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The Signaling Value of Punishing Norm-Breakers and Rewarding Norm-Followers. (2018). Adriani, Fabrizio ; Sonderegger, Silvia.
In: Games.
RePEc:gam:jgames:v:9:y:2018:i:4:p:102-:d:190380.

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  1. Gender differences in tolerance for womens opinions and the role of social norms. (2022). Takahashi, Ryo.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:wap:wpaper:2123.

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  2. Social punishment for breaching restrictions during the COVID?19 pandemic. (2021). Tanaka, Kenta ; Takahashi, Ryo.
    In: Economic Inquiry.
    RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:59:y:2021:i:4:p:1467-1482.

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  3. Call to Action: Intrinsic Motives and Material Interests. (2018). Kotsidis, Vasileios.
    In: Games.
    RePEc:gam:jgames:v:9:y:2018:i:4:p:92-:d:182676.

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