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A. Alesina, R. Baqir, and W. Easterly, “Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, no. 4 (1999): 1243-1284.
A. Gethin, “Political Cleavages, Class Structures and the Politics of Old and New Minorities in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand 1963-2019” (WID.world Working Paper, 2021).
A. Gethin, C. Martínez-Toledano, and T. Piketty, Political Cleavages and Social Inequalities. A Study of 50 Democracies, 1948-2020 (Harvard University Press, forthcoming 2021).
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B. Enke, “Moral Values and Voting,” Journal of Political Economy 128, no. 10 (2020): 36793729. 36 G. Evans and J. Tilley (ed.), Political Choice Matters: Explaining the Strength of Class and Religious Cleavages in Cross-National Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2013).
C. Durrer, A. Gethin, and C. Martínez-Toledano, “Party System Transformation and the Structure of Political Cleavages in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland, 19672019 ” (WID.world Working Paper, 2021).
C. Malgouyres, “Trade Shocks and Far-Right Voting: Evidence from French Presidential Elections” (EUI Working Paper, 2017). 38 C. Martínez-Toledano and A. Sodano, “Changing Party Systems, Socioeconomic Cleavages, and Nationalism in Northern Europe, 1956-2017” (WID.world Working Paper, 2021).
- Centers correspond to the Australian Capital Territory (Australia), Vienna (Austria), Brussels (Belgium), Copenhagen (Denmark), Paris (France), Reykjavík (Iceland), Dublin (Ireland), Auckland and Wellington (New Zealand), Lisbon (Portugal), Madrid (Spain), and London (United Kingdom). -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20 Figure CB6 - Vote for left-wing parties among capital cities in Western democracies Australia Austria Belgium Britain Denmark France Iceland Ireland New Zealand Portugal Spain Average Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
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D. Autor, D. Dorn, G. Hanson, and K. Majlesi, “Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure”, American Economic Review 110, no. 10 (2020): 3139-3183.
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F. Alvaredo, L. Chancel, T. Piketty, E. Saez, and G. Zucman, World Inequality Report 2018 (Harvard University Press, 2018).
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F. Liberini, A. J. Oswald, E. Proto, and M. Redoano, “Was Brexit Triggered by the Old and Unhappy? Or by Financial Feelings?,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 161 (2019): 287-302.
- Figure 1 - From brackets to deciles: vote for the New Democratic Party by income group in Canada, 2015 Figure 1 shows the results obtained when computing vote shares for the New Democratic Party in the 2015 Canadian national election. Unsurprisingly, the two pictures look very similar, since computing vote shares by decile amounts to computing weighed averages across income brackets.
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G. Duranton, and D. Puga, “Micro-Foundations of Urban Agglomeration Economies,” in Handbook of regional and urban economics, vol. 4 (Elsevier, 2004): 2063-2117.
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I. Colantone and P. Stanig, “The Surge of Economic Nationalism in Western Europe,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 33, no. 4 (2019): 128-151. 35 R. J. Dalton, “Political Cleavages, Issues, and Electoral Change,” in Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective, ed. L. LeDuc, R. G. Niemi, and P. Norris (Sage, 1996).
I. Colantone and P. Stanig, “The Trade Origins of Economic Nationalism: Import Competition and Voting Behavior in Western Europe,” American Journal of Political Science 62, no. 4 (2018): 936-953.
- Interpretation: in 1948-1979, the link between a party's position on the sociocultural axis and the composition of its electorate in terms of education was small and not statistically significant; in 2000-2020, it has become strongly negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, so that parties strongly emphasizing liberal issues in their manifestos receive much greater support from higher-educated voters. 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 2018 Figure B1 - Share of votes covered by the survey-manifesto dataset Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Iceland Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland USA United Kingdom Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and Manifesto Project data.
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Italy Sweden Iceland Denmark 1 Brahmin Left versus Merchant Right: Changing Political Cleavages in 21 Western Democracies, 1948-2020 Amory Gethin Clara Martínez-Toledano Thomas Piketty May 5, 2021 Amory Gethin, Thomas Piketty: Paris School of Economics – World Inequality Lab; Clara Martínez-Toledano: Imperial College London – World Inequality Lab.
- J. Blondel, Votes, Parties and Leaders (Penguin, 1970).
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J. E. Roemer, “Why the Poor do not Expropriate the Rich: An Old Argument in New Garb,” Journal of Public Economics 70, no. 3 (1998): 399-424.
- J. E. Roemer, W. Lee, and K. Van der Straeten, Racism, Xenophobia, and Distribution. MultiIssue Politics in Advanced Democracies (Harvard University Press, 2007).
