Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]
create a website
Incentive and Selection Effects of Medigap Insurance on Inpatient Care. (2012). Li Donni, Paolo ; Dardanoni, Valentino.
In: EIEF Working Papers Series.
RePEc:eie:wpaper:1203.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Cited: 18

Citations received by this document

Cites: 59

References cited by this document

Cocites: 50

Documents which have cited the same bibliography

Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Dynamic information asymmetry in micro health insurance: implications for sustainability. (2021). Yao, YI ; Chen, YI ; Zhang, Xiaoqi.
    In: The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice.
    RePEc:pal:gpprii:v:46:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1057_s41288-020-00200-8.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Latent class models for multiple ordered categorical health data: testing violation of the local independence assumption. (2020). Li Donni, Paolo ; Thomas, Ranjeeta.
    In: Empirical Economics.
    RePEc:spr:empeco:v:59:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s00181-019-01685-6.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Moral hazard effects of supplemental private health insurance in Korea. (2020). Ko, Hansoo.
    In: Social Science & Medicine.
    RePEc:eee:socmed:v:265:y:2020:i:c:s027795362030544x.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. The democratization process: An empirical appraisal of the role of political protest. (2020). Cellini, Marco ; Bavetta, Sebastiano ; Marino, Maria.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:63:y:2020:i:c:s017626802030029x.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. Impact of supplementary private health insurance on hospitalization and physical examination in China. (2020). Jiang, Yawen ; Ni, Weiyi.
    In: China Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:chieco:v:63:y:2020:i:c:s1043951x20301115.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. Determinants of Software Vulnerability Disclosure Timing. (2020). Kumar, Subodha ; Choobineh, Joobin ; Sen, Ravi .
    In: Production and Operations Management.
    RePEc:bla:popmgt:v:29:y:2020:i:11:p:2532-2552.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. Health Uninsurance in rural America: a partial equilibrium analysis. (2019). Nganje, William ; Addey, Kwame Asiam.
    In: Health Economics Review.
    RePEc:spr:hecrev:v:9:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1186_s13561-019-0234-x.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. Disentangling Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and Supply Induced Demand: An Empirical Analysis of The Demand For Healthcare Services. (2018). Holly, Alberto ; Atella, Vincenzo ; Mistretta, Alessandro.
    In: CEIS Research Paper.
    RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:389.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. Oral Health, Dental Insurance and Dental Service use in Australia. (2017). Chen, Gang ; Harris, Anthony ; Srivastava, Preety.
    In: Health Economics.
    RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:26:y:2017:i:1:p:35-53.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  10. Demand and Selection Effects in Supplemental Health Insurance in Germany. (2017). Schiller, Jorg ; Steinorth, Petra ; Lange, Renate .
    In: The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice.
    RePEc:pal:gpprii:v:42:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1057_s41288-016-0023-2.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. A Fisher-scoring algorithm for fitting latent class models with individual covariates. (2017). Forcina, Antonio.
    In: Econometrics and Statistics.
    RePEc:eee:ecosta:v:3:y:2017:i:c:p:132-140.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  12. Adverse selection, moral hazard and the demand for Medigap insurance. (2016). Stavrunova, Olena ; Keane, Michael.
    In: Journal of Econometrics.
    RePEc:eee:econom:v:190:y:2016:i:1:p:62-78.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  13. The welfare cost of unpriced heterogeneity in insurance markets. (2016). Dardanoni, Valentino ; Donni, Paolo.
    In: RAND Journal of Economics.
    RePEc:bla:randje:v:47:y:2016:i:4:p:998-1028.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  14. Risk Selection under Public Health Insurance with Opt-out. (2015). Panthöfer, Sebastian ; Panthofer, Sebastian .
    In: Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy.
    RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:113085.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  15. Empirical definition of social types in the analysis of inequality of opportunity: a latent classes approach. (2015). Rosa Dias, Pedro ; Rodríguez, Juan ; Li Donni, Paolo ; Rodriguez, Juan.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:44:y:2015:i:3:p:673-701.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  16. Demand and Selection Effects in Supplemental Health Insurance in Germany. (2015). Schiller, Joerg ; Lange, Renate ; Steinorth, Petra .
    In: SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research.
    RePEc:diw:diwsop:diw_sp757.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  17. Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and the Demand for Medigap Insurance. (2014). Stavrunova, Olena ; Keane, Michael.
    In: Economics Papers.
    RePEc:nuf:econwp:1402.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  18. Risk preference heterogeneity and multiple demand for insurance. (2014). Li Donni, Paolo.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:imp:wpaper:18674.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

