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Climate Agreements in a Mitigation-Adaptation Game. (2016). Jacques, Jean-François ; Finus, Michael ; Bayramoglu, Basak.
In: Working Papers.
RePEc:fae:wpaper:2016.17.

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  1. Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements: Adaptation and Complementarity. (2018). Rubio, Santiago.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fem:femwpa:2018.29.

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References

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