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- J. M. Wooldridge, Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT Press, 2002.
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- J. Thomassen (ed.), The European Voter: A Comparative Study Of Modern Democracies (Oxford University Press, 2005).
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- J. van der Wall, P. Achterberg, and D. Houtman, “Class Is Not Dead—It Has Been Buried Alive: Class Voting and Cultural Voting in Postwar Western Societies (1956–1990),” Politics and Society 35, no. 3 (2007): 403–426. 39 M. Young, The Rise of the Meritocracy, 1870-2033: An Essay on Education and Inequality, Penguin, 1958 A. Volkens, T. Burst, W. Krause, P. Lehmann, T. Matthieß, N. Merz, S. Regel, B. Weßels, and L. Zehnter, The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR), Version 2020b, https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/datasets, 2020.
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K. Behrens, G. Duranton, and F. Robert-Nicoud, “Productive cities: Sorting, Selection, and Agglomeration”, Journal of Political Economy 122, no. 3 (2014): 507-553.
L. Bauluz, A. Gethin, C. Martínez-Toledano, and M. Morgan, “Historical Political Cleavages and Post-Crisis Transformations in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland, 1953-2020” (WID.world Working Paper, 2021).
L. Edlund and R. Pande, “Why have Women become Left-wing? The Political Gender Gap and the Decline in Marriage,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, no. 3 (2002): 917–961.
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- M. Bovens and A. Wille, “Education: The Contours of a New Cleavage? Comparing 23 European Countries,” in Stabiliteit en verandering in Europa, ed. K. Aarts and M. Wittenberg (DANS, 2012).
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- M. Dolezal, “Exploring the Stabilization of a Political Force: The Social and Attitudinal Basis of Green Parties in the Age of Globalization,” West European Politics 33, no. 3 (2010): 534– 552.
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- M. Duverger, The Political Role of Women (Unesco, 1955).
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- M. Franklin, T. Hackie, H. Valen, et al., Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries (Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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M. Funke, M. Schularick, and C. Trebesh, “Going to Extremes: Politics after Financial Crises, 1870–2014,” European Economic Review 88 (2016): 227-260.
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M. Halla, A. F. Wagner, and J. Zweimüller, “Immigration and Voting for the Far Right,” Journal of the European Economic Association 15, no. 6 (2017): 1341-1385.
M. Tabellini, “Gifts of the Immigrants, Woes of the Natives: Lessons from the Age of Mass Migration,” The Review of Economic Studies 87, no. 1 (2020): 454-486.
- Muslim voters more likely to vote for social democratic / socialist / green parties by over 40 percentage points -35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20 Figure 11 - The reversal of the gender cleavage Australia Austria Belgium Britain Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Iceland Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United States Average Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
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N. Baum-Snow, and R. Pavan, “Inequality and City Size”, Review of Economics and Statistics 95, no. 5 (2013): 1535-1548.
N. Baum-Snow, M. Freedman, and R. Pavan, “Why has Urban Inequality Increased?,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 10, no. 4 (2018): 1-42.
N. Gennaioli and G. Tabellini, “Identity, Beliefs, and Political Conflict” (SSRN Working Paper, 2019).
- Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing (democratic / labor / socialdemocratic / socialist / green) parties than lower-educated and low-income voters by more than 10 percentage points. The left vote has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a multi-elite party system. Figures correspond to five-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).
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- Note: parties are categorized into conservative and Christian democratic parties; liberal and social-liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; green parties; and other unclassifiable parties. -0,5 -0,4 -0,3 -0,2 -0,1 0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 1970-79 1980-89 1990 2000-09 2010-20 Figure B14 - Ideological polarization and multi-elite party systems (country-level analysis) Correlation between education gradient and sociocultural polarization Correlation between income gradient and economic-distributive polarization Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and Manifesto Project data.
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- Note: parties are categorized into conservative and Christian democratic parties; liberal and social-liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; green parties; and other unclassifiable parties. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 -70-60-50-40-30-20-10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Share of top 10% educated in party electorate Sociocultural index Figure B10 - Sociocultural polarization and educational cleavages, 1980s Conservatives Social Democrats Liberals Anti-immigration Greens Other Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and Manifesto Project data.
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- Note: parties are categorized into conservative and Christian democratic parties; liberal and social-liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; green parties; and other unclassifiable parties. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 -70-60-50-40-30-20-10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Share of top 10% educated in party electorate Sociocultural index Figure B11 - Sociocultural polarization and educational cleavages, 1990s Conservatives Social Democrats Liberals Anti-immigration Greens Other Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and Manifesto Project data.