References

References cited by this document

  1. Abbring, J. H., Chiappori, P.-A. and Pinquet, J. (2003). Moral hazard and dynamic insurance data. Journal of the European Economic Association 1: 767â820.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  2. Abbring, J. H., Chiappori, P.-A., Heckman, J. J. and Pinquet, J. (2003). Adverse selection and moral hazard in insurance: Can dynamic data help to distinguish? Journal of the European Economic Association 1: 512â521.

  3. Arnott, R. J. and Stiglitz, J. E. (1990). The basic analytics of moral hazard. NBER Working Papers 2484, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

  4. Arrow, K. J. (1963). Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. The American Economic Review 53: 941â973.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  5. Bartholomew, D. J. and Knott, M. (1999). Latent variable models and factor analysis: a uniïed approach. London:Arnold.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  6. Bergsma, W., Croon, M. and Hagenaars, J. A. (2009). Marginal models: For dependent, clustered, and longitudinal categorial data. Springer Verlag.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  7. Buchmueller, T. C., Couïnhal, A., Grignon, M. and Perronnin, M. (2004). Access to physician services: does supplemental insurance matter? evidence from france. Health Economics 13: 669â687.

  8. Cameron, A. C. and Trivedi, P. K. (1991). The role of income and health risk in the choice of health insurance: Evidence from australia. Journal of Public Economics 45: 1 â 28.

  9. Cameron, A. C., Trivedi, P. K., Milne, F. and Piggott, J. (1988). A microeconometric model of the demand for health care and health insurance in australia. The Review of Economic Studies 55: 85â106.

  10. Cameron, S. V. and Heckman, J. J. (1998). Life cycle schooling and dynamic selection bias: Models and evidence for ïve cohorts of american males. The Journal of Political Economy 106: 262â333.

  11. Cardon, J. H. and Hendel, I. (2001). Asymmetric information in health insurance: Evidence from the national medical expenditure survey. The RAND Journal of Economics 32: 408â427.

  12. Carlin, C. and Town, R. (2010). Adverse selection: The dog that didnât bite. Manuscript. University of Minnesota .
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  13. Chiappori, P.-A. and Salanie, B. (2000). Testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets. The Journal of Political Economy 108: 56â78.

  14. Chiappori, P.-A., Durand, F. and Geoïard, P.-Y. (1998). Moral hazard and the demand for physician services: First lessons from a french natural experiment. European Economic Review 42: 499â511.

  15. Chiappori, P.-A., Jullien, B., Salanie, B. and Salanie, F. (2006). Asymmetric information in insurance: General testable implications. The RAND Journal of Economics 37: 783â 798.

  16. Cohen, A. (2005). Asymmetric information and learning: Evidence from the automobile insurance market. Review of Economics and Statistics 87: 197â207.

  17. Cohen, A. and Spiegelman, P. (2010). Testing for adverse selection in insurance markets. Journal of Risk and Insurance 77: 39â84.

  18. Crocker, K. J. and Snow, A. (1986). The eïciency eïects of categorical discrimination in the insurance industry. Journal of Political Economy 94: pp. 321â344.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  19. Cutler, D. M., Finkelstein, A. and McGarry, K. (2008). Preference heterogeneity and insurance markets: explaining a puzzle of insurance. American Economic Review 98: INCENTIVE AND SELECTION EFFECTS OF MEDIGAP INSURANCE 28 157â162.

  20. De Meza, D. and Webb, D. C. (2001). Advantageous selection in insurance markets. The RAND Journal of Economics 32: 249â262.

  21. Deb, P. and Trivedi, P. K. (1997). Demand for medical care by the elderly: A ïnite mixture approach. Journal of Applied Econometrics 12: 313â336.

