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Disagreement Between FOMC Members and the Fed’s Staff: New Insights Based on a Counterfactual Interest Rate. (2018). Neuenkirch, Matthias ; Bennani, Hamza ; Kranz, Tobias.
In: Post-Print.
RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01868010.

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  1. Central Bank Forecasting: A Survey. (2023). Sekkel, Rodrigo ; Binder, Carola Conces.
    In: Staff Working Papers.
    RePEc:bca:bocawp:23-18.

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  2. The calculus of dissent: Bias and diversity in FOMC projections. (2022). Hogan, Thomas.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:191:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-021-00952-4.

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