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- Note: parties are categorized into conservative and Christian democratic parties; liberal and social-liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; green parties; and other unclassifiable parties. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 -70-60-50-40-30-20-10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Share of top 10% educated in party electorate Sociocultural index Figure B12 - Sociocultural polarization and educational cleavages, 2000s Conservatives Social Democrats Liberals Anti-immigration Greens Other Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and Manifesto Project data.
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- Note: parties are categorized into conservative and Christian democratic parties; liberal and social-liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; green parties; and other unclassifiable parties. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 -70-60-50-40-30-20-10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Share of top 10% educated in party electorate Sociocultural index Figure B13 - Sociocultural polarization and educational cleavages, 2010s Conservatives Social Democrats Liberals Anti-immigration Greens Other Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and Manifesto Project data.
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- Note: the figure displays the average score of all parties available in the CMP dataset in the 1950s on the economic-distributive index (y-axis) and the sociocultural index (x-axis). Parties are categorized into conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; green parties; and other unclassifiable parties. -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 -50-40-30-20-10 0 10 20 30 40 50 Economic-distributive index Sociocultural index Figure B3 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 1960s Conservatives Anti-immigration Social Democrats Other Source: authors' computations using the Comparative Manifesto Project database.
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- Note: the figure displays the average score of all parties available in the CMP dataset in the 1960s on the economic-distributive index (y-axis) and the sociocultural index (x-axis). Parties are categorized into conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; green parties; and other unclassifiable parties. -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 -50-40-30-20-10 0 10 20 30 40 50 Economic-distributive index Sociocultural index Figure B4 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 1970s Conservatives Anti-immigration Social democrats Other Source: authors' computations using the Comparative Manifesto Project database.
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- Note: the figure displays the average score of all parties available in the CMP dataset in the 1970s on the economic-distributive index (y-axis) and the sociocultural index (x-axis). Parties are categorized into conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; green parties; and other unclassifiable parties. -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 -50-40-30-20-10 0 10 20 30 40 50 Economic-distributive index Sociocultural index Figure B5 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 1980s Conservatives Anti-immigration Social democrats Other Source: authors' computations using the Comparative Manifesto Project database.
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- Note: the figure displays the average score of all parties available in the CMP dataset in the 1980s on the economic-distributive index (y-axis) and the sociocultural index (x-axis). Parties are categorized into conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; green parties; and other unclassifiable parties. -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 -50-40-30-20-10 0 10 20 30 40 50 Economic-distributive index Sociocultural index Figure B6 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 1990s Conservatives Anti-immigration Social Democrats Greens Other Source: authors' computations using the Comparative Manifesto Project database.
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- Note: the figure displays the average score of all parties available in the CMP dataset in the 1990s on the economic-distributive index (y-axis) and the sociocultural index (x-axis). Parties are categorized into conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; green parties; and other unclassifiable parties. -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 -50-40-30-20-10 0 10 20 30 40 50 Economic-distributive index Sociocultural index Figure B7 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 2000s Conservatives Anti-immigration Social Democrats Greens Other Source: authors' computations using the Comparative Manifesto Project database.
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- Note: the figure displays the average score of all parties available in the CMP dataset in the 2000s on the economic-distributive index (y-axis) and the sociocultural index (x-axis). Parties are categorized into conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; green parties; and other unclassifiable parties. -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 -50-40-30-20-10 0 10 20 30 40 50 Economic-distributive index Sociocultural index Figure B8 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 2010s Conservatives Anti-immigration Social Democrats Greens Other Source: authors' computations using the Comparative Manifesto Project database.
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- Note: the figure displays the average score of all parties available in the CMP dataset in the 2010s on the economic-distributive index (y-axis) and the sociocultural index (x-axis). Parties are categorized into conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; green parties; and other unclassifiable parties. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 -70-60-50-40-30-20-10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Share of top 10% educated in party electorate Sociocultural index Figure B9 - Sociocultural polarization and educational cleavages, 1970s Conservatives Social Democrats Liberals Anti-immigration Other Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and Manifesto Project data.
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- Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in Western democracies. In the majority of countries, women have gradually shifted from being significantly more conservative than men in the 1950s-1960s to being significantly more left-wing in the 2000s-2010s.
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- Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income voters. -35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20 Figure A8 - The decline/stability of income divides, all Western democracies, after controls Australia Austria Belgium Britain Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Iceland Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland Average United States Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
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- Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis, over the 2010-2020 period. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).