  22. Deb, P. and Trivedi, P. K. (2002). The structure of demand for health care: Latent class versus two-part models. Journal of Health Economics 21: 601â625.

  23. Dempster, A. P., Laird, N. M. and Rubin, D. B. (1977). Maximum likelihood from incomplete data via the em algorithm. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological) 39: 1â38.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  24. Eichner, M. J. (1998). The demand for medical care: What people pay does matter. The American Economic Review 88: 117â121.

  25. Einav, L. and Finkelstein, A. (2011). Selection in insurance markets: Theory and empirics in pictures. Journal of Economic Perspectives 25: 115â38.

  26. Einav, L., Finkelstein, A. and Cullen, M. R. (2010). Estimating welfare in insurance markets using variation in prices. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 125: 877â921(45).

  27. Einav, L., Finkelstein, A. and Levin, J. (2010). Beyond testing: Empirical models of insurance markets. Annual Review of Economics 2: 311â336.

  28. Einav, L., Ryan, S., Finkelstein, A., Schrimpf, P. and Cullen, M. (2011). Selection on moral hazard in health insurance. working paper .

  29. Ettner, S. L. (1997). Adverse selection and the purchase of Medigap insurance by the elderly. Journal of Health Economics 16: 543â562.

  30. Fang, H., Keane, M. P. and Silverman, D. (2008). Sources of advantageous selection: Evidence from the medigap insurance market. Journal of Political Economy 116: 303â 350.

  31. Finkelstein, A. and McGarry, K. (2006). Multiple dimensions of private information: Evidence from the long-term care insurance market. The American Economic Review 96: 938â958.

  32. Finkelstein, A. and Poterba, J. (2006). Testing for adverse selection with âunused observables â. Working Paper 12112, NBER.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  33. Forcina, A. (2008). Identiïability of extended latent class models with individual covariates. Computational Statistics and Data Analysis 52: 5263â5268.

  34. Goodman, L. A. (1974). Exploratory latent structure analysis using both identiïable and unidentiïable models. Biometrika 61: 215â231.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  35. Heckman, J. and Singer, B. (1984). A method for minimizing the impact of distributional assumptions in econometric models for duration data. Econometrica 52: 271â320.

  36. Hemenway, D. (1990). Propitious selection. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 105: 1063â1069.

  37. Holly, A., Gardiol, L., Domenighetti, G. and Bisig, B. (1998). An econometric model of health care utilization and health insurance in switzerland. European Economic Review 42: 513 â 522.

  38. Hoy, M. (1982). Categorizing risks in the insurance industry. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 97: 321â36.

  39. Huang, G.-H. and Bandeen-Roche, K. (2004). Building an identiïable latent class model with covariate eïects on underlying and measured variables. Psychometrika 69: 5â32.

  40. Hurd, M. D. and McGarry, K. (1997). Medical insurance and the use of health care services by the elderly. Journal of Health Economics 16: 129â154. INCENTIVE AND SELECTION EFFECTS OF MEDIGAP INSURANCE 29

  41. Jones, A. M., Koolman, X. and Van Doorslaer, E. (2007). The impact of supplementary private health insurance on the use of specialists in European countries. In Annales dâEconomie et de Statistiques, 83.

  42. Jong, R. M. de and Woutersen, T. (2011). Dynamic time series binary choice. Econometric Theory 27: 673â702.

  43. Joreskog, K. G. and Goldberger, A. S. (1975). Estimation of a model with multiple indicators and multiple causes of a single latent variable. Journal of the American Statistical Association 70: 631â639.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  44. Khandker, R. K. and McCormack, L. A. (1999). Medicare spending by beneïciaries with various types of supplemental insurance. Medical Care Research and Review 56: 137.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  45. Lustig, J. (2011). Measuring welfare losses from adverse selection and imperfect competition in privatized medicare. Manuscript. Boston University .
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  46. Matzkin, R. (2007). Nonparametric identiïcation. Handbook of Econometrics 6: 5307â 5368.

  47. McLachlan, G. J. and Peel, D. (2000). Finite Mixture Models. Wiley-Interscience.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  48. Monfardini, C. and Radice, R. (2008). Testing exogeneity in the bivariate probit model: A monte carlo study. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 70: 271â282.

