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Dynamic optimal insurance and lack of commitment. (2011). Martin, Fernando ; Karaivanov, Alexander.
In: Working Papers.
RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2011-029.

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Cited: 1

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Cites: 25

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Cocites: 21

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Coauthors: 0

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Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Markov-Perfect Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment. (2017). Martin, Fernando ; Karaivanov, Alexander.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2011-030.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

References

References cited by this document

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Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Markov-Perfect Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment. (2017). Martin, Fernando ; Karaivanov, Alexander.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2011-030.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Too big to cheat: Efficiency and Investment in Partnerships. (2015). Sanchez, Juan ; Kozlowski, Julian ; Espino, Emilio.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2013-001.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Dynamic contractual incentives in the face of a Samaritans’s dilemma. (2013). Miquel-Florensa, Josepa.
    In: Theory and Decision.
    RePEc:kap:theord:v:74:y:2013:i:1:p:151-166.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. Unemployment accounts. (2012). .
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:38064.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. Dynamic optimal insurance and lack of commitment. (2011). Martin, Fernando ; Karaivanov, Alexander.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2011-029.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. Unemployment Insurance with Hidden Savings. (2010). Zhang, Yuzhe ; Mitchell, Matthew.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:23214.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans. (2010). Mele, Antonio.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:21741.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. Consumption and Saving: Models of Intertemporal Allocation and Their Implications for Public Policy. (2010). Weber, Guglielmo ; Attanasio, Orazio.
    In: Journal of Economic Literature.
    RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:48:y:2010:i:3:p:693-751.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. Unemployment insurance with a hidden labor market. (2009). Sanchez, Juan ; Alvarez-Parra, Fernando.
    In: Journal of Monetary Economics.
    RePEc:eee:moneco:v:56:y:2009:i:7:p:954-967.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  10. Efficient Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending: A Recursive Formulation. (2008). Pavoni, Nicola ; Abraham, Arpad.
    In: Review of Economic Dynamics.
    RePEc:red:issued:06-26.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. Persistent Private Information. (2008). Williams, Noah.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13894.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  12. Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence. (2008). Jarque, Arantxa.
    In: Working Paper.
    RePEc:fip:fedrwp:08-04.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  13. Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Hidden Trade. (2007). Zhang, Yuzhe ; Mitchell, Matthew.
    In: 2007 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed007:1023.

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  14. Risk Sharing in Private Information Models with Asset Accumulation: Explaining the Excess Smoothness of Consumption. (2007). Pavoni, Nicola ; Attanasio, Orazio.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12994.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  15. Optimal Income Taxation with Human Capital Accumulation and Limited Record Keeping. (2006). Kapicka, Marek.
    In: Review of Economic Dynamics.
    RePEc:red:issued:05-24.

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  16. Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs. (2006). Violante, Giovanni ; Pavoni, Nicola.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5937.

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  17. Optimal welfare-to-work programs. (2005). Violante, Giovanni ; Pavoni, Nicola.
    In: Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:fip:fedmem:143.

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  18. On the Recursive Saddle Point Method. (2004). Pavoni, Nicola ; Messner, Matthias.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:igi:igierp:255.

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  19. On the Recursive Saddle Point Method. (2004). Pavoni, Nicola ; Messner, Matthias.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000050.

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  20. Designing Optimal Disability Insurance. (2003). Tsyvinski, Aleh ; Golosov, Mikhail.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000217.

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  21. Should UI Benefits Really Fall over Time?. (2002). Rodríguez Mora, Sevi ; Hassler, John ; Mora , Jose V. Rodriguez, ; Mora, Jose V. Rodriguez, .
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_804.

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