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Recessions, Inequality, and Democratization. (2014). Maarek, Paul ; Dorsch, Michael.
In: THEMA Working Papers.
RePEc:ema:worpap:2014-19.

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  1. Income Shocks, Inequality, and Democracy. (2021). Sunde, Uwe ; Kotschy, Rainer.
    In: Munich Reprints in Economics.
    RePEc:lmu:muenar:75814.

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  2. A Note on Economic Inequality and Democratization. (2014). Maarek, Paul ; Dorsch, Michael ; Dorsch Michael T., ; Paul, Maarek .
    In: Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy.
    RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:20:y:2014:i:4:p:12:n:3.

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References

References cited by this document

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  23. Gini < t.p. Gini ≥ t.p. prob(transition) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) downturn t−1 0.0365 0.0958 -0.6220** 0.9001 -2.1001* 2.0485** (0.041) (0.065) (0.261) (0.621) (1.199) (0.848) inequality t−1 0.0048* 0.0047* -0.0006 0.0594* -0.0139 0.1319*** (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.030) (0.045) (0.048) downturn t−1 × inequality t−1 0.0146*** (0.005) N 377 248 248 248 211 146 54 45 125 Transitions 57 49 49 49 44 24 16 10 31 R 2 / pseudo-R 2 0.3283 0.3756 0.3833 0.4021 0.4178 0.3375 0.6460 0.6478 0.4060 FH iPolity2 control X X X X X X X X X Income control X X X X X X X X X Regime type control X X X X X X X X X Period fixed effect X X X X X X X X X Regional fixed effect X X X X X X X X X Notes: Standard errors have been clustered at the country level. The turning point market Gini coefficient is calculated from column (4) as 43.643349 for panel A and as 42.490436 for panel B. Table 5: Binary DV: Democratic transition. Fixed effects investigation.
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  24. Guinea-Biussau 1995 – 1999 1.439557 48.71349 36.20636 Senegal c 1985 – 1989 -1.1343487 49.10647 49.38421 Guyana 1990 – 1994 -0.43554313 . 42.40846 Senegal 2000 – 2004 1.8849026 42.14108 36.46976 Haiti 1995 – 1999 -9.3986487 53.92298 54.37456 Serbia and Montenegro 2000 – 2004 . 29.22845 .
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  35. Nigeria 1980 – 1984 -.80189548 51.04012 47.03493 Cape Verde 1990 – 1994 4.233563 40.11286 50.54889 Nigeria 2000 – 2004 0.12627181 49.59867 .
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  36. Not identified by Acemoglu et al. (2014) as a democratization.
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  37. Notes: All data was sourced from the Quality of Government database (Teorell, Charron, Dahlberg, Holberg, Rothstein, Sundin and Svensson, 2013).
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  38. Papaioannou, E. and Siourounis, G. (2008) Democratization and growth, The Economic Journal, 118, 1520–1551.

  39. Poland a 1990 – 1994 . 26.83595 30.29912 Ghana 1995 – 1999 1.2533877 36.91615 39.40947 Portugal 1975 – 1979 7.9580053 30.23566 30.60797 Greece 1975 – 1979 5.0700934 32.90662 32.34943 Romania a 1990 – 1994 -1.0767396 19.86865 27.58579 Guatemala 1985 – 1989 -2.6635406 46.71217 54.06861 Russia b 1995 – 1999 . 26.27164 .
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  43. Sierra Leone 2000 – 2004 -6.2664286 51.7655 43.75809 Honduras 1980 – 1984 4.254432 52.40306 52.13841 South Africa 1990 – 1995 -0.9598904 62.18617 59.73333 Hungary a 1990 – 1994 1.5580404 23.69318 30.25498 Spain 1975 – 1979 5.0518799 30.94354 30.4766 Indonesia 2000 – 2004 0.2761307 33.59033 36.02671 Suriname 1990 – 1994 -1.3545858 . 48.81926 Kenya 2000 – 2004 0.20270938 47.88778 46.10921 Taiwan 1990 – 1994 . 26.92656 28.49401 Korea, South 1985 – 1989 4.6233239 35.25042 30.91105 Tanzania c 2005 – 2009 3.8464447 34.50254 .
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  44. Solt (2009) http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fsolt/swiid/swiid.html gini market Continuous index variable, 0 – 100, where 0 corresponds to perfect income equality and 100 corresponds to perfect income inequality. A custom missingdata algorithm was used to standardize the United Nations Universitys World Income Inequality Database, with data collected by the Luxembourg Income Study serving as the standard. gini market is a measure of gross income inequality, before taxation and transfers by fiscal authorities. gini net Continuous index variable, 0 – 100, where 0 corresponds to perfect income equality and 100 corresponds to perfect income inequality. gini net is a measure of net income inequality, after taxation and transfers by fiscal authorities.
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  45. Solt, F. (2009) Standardising the world income inequality database, Social Science Quarterly, 90, 231–242. SWIID Version 4.0, September 2013.

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  49. Teorell, J., Charron, N., Dahlberg, S., Holberg, S., Rothstein, B., Sundin, P. and Svensson, R. (2013) The Quality of Government Dataset, version 20Dec13, The Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg.
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  50. World Bank (2013) http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators growth Continuous variable. Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency (inflation adjusted). GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy. downturn Binary variable constructed from growth. downturnt = 0 if growtht ≥ 0 and downturnt = 1 if growtht > 0.
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  51. World Bank (2013) World Development Indicators, The World Bank Group, Washington DC.
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