  49. Olivella, P. and Vera-Hernandez, M. (2012). Testing for asymmetric information in private health insurance. The Economic Journal Forthcoming.

  50. Pauly, M. V. (1968). The economics of moral hazard: Comment. The American Economic Review 58: 531â537.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  51. Propper, C. (1993). Constrained choice sets in the u.k. demand for private medical insurance. Journal of Public Economics 51: 287 â 307.

  52. Rothschild, C. (2011). The eïciency of categorical discrimination in insurance markets. Journal of Risk and Insurance 78: 267â285.

  53. Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz, J. (1976). Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 90: 629â649.

  54. Schellhorn, M. (2001). The eïect of variable health insurance deductibles on the demand for physician visits. Health Economics 10: 441â456.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  55. Smart, M. (2000). Competitive insurance markets with two unobservables. International Economic Review 41: 153â69.

  56. Villeneuve, B. (2003). Concurrence et antiselection multidimensionnelle en assurance. Annales dâEconomie et de Statistique : 06.

  57. Wambach, A. (2000). Introducing heterogeneity in the rothschild-stiglitz model. The Journal of Risk and Insurance 67: 579â591.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  58. Wilde, J. (2000). Identiïcation of multiple equation probit models with endogenous dummy regressors. Economics Letters 69: 309 â 312.

  59. Zweifel, P. and Manning, W. G. (2000). Moral hazard and consumer incentives in health care. In Culyer, A. J. and Newhouse, J. P. (eds), Handbook of Health Economics. Elsevier, Handbook of Health Economics 1, chap. 8, 409â459.

Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Road safety for fleets of vehicles. (2021). Dionne, Georges ; Angers, Jean-Franois ; Desjardins, Denise.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ris:crcrmw:2021_003.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Testing for information asymmetry in the mortgage servicing market. (2019). Dionne, Georges ; Jedidi, Helmi.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ris:crcrmw:2019_001.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Selection bias and moral hazard in the Australian private health insurance market: Evidence from the Queensland skin cancer database. (2019). Graves, Nicholas ; Nghiem, Son.
    In: Economic Analysis and Policy.
    RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:64:y:2019:i:c:p:259-265.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. Moral Hazard and Advantageous Selection in Private Disability Insurance. (2018). Soika, Sebastian .
    In: The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice.
    RePEc:pal:gpprii:v:43:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1057_s41288-017-0055-2.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. On the road again: traffic fatalities and auto insurance minimums. (2018). Yakovlev, Pavel A ; Orr-Magulick, Christina M.
    In: Public Sector Economics.
    RePEc:ipf:psejou:v:42:y:2018:i:42:p:45-65.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. On the road again: traffic fatalities and auto insurance minimums. (2018). Yakovlev, Pavel A ; Orr-Magulick, Christina M.
    In: Public Sector Economics.
    RePEc:ipf:psejou:v:42:y:2018:i:1:p:45-65.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. The effects of access to health insurance: Evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Peru. (2017). Klein, Tobias ; Carpio, M A ; Lobato, Noelia Bernal.
    In: Other publications TiSEM.
    RePEc:tiu:tiutis:215d796f-09fd-4231-a02d-178555516525.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. Insurance and Insurance Markets. (2017). Dionne, Georges ; Harrington, Scott .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ris:crcrmw:2017_002.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. Effects of Insurance Incentives on Road Safety: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China. (2017). Dionne, Georges ; Liu, Ying.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ris:crcrmw:2017_001.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  10. The Moral Hazard issues of the State-Aid Programs for SME’s. (2017). Vas, Gyorgy.
    In: Volume of Management, Enterprise and Benchmarking in the 21st century IV.
    RePEc:pkk:meb017:453-460.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. Equilibrium in Insurance Markets: An Empiricist’s View. (2017). Salanie, Bernard.
    In: The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review.
    RePEc:pal:genrir:v:42:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1057_s10713-017-0019-2.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  12. Equilibrium in Insurance Markets: An Empiricist’s View. (2017). Salanié, Bernard ; Salanie, Bernard.
    In: The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory.
    RePEc:kap:geneva:v:42:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1057_s10713-017-0019-2.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  13. Why test the theory of incentives in a dynamic framework?. (2017). Chaudey, Magali.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:gat:wpaper:1733.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  14. Adverse Selection versus Moral Hazard in Financial Contracting: Evidence from collateralized and non-collateralized loans. (2017). Uchida, Hirofumi ; Hiromichi, Iwaki ; Iichiro, Uesugi ; Hirofumi, Uchida.
    In: Discussion papers.
    RePEc:eti:dpaper:17058.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  15. The effects of access to health insurance: Evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Peru. (2017). Klein, Tobias ; Carpio, Miguel ; Bernal, Noelia.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:154:y:2017:i:c:p:122-136.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  16. Decomposing Asymmetric Information in Chinas Automobile Insurance Market. (2017). Gao, Feng ; Wang, Jun ; Powers, Michael R.
    In: Journal of Risk & Insurance.
    RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:84:y:2017:i:4:p:1269-1293.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  17. Two Tests for Ex Ante Moral Hazard in a Market for Automobile Insurance. (2017). Rowell, David ; Connelly, Luke B ; Nghiem, Son.
    In: Journal of Risk & Insurance.
    RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:84:y:2017:i:4:p:1103-1126.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  18. Asymmetric Information in the Home Insurance Market. (2017). Aarbu, Karl Ove.
    In: Journal of Risk & Insurance.
    RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:84:y:2017:i:1:p:35-72.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  19. Liability Insurance and Choice of Cars: A Large Game Approach. (2015). Wolfstetter, Elmar ; Flm, Sjur Didrik.
    In: Journal of Public Economic Theory.
    RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:17:y:2015:i:6:p:943-963.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  20. “They do know what they are doing... at least most of them.†Asymmetric Information in the (private) Disability Insurance. (2013). Spindler, Martin.
    In: MEA discussion paper series.
    RePEc:mea:meawpa:201209.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  21. Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data. (2013). Finkelstein, Amy Nadya ; Chetty, Nadarajan .
    In: Scholarly Articles.
    RePEc:hrv:faseco:34330197.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  22. Do Insurance Companies Possess an Informational Monopoly? Empirical Evidence From Auto Insurance. (2013). Nini, Gregory P. ; Kofman, Paul .
    In: Journal of Risk & Insurance.
    RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:80:y:2013:i:4:p:1001-1026.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  23. Testing for asymmetric information in the viager market. (2012). visser, michael ; Linnemer, Laurent ; Fvrier, Philippe.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:96:y:2012:i:1:p:104-123.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  24. Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving: A Comparative Analysis with Dynamic Data. (2011). Pinquet, Jean ; Dionne, Georges ; Vanasse, Charles ; Maurice, Mathieu .
    In: The Review of Economics and Statistics.
    RePEc:tpr:restat:v:93:y:2011:i:1:p:218-227.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  25. Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard in Income Insurance. (2011). Ejrnæs, Mette ; Ejrnaes, Mette ; Hochguertel, Stefan.
