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Asserting Independence: Optimal Monetary Policy When the Central Bank and Political Authority Disagree. (2022). Tortorice, Daniel ; Svec, Justin.
In: Working Papers.
RePEc:hcx:wpaper:2201.

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Cocites

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  2. Asserting Independence: Optimal Monetary Policy When the Central Bank and Political Authority Disagree. (2022). Tortorice, Daniel ; Svec, Justin.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hcx:wpaper:2201.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

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