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Modesty Pays: Sometimes!. (2004). Finus, Michael.
In: Working Papers.
RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.68.

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  1. A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements. (2010). Zaccour, Georges ; Sbragia, Lucia.
    In: Environmental & Resource Economics.
    RePEc:kap:enreec:v:45:y:2010:i:1:p:25-48.

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  2. DO ABATEMENT QUOTAS LEAD TO MORE SUCCESSFUL CLIMATE COALITIONS?. (2008). Finus, Michael ; Dellink, Rob ; Altamirano-Cabrera, Juan-Carlos .
    In: Manchester School.
    RePEc:bla:manchs:v:76:y:2008:i:1:p:104-129.

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  3. Dynamic Models for International Environmental Agreements. (2008). Zaccour, Georges ; Sbragia, Lucia ; Breton, Michele.
    In: Coalition Theory Network Working Papers.
    RePEc:ags:feemct:6231.

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  4. An equitable, efficient and implementable scheme to control global carbon dioxide emissions. (2007). Silva, Emilson ; Caplan, Arthur.
    In: International Tax and Public Finance.
    RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:14:y:2007:i:3:p:263-279.

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  5. The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection. (2006). Tol, Richard ; Osmani, Dritan.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:4256.

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  6. A Comparison of Emission Taxes and Permit Markets for Controlling Correlated Externalities. (2006). Caplan, Arthur.
    In: Environmental & Resource Economics.
    RePEc:kap:enreec:v:34:y:2006:i:4:p:471-492.

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  7. The effect of membership rules and voting schemes on the success of international climate agreements. (2005). van Ierland, Ekko ; Finus, Michael ; Altamirano-Cabrera, Juan-Carlos.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:125:y:2005:i:1:p:95-127.

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References

References cited by this document

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  3. Barrett, S. (1997a), Heterogeneous International Agreements. In: C. Carraro (ed.), International Environmental Negotiations: Strategic Policy Issues. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 9-25.
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  4. Barrett, S. (1997b), The Strategy of Trade Sanctions in International Environmental Agreements. Resource and Energy Economics, vol. 19, pp. 345-361.

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  8. Böhringer C. and Vogt C. (2002). Dismantling of a Breakthrough: The Kyoto Protocol - Just Symbolic Policy! Manuscript, ZEW, Mannheim. Forthcoming in European Journal of Political Economy.

  9. Botteon, M. and C. Carraro (1997), Burden-Sharing and Coalition Stability in Environmental Negotiations with Asymmetric Countries. In: Carraro, C. (ed.), International Environmental Negotiations: Strategic Policy Issues. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham et al., ch. 3, pp. 26-55.
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  10. Botteon, M. and C. Carraro (1998), Strategies for Environmental Negotiations: Issue Linkage with Heterogeneous Countries. In: Hanley, N. and H. Folmer (eds.), Game Theory and the Global Environment. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham et al., ch. 9, pp. 180-200.

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  23. Finus, M. (2003a), New Developments in Coalition Theory: An Application to the Case of Global Pollution. In: Marsiliani, L., Rauscher, M. and Withagen, C. (eds), Environmental Policy in an International Perspective. Kluwer, Dordrecht, Holland, 2003, pp. 19-49.
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  24. Finus, M. (2003b), Stability and Design of International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Global and Transboundary Pollution. In: Folmer, H. and T. Tietenberg (eds), International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics 2003/4. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, ch. 3, pp. 82-158.
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  25. Finus, M. and B. Rundshagen (1998a), Toward a Positive Theory of Coalition Formation and Endogenous Instrumental Choice in Global Pollution Control. Public Choice, vol. 96, pp. 145-186.

  26. Finus, M. and B. Rundshagen (1998b), Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in Global Emission Game When Players Are Impatient. Journal of Environmental and Resource Economics, vol. 12, pp. 275-306.

  27. Finus, M. and B. Rundshagen (2003), Endogenous Coalition Formation in Global Pollution Control. A Partition Function Approach. In: Carraro, C. (ed.), Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, ch. 6, pp. 199-243.

  28. Folmer, H., and P. van Mouche (1994), Interconnected Games and International Environmental Problems II. Annals of Operations Research, vol. 54, pp. 97-117.
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  29. Folmer, H., P. van Mouche and S. Ragland (1993), Interconnected Games and International Environmental Problems. Environmental and Resource Economics, vol. 3, pp. 313-335.

  30. Hoel, M. (1992), International Environment Conventions: The Case of Uniform Reductions of Emissions. Environmental and Resource Economics, vol. 2, pp. 141-159.

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  32. Jeppesen, T. and P. Andersen (1998), Commitment and Fairness in Environmental Games. In: Hanley, N. and H. Folmer (eds.), Game Theory and the Environment. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, ch. 4, pp. 65-83.
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  33. Katsoulacos, Y. (1997), R&D Spillovers, Cooperation, Subsidies and International Agreements. In: Carraro, C. (ed.), International Environmental Negotiations: Strategic Policy Issues. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, ch. 6, pp. 97-109.
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  34. Mäler, K.-G. (1990), International Environmental Problems. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 6, pp. 80-108.
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  35. Murdoch, J.C. and T. Sandler (1997a), Voluntary Cutbacks and Pretreaty Behavior: The Helsinki Protocol and Sulfur Emissions. Public Finance Review, vol. 25, pp. 139-162.
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  36. Murdoch, J.C. and T. Sandler (1997b), The Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good: the Case of Reduced CFC Emissions and the Montreal Protocol. Journal of Public Economics vol. 63, pp. 331-349.

  37. Petrakis, E. and A. Xepapadeas (1996), Environmental Consciousness and Moral Hazard in International Agreements to Protect the Environment. Journal of Public Economics, vol. 60, pp. 95-110.

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  2. Coaseian Biodiversity Conservation and Market Power. (2019). Pethig, Rüdiger ; Eichner, Thomas.
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  3. Optimize emission reduction commitments for international environmental agreements. (2018). Yu, Guanyi ; Fan, Wanlong ; Zang, Wenjuan ; Chen, Weidong.
    In: Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change.
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  4. Self-enforcing Biodiversity Agreements with Financial Support from North to South. (2018). Pethig, Rüdiger ; Eichner, Thomas.
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  5. Regulation versus subsidies in conservation with a self-interested policy maker. (2017). Palokangas, Tapio.
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  7. Coaseian biodiversity conservation. Who benefits?. (2016). Pethig, Rüdiger ; Eichner, Thomas.
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  8. Environment and development economics 20 years on. (2014). Perrings, Charles.
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  9. On the Voluntary Provision of International Public Goods. (2014). Rübbelke, Dirk ; Löschel, Andreas ; Loschel, Andreas ; Rubbelke, Dirk.
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  10. The biodiversity conservation game with heterogeneous countries. (2013). Weikard, Hans-Peter ; Winands, Sarah ; Holm-Muller, Karin.
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  11. Technology investment, bargaining, and international environmental agreements. (2012). Urpelainen, Johannes.
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  12. Financial Mechanism and Enforceability of International Environmental Agreements. (2012). Terai, Kimiko.
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  13. Regulating Biodiversity: What is the Problem?. (2012). Swanson, Timothy ; Groom, Ben.
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