uncertainty. (2006). .
    In: Economics Bulletin.
    RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:15:y:2006:i:1:p:1-7.

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  27. Human capital and growth under political uncertainty. (2006). Hashimzade, Nigar ; Davis, George.
    In: Economics Bulletin.
    RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-05o40013.

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  28. Candidate Quality. (2004). Takalo, Tuomas ; Poutvaara, Panu.
    In: Public Economics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0406009.

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  29. Candidate Quality. (2004). Takalo, Tuomas ; Poutvaara, Panu.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1195.

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