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The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors. (2010). Pouyet, Jerome ; MARTIMORT, David ; Hiriart, Yolande.
In: Journal of Public Economics.
RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:94:y:2010:i:11-12:p:1008-1019.

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Cited: 33

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Cites: 44

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  1. Price Authority and Information Sharing with Competing Principals. (2022). Neven, Damien ; Piccolo, Salvatore ; Andreu, Enrique.
    In: IHEID Working Papers.
    RePEc:gii:giihei:heidwp29-2022.

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  2. Frequent audits and honest audits. (2022). Bizzotto, Jacopo ; de Chiara, Alessandro.
    In: UB School of Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:ewp:wpaper:417web.

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  3. Corruption, regulation, and investment incentives. (2022). Manna, Ester ; de Chiara, Alessandro.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:142:y:2022:i:c:s0014292121002798.

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  4. Corruption and the case for safe-harbor regulation. (2022). Manna, Ester ; de Chiara, Alessandro.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:216:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522001537.

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  5. When is duplication of effort a good thing in law enforcement?. (2022). Liu, Zhiyong ; Wang, Zhewei ; Yin, Zhendong.
    In: Journal of Public Economic Theory.
    RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:24:y:2022:i:4:p:682-708.

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  6. A dynamic theory of regulatory capture. (2021). Schwarz, Marco ; de Chiara, Alessandro.
    In: UB School of Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:ewp:wpaper:410web.

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  7. A Dynamic Theory of Regulatory Capture. (2021). Schwarz, Marco ; de Chiara, Alessandro.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8968.

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  8. Innovation, information, lobby and tort law under uncertainty.. (2020). Orset, Caroline ; Jacob, Julien.
    In: Working Papers of BETA.
    RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2020-25.

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  9. A Dynamic Theory of Regulatory Capture. (2020). Schwarz, Marco ; De Chiara, Alessandro.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:inn:wpaper:2020-12.

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  10. Collusion, extortion and the government’s organizational structure. (2020). Yin, Zhendong ; Hong, Fuhai.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:180:y:2020:i:c:p:1-23.

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  11. Tradable climate liabilities: A thought experiment. (2019). Billette de Villemeur, Etienne ; Leroux, Justin.
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02504760.

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  12. The Rise of NGO Activism. (2019). Rochet, Jean ; Daubanes, Julien.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fae:wpaper:2019.01.

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  13. Tradable Climate Liabilities: A Thought Experiment. (2018). Leroux, Justin ; Billette de Villemeur, Etienne.
    In: CIRANO Working Papers.
    RePEc:cir:cirwor:2018s-43.

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  14. The threat of corruption and the optimal supervisory task. (2017). Livio, Luca ; De Chiara, Alessandro.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:133:y:2017:i:c:p:172-186.

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  15. A liability approach to climate policy: A thought experiment. (2016). Leroux, Justin ; Billette de Villemeur, Etienne.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:75497.

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  16. Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence. (2016). Attanasi, Giuseppe ; Angelova, Vera ; Hiriart, Yolande.
    In: SFB 649 Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2016-028.

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  17. Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments. (2016). Schmitz, Patrick ; Goldlücke, Susanne ; Goldlucke, Susanne.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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  18. The Threat of Corruption and the Optimal Supervisory Task. (2015). Livio, Luca ; De Chiara, Alessandro.
    In: Working Papers ECARES.
    RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/219175.

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  19. Track-and-Trade: A liability approach to climate policy. (2015). Leroux, Justin ; Billette de Villemeur, Etienne.
    In: CIRANO Working Papers.
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  20. Regulatory Impact Assessment in Mexico: A Story of Interest Groups Pressure. (2015). Emma, Sottilotta Cecilia ; Alessandro, Romano ; Renny, Reyes .
    In: The Law and Development Review.
    RePEc:bpj:lawdev:v:8:y:2015:i:1:p:99-121:n:2.

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  21. Liability as a complement to environmental regulation: an empirical study of the French legal system. (2014). Bentata, Pierre.
    In: Environmental Economics and Policy Studies.
    RePEc:spr:envpol:v:16:y:2014:i:3:p:201-228.

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  22. Relative performance of liability rules: experimental evidence. (2014). Attanasi, Giuseppe ; Angelova, Vera ; Hiriart, Yolande ; Armantier, Olivier.
    In: Theory and Decision.
    RePEc:kap:theord:v:77:y:2014:i:4:p:531-556.

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  23. Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence. (2013). Attanasi, Giuseppe ; Angelova, Vera ; Hiriart, Yolande ; Armantier, Olivier.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:crb:wpaper:2013-03.

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  24. Environmental Regulation and Civil Liability Under Causal Uncertainty: An Empirical Study of the French Legal System. (2013). Bentata, Pierre.
    In: Review of Law & Economics.
    RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:9:y:2013:i:2:p:239-263:n:1.

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  25. Moral Hazard in Hierarchies and Soft Information. (2012). Russo, Antonio ; Angelucci, Charles.
    In: TSE Working Papers.
    RePEc:tse:wpaper:26384.

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  26. Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence. (2012). Attanasi, Giuseppe ; Angelova, Vera.
    In: TSE Working Papers.
    RePEc:tse:wpaper:25820.

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  27. Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence. (2012). Attanasi, Giuseppe ; Angelova, Vera ; Hiriart, Yolande.
    In: LERNA Working Papers.
    RePEc:ler:wpaper:25818.

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  28. Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence. (2012). Attanasi, Giuseppe ; Angelova, Vera ; Hiriart, Yolande.
    In: Jena Economics Research Papers.
    RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-012.

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  29. Truthful Reporting, Moral Hazard and Purely Soft Information. (2012). Livio, Luca ; De Chiara, Alessandro.
    In: Working Papers ECARES.
    RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/126622.

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  30. Environmental Liability and Regulation: An Empirical Study of the French Institutional Division of Labour. (2012). Bentata, Pierre ; Barkat, Karim.
    In: CAE Working Papers.
    RePEc:cgm:wpaper:98.

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  31. ¿CUÁL ES EL COSTO DE LA CONTAMINACIÓN AMBIENTAL MINERASOBRE LOS RECURSOS HÍDRICOS EN EL PERÚ?: COMENTARIOS. (2011). Vásquez Cordano, Arturo ; Garcia Carpio, Raul ; Dammert, Alfredo ; Ortiz, Humberto ; Ruiz, Erix ; Vasquez, Arturo ; Zurita, Victor .
    In: Documentos de Trabajo / Working Papers.
    RePEc:pcp:pucwps:wp00326.

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  32. ¿CUÁL ES EL COSTO DE LA CONTAMINACIÓN AMBIENTAL MINERA SOBRE LOS RECURSOS HÍDRICOS EN EL PERÚ?. (2011). HERRERA CATALAN, PEDRO ; Millones, Oscar.
    In: Documentos de Trabajo / Working Papers.
    RePEc:pcp:pucwps:wp00321.

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  33. The Benefits of Extended Liability. (2005). MARTIMORT, David.
    In: IDEI Working Papers.
    RePEc:ide:wpaper:560.

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  47. Real Investment Decisions Under Information Constraints. (1995). Gaudet, Gérard.
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  49. Research Joint Ventures and Optimal R&D Policy with Asymmetric Information. (1994). Cassiman, Bruno.
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