[1] Abraham, A. and N. Pavoni (2008), âEïcient Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending: A Recursive Formulationâ, Review of Economic Dynamics 11(4): 781-803.
[10] Fernandes, A. and C. Phelan (2000), âA Recursive Formulation for Repeated Agency with History Dependenceâ, Journal of Economic Theory 91, pp. 223-47.
[11] Karaivanov, A. and F. Martin (2011), âMoral Hazard and Lack of Commitment in Dynamic Economiesâ, manuscript, Simon Fraser University.
- [12] Klein, P., P. Krusell and J.-V. RÄos-Rull (2008), âTime-Consistent Public Expendituresâ, Review of Economic Studies 78(3): 789-808.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [13] Kocherlakota, N. (1996), âImplications of Eïcient Risk Sharing without Commitmentâ, Review of Economic Studies 63(4): 595-609.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
[14] Kovrijnykh, N. (2010), âDebt Contracts with Partial Commitmentâ, manuscript, Arizona State University.
[15] Krueger, D. and H. Uhlig (2006), âCompetitive risk-sharing contracts with one-sided commitment â, Journal of Monetary Economics 53, pp. 1661-91.
- [16] Krusell P. and A. Smith (2003), âConsumption-Savings Decisions with Quasi-Geometric Discountingâ, Econometrica 71(1): 365-375.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
[17] Ligon, E., J. Thomas and T. Worrall, (2002) âInformal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economiesâ, Review of Economic Studies 69(1): 209-44.
[18] Martin, F. (2009), âA Positive Theory of Government Debtâ, Review of Economic Dynamics 12(4): 608-631.
- [19] Maskin, E. and J. Tirole (2001), âMarkov Perfect Equilibriumâ, Journal of Economic Theory 100(2): 191-219.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
[2] Acemoglu, D., M. Golosov and A. Tsyvinski (2006), âMarkets Versus Governments: Political Economy of Mechanismsâ, NBER Working Paper #12224.
- [20] Phelan, C. (1995), âRepeated Moral Hazard and One-Sided Commitmentâ, Journal of Economic Theory 66(2): 488-506.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [21] Rogerson, W. (1985), âThe First Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problemsâ, Econometrica 53: 1357-68.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [22] Schechtman, J. and V. Escudero (1977), âSome Results on an Inïnite Fluctuation Problem â, Journal of Economic Theory 16: 151-66.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
[23] Sleet, C. and S. Yeltekin (2006), âCredibility and Endogenous Societal Discountingâ, Review of Economic Dynamics 9: 410-37.
[24] Sleet, C. and S. Yeltekin (2008), âPolitically Credible Social Insuranceâ, Journal of Monetary Economics 55: 129-151.
- [25] Stokey, N., R. Lucas and E. Prescott (1989), Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
[26] Thomas, J. and T. Worrall (1988), âSelf-Enforcing Wage Contractsâ, Review of Economic Studies 55(4): 541-553.
[4] Aiyagari, S.R. (1994), âUninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Savingâ, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(3): 659-84.
- [5] Allen, F. (1985), âRepeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowingâ, Economics Letters 17(1-2): 27-31.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
[6] Bester, H. and R. Strausz (2001), âContracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Caseâ, Econometrica 69(4): 1077-98.
[7] Bisin, A. and A. Rampini (2006), âMarkets as beneïcial constraints on the governmentâ, Journal of Public Economics 90(4-5): 601-29.
- [8] Cole, H. and N. Kocherlakota (2001), âEïcient Allocations with Hidden Income and Hidden Storageâ, Review of Economic Studies 68(3): 523-42.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
[9] Doepke, M. and R. Townsend (2006), âDynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actionsâ, Journal of Economic Theory 126(1): 235-85.