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- Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties within specific cohorts. Between the 1960s and the 1990s, lower-educated voters born in the early decades of the twentieth century remained significantly more likely to vote for these parties than higher-educated voters born during the same period. In the last decade, on the contrary, young lower-educated voters were significantly less likely to vote for these parties than young higher-educated voters. Figures correspond to ten-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US.
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- Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, highereducated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for leftwing parties. -40 -35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20 Figure A6 - The reversal of educational divides, all Western democracies, after controls Australia Austria Belgium Britain Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Iceland Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland Average United States Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
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- Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of Muslim voters and the share of non-Muslims voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties over the 2010-2020 period. In all Western countries, Muslims are substantially more likely to vote for these parties than non-Muslims. This cleavage is stronger in countries with strong far-right parties (e.g. Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, France). Excludes Fianna Fáil in Ireland.
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- Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of union members and the share of non-union members voting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western democracies. -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20 Figure CF6 - Vote for left-wing parties among union members in Western democracies, after controls Australia Austria Belgium Britain Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Iceland Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United States Average Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
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- Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of union members and the share of non-union members voting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western democracies. Estimates control for education, income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20 Figure CF7 - Vote for left-wing parties among public sector workers in Western democracies Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Iceland Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland Average Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
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- Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of voters belonging to no religion and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies. Non-religious voters have remained significantly more left-wing than the rest of the electorate since the 1950s. 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% Figure CC4 - Vote for Green parties by religion, 2010s Catholic Other Christian Other None Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
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- Note: the figure represents the relationship between sociocultural polarization (defined as the standard deviation of the sociocultural index across all parties in a given country) and the educational cleavage for all 21 Western democracies in the 2010s. Higher-educated voters are significantly more likely to support left-wing parties in countries where polarization on the sociocultural axis is higher. 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 Age Figure 8 - Generational cleavages Panel A. Generational cleavages and party system fragmentation Green parties New left (Germany, Spain, France, Portugal, Norway) Anti-immigration (Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden) Anti-immigration (Austria, Spain, Finland, France) Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
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- Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by selected groups of parties in Western democracies by age in the last election available. Green parties and New left parties (Die Linke, Podemos, France Insoumise, Bloco de Esquerda, Norwegian Socialist Left Party) make much higher scores among the youth than among older generations. By contrast, there is no clear age profile in the case of far-right or anti-immigration parties. 20 correponds to voters aged 20 or younger; 70 corresponds to voters 70 or older. -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20 Figure 8 - Generational cleavages Panel B. The educational cleavage by birth cohort Post-1980 generation 1970s 1960s 1950s 1940s 1930s 1920s 1910s Pre-1900 generation Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
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- Note: the figure represents the total share of votes captured by the merged survey-manifesto dataset by country for all elections available between 1945 and 2020. -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 -50-40-30-20-10 0 10 20 30 40 50 Economic-distributive index Sociocultural index Figure B2 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 1950s Conservatives Anti-immigration Social Democrats Other Source: authors' computations using the Comparative Manifesto Project database.
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- Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of the 10% oldest voters and the share of the youngest 90% voters voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies. -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20 Figure CA3 - Vote for left-wing parties among young voters in Western democracies, after controls Australia Austria Belgium Britain Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Iceland Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United States Average Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
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- Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters younger than 25 and the share of voters aged 25 or above voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies. -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20 Figure CA2 - Vote for left-wing parties among old voters in Western democracies Australia Austria Belgium Britain Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Iceland Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United States Average Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
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- Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties by gender in Western democracies in the last election available -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20 Figure CF1 - The decline of self-perceived class cleavages in Western democracies (before controls) Australia Britain Denmark France Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain Sweden United States Average Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
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- Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties in Western democracies in the last election available by self-perceived social class. -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20 Figure CF5 - Vote for left-wing parties among union members in Western democracies Australia Austria Belgium Britain Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Iceland Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United States Average Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
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- Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties by religious affiliation. 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% Figure CC5 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by religion, 2010s Catholic Other Christian None Other Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
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- Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by country of birth in Western democracies in the 2010s.