    In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:tin:wpaper:20080065.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  26. Adverse selection and moral hazard among the poor: evidence from a randomized experiment. (2011). Spenkuch, Jörg ; Spenkch, Jorg L..
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:31443.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  27. A copula approach to test asymmetric information with applications to predictive modeling. (2011). Valdez, Emiliano ; Shi, Peng.
    In: Insurance: Mathematics and Economics.
    RePEc:eee:insuma:v:49:y:2011:i:2:p:226-239.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  28. Are Risk Preferences Stable across Contexts? Evidence from Insurance Data. (2011). Teitelbaum, Joshua ; Prince, Jeffrey ; Barseghyan, Levon.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:101:y:2011:i:2:p:591-631.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  29. Testing for Asymmetric Information in the Viager Market. (2010). visser, michael ; Linnemer, Laurent ; Philippe Fevrier ; Laurent Linnemer ; Michael Viss, .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:crs:wpaper:2010-01.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  30. Ex Post Moral Hazard and Bayesian Learning in Insurance. (2010). Ludkovski, Michael ; Young, Virginia R..
    In: Journal of Risk & Insurance.
    RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:77:y:2010:i:4:p:829-856.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  31. Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets. (2010). Siegelman, Peter ; Cohen, Alma.
    In: Journal of Risk & Insurance.
    RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:77:y:2010:i:1:p:39-84.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  32. THE DYNAMICS OF SELLER REPUTATION: EVIDENCE FROM EBAY -super-*. (2010). Cabral, Luis ; Ali Hortaçsu, ; LUÍS CABRAL, .
    In: Journal of Industrial Economics.
    RePEc:bla:jindec:v:58:y:2010:i:1:p:54-78.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  33. WHY IS THE TAKE-UP OF MICROINSURANCE SO LOW? EVIDENCE FROM A HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME IN INDIA. (2010). Kono, Hisaki ; Ito, Seiro.
    In: The Developing Economies.
    RePEc:bla:deveco:v:48:y:2010:i:1:p:74-101.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  34. Identification of Dynamic Discrete Choice Models. (2010). Abbring, Jaap.
    In: Annual Review of Economics.
    RePEc:anr:reveco:v:2:y:2010:p:367-394.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  35. Barriers to household risk management: evidence from India. (2009). Vickery, James ; Townsend, Robert ; Tobacman, Jeremy ; Topalova, Petia ; Gine, Xavier ; Cole, Shawn.
    In: Staff Reports.
    RePEc:fip:fednsr:373.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  36. Evidence of Asymmetric Information in the Automobile Insurance Market: Dichotomous Versus Multinomial Measurement of Insurance Coverage. (2009). Kim, Doyoung ; Hardin, James W..
    In: Journal of Risk & Insurance.
    RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:76:y:2009:i:2:p:343-366.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  37. Estimating Welfare in Insurance Markets Using Variation in Prices. (2008). Finkelstein, Amy ; Cullen, Mark ; Einav, Liran.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:sip:dpaper:08-006.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  38. Estimating Welfare in Insurance Markets Using Variation in Prices. (2008). Finkelstein, Amy ; Cullen, Mark R. ; Einav, Liran.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14414.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  39. An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Increasing Deductibles on Moral Hazard. (2008). Chung, Ching-Fan ; Tzeng, Larry Y. ; Wang, Jennifer L..
    In: Journal of Risk & Insurance.
    RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:75:y:2008:i:3:p:551-566.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  40. Patternsof rainfall insurance participation in rural India. (2007). Vickery, James ; Townsend, Robert ; Gine, Xavier.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4408.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  41. The Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market. (2007). Finkelstein, Amy ; Schrimpf, Paul ; Einav, Liran.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13228.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  42. Point-record incentives, asymmetric information and dynamic data. (2007). Pinquet, Jean ; Dionne, Georges ; Vanasse, Charles ; Maurice, Mathieu .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00243056.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  43. Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice. (2007). Cohen, Alma ; Einav, Liran.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:97:y:2007:i:3:p:745-788.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  44. Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market. (2006). Silverman, Dan ; Keane, Michael ; Fang, Hanming.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12289.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  45. Testing for Asymmetric Information Using Unused Observables in Insurance Markets: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market. (2006). Poterba, James ; Finkelstein, Amy.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12112.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  46. Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market. (2006). Silverman, Dan ; Keane, Michael ; Fang, Hanming.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ecl:yaleco:17.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  47. Threat of Dismissal: Incentive or Sorting?. (2005). Kwon, Illoong.
    In: Journal of Labor Economics.
    RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:23:y:2005:i:4:p:797-838.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  48. Adverse selection in disability insurance; empirical evidence for Dutch firms. (2005). Deelen, Anja.
    In: CPB Discussion Paper.
    RePEc:cpb:discus:46.rdf.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  49. Trust and Reputation on eBay: Micro and Macro Perspectives. (2005). Hortacsu, Ali.
    In: Department of Economics, Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt8vj7d50q.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  50. The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay. (2004). Hortacsu, Ali ; Cabral, Luis.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10363.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Coauthors

Authors registered in RePEc who have wrote about the same topic

Report date: 2024-12-15 07:43:18 || Missing content? Let us know

CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Sponsored by INOMICS. Last updated October, 6 2023. Contact: CitEc Team.