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Gradualism and Liquidity Traps. (2016). Schmidt, Sebastian ; Nakata, Taisuke.
In: Finance and Economics Discussion Series.
RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2016-92.

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Cited: 12

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Cites: 34

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Cocites: 25

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Coauthors: 0

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Citations received by this document

  1. Irreversible monetary policy at the zero lower bound. (2019). Hasui, Kohei ; Kobayashi, Teruyoshi ; Sugo, Tomohiro.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:koe:wpaper:1906.

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  2. Tying down the anchor: monetary policy rules and the lower bound on interest rates. (2019). Williams, John ; Mertens, Thomas.
    In: Staff Reports.
    RePEc:fip:fednsr:887.

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  3. Monetary policy frameworks and the effective lower bound on interest rates. (2019). Williams, John ; Mertens, Thomas.
    In: Staff Reports.
    RePEc:fip:fednsr:877.

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  4. Tying Down the Anchor: Monetary Policy Rules and the Lower Bound on Interest Rates. (2019). Williams, John ; Mertens, Thomas.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:fip:fedfwp:2019-14.

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  5. Monetary Policy Frameworks and the Effective Lower Bound on Interest Rates. (2019). Williams, John ; Mertens, Thomas.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:fip:fedfwp:2019-01.

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  6. Conservatism and liquidity traps. (2019). Schmidt, Sebastian ; Nakata, Taisuke.
    In: Journal of Monetary Economics.
    RePEc:eee:moneco:v:104:y:2019:i:c:p:37-47.

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  7. The State of New Keynesian Economics: A Partial Assessment. (2018). Gali, Jordi.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24845.

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  8. The effective lower bound and the desirability of gradual interest rate adjustments. (2018). Schmidt, Sebastian.
    In: Research Bulletin.
    RePEc:ecb:ecbrbu:2018:0045:.

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  9. The State of New Keynesian Economics: A Partial Assessment. (2018). Gali, Jordi.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13095.

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  10. Conservatism and Liquidity Traps. (2015). Schmidt, Sebastian ; Nakata, Taisuke.
    In: UTokyo Price Project Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:upd:utppwp:059.

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  11. Conservatism and Liquidity Traps. (2015). Nakata, Taisuke.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:tcr:wpaper:e101.

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  12. Conservatism and liquidity traps. (2015). Schmidt, Sebastian ; Nakata, Taisuke.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20151816.

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References

References cited by this document

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  34. Woodford, M. (2003a): Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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  2. Central Bank Capital and Credibility: A Literature Survey. (2021). Tanaka, Atsushi.
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  4. Strengthening the FOMC’s Framework in View of the Effective Lower Bound and Some Considerations Related to Time-Inconsistent Strategies. (2020). Nakata, Taisuke ; Melosi, Leonardo ; Duarte, Fernando ; Johannsen, Benjamin K.
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  6. (Why) do central banks care about their profits?. (2020). Ioannidou, Vasso ; Goncharov, Igor ; Schmalz, Martin C.
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  7. How Can a Central Bank Exit Quantitative Easing Without Rapidly Shrinking its Balance Sheet?. (2019). Tanaka, Atsushi.
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  8. The Dependence of China’s Monetary Policy Rules on Interest Rate Regimes: Empirical Analysis Based on a Pseudo Output Gap. (2019). Pan, Fanghui ; Zhang, Xiaoyu.
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  10. Fiscal Multipliers at the Zero Lower Bound: The Role of Policy Inertia. (2018). Nakata, Taisuke ; Hills, Timothy S.
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  11. Fiscal implications of the Federal Reserves balance sheet normalization. (2018). Rosa, Carlo ; Grasing, Jamie ; Frame, W ; Del Negro, Marco ; Malin, Benjamin A ; Cavallo, Michele.
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  15. The signaling effect of raising inflation. (2018). Mengus, Eric ; Barthélemy, Jean ; Barthelemy, Jean.
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    In: Finance and Economics Discussion Series.
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