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- Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by religion in the 2010s in Western democracies. -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20 Figure CC3 - Vote for left-wing parties among voters with no religion in Western democracies Australia Belgium Britain Canada France Germany Italy Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Portugal Spain Switzerland Average Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
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- Note: the table reports the coefficient associated to a regression of the sociocultural index on the education gradient (the share of top 10% educated voters within a given party's electorate) at the party level, decomposing the dataset into three time periods: 1948-1979, 1980-1999, and 2000-2020. The first column reports the raw coefficient (without controls). The second column reports the coefficient after controlling for country and year fixed effects and for the composition of the electorate of each party in terms of income, age, gender, rural-urban location, and religion. The third column reports the same coefficient after controlling for the same variables and for election fixed effects (that is, interacting country and year fixed effects). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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- Panel A. 1960-1980 Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
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- Portugal Sweden -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 -25-20-15-10-5 0 5 10 15 20 25 Relative support among high-income voters Relative support among higher-educated voters Figure 6 - Decomposing multi-elite party systems, 2010-2020 Panel A. Social Democrats / Socialists vs. Conservatives / Christians Right-wing parties (excl. anti-immigration) Left-wing parties (excl. Greens) Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
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- Portugal Sweden US -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 -20-15-10-5 0 5 10 15 20 Relative support among high-income voters Relative support among higher-educated voters Figure A16 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 2010s Left-wing parties Right-wing parties 0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20 Figure A17 - Correlation between income and education Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Iceland Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States Average Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
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- Portugal Sweden US -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 -15-10-5 0 5 10 15 Relative support among high-income voters Relative support among higher-educated voters Figure A14 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1990s Left-wing parties Right-wing parties Austria Australia Belgium Canada Switzerland Germany Denmark Spain Finland France UK Ireland Iceland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Norway New Z. Portugal Sweden US Austria Australia Belgium Canada Switzerland Germany Denmark Spain Finland France UK Ireland Iceland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Norway New Z.
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- Portugal Sweden US -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 -15-10-5 0 5 10 15 Relative support among high-income voters Relative support among higher-educated voters Figure A15 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 2000s Left-wing parties Right-wing parties Austria Australia Belgium Canada Switzerland Germany Denmark Spain Finland France UK Ireland Iceland Italy Netherlands Norway New Z. Portugal Sweden US Austria Australia Belgium Canada Switzerland Germany Denmark Spain Finland France UK Ireland Iceland Italy Netherlands Norway New Z.
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- Portugal Sweden US -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 -20-15-10-5 0 5 10 15 20 Relative support among high-income voters Relative support among higher-educated voters Figure A13 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1980s Left-wing parties Right-wing parties Austria Australia Belgium Canada Switzerland Germany Denmark Finland France UK Ireland Iceland Luxembourg Netherlands Norway New Z. Portugal Sweden US Austria Australia Belgium Canada Switzerland Germany Denmark Finland France UK Ireland Iceland Luxembourg Netherlands Norway New Z.
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- Raw coefficient After controls and country/year fixed effects After controls and election fixed effects 1948-1979-0.13* 0.12 0.11 1980-1999-0.68*** -0.13-0.21 2000-2020-1.21*** -0.65*** -0.73*** Table B2 - Sociocultural polarization and educational cleavages: regression results Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Datatabase with Manifesto Project data.
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- Social Democrats Conservatives Anti-immigration Greens Social Democrats Conservatives Anti-immigration Greens 1945-59-12,3 11,2-2,2 2,2 1960-69-9,1 9,2-1,1 0,9 1970-79-9,3 8,8 17,6-0,6 0,6 3,9 1980-89-10,9 10,9 15,8-8,5-1,9 2,5 3,4-24,1 1990-99-9,9 8,2 11,6-11,5-3,6 5,2 7,1-25,4 2000-09-9,4 8,1 10,4-6,8-4,9 6,3 11,2-24,8 2010-20-13,5 11,2 8,7-11,2-5,4 4,4 20,4-25,1 Economic-distributive index Sociocultural index Table 2 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 1945-2020 Source: authors' computations using the Comparative Manifesto Project database.
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- Sweden US -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 -25-20-15-10-5 0 5 10 15 20 25 Relative support among high-income voters Relative support among higher-educated voters Figure A12 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1970s Left-wing parties Right-wing parties Austria Australia Belgium Canada Denmark Spain Finland France UK Ireland Iceland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Norway New Z. Portugal Sweden US Austria AustraliaBelgium Canada Denmark Spain Finland France UK Ireland Iceland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Norway New Z.
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- United States United States Austria Belgium Switzerland Germany Denmark Spain Finland France Italy Netherlands Norway New Zealand Sweden Austria Australia Belgium Canada Switzerland Germany Denmark Finland Ireland Iceland Netherlands Norway New Zealand Portugal Sweden -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 -25-20-15-10-5 0 5 10 15 20 Relative support among high-income voters Relative support among higher-educated voters Figure 6 - Decomposing multi-elite party systems, 2010-2020 Panel B. Green vs. Anti-immigration parties Anti-immigration parties Green parties Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
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