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The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics. (2008). Semenov, Aggey ; MARTIMORT, David.
In: Journal of Public Economics.
RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:7:p:1541-1563.

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Cited: 22

Citations received by this document

Cites: 52

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Cocites: 50

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Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Optimal contingent delegation. (2023). Weng, Xi ; Hu, JU ; Gan, Tan.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:208:y:2023:i:c:s0022053122001879.

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  2. Delegating to Multiple Agents. (2023). Shin, Suho ; Rezaei, Keivan ; Hajiaghayi, Mohammadtaghi.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2305.03203.

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  3. Bilateral Contracts and Social Welfare. (2022). Hitzig, Zoe ; Niswonger, Benjamin.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2203.01233.

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  4. Self‐managed work teams: An efficiency‐rationale for pay compression. (2020). Möller, Marc ; Moller, Marc ; Adrian, Nana.
    In: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
    RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:29:y:2020:i:2:p:315-334.

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  5. Continuous decisions by a committee: Median versus average mechanisms. (2015). Rosar, Frank .
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:159:y:2015:i:pa:p:15-65.

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  6. OPTIMAL ARBITRATION. (2013). Zapechelnyuk, Andriy ; Mylovanov, Tymofiy.
    In: International Economic Review.
    RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:54:y:2013:i:3:p:769-785.

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  7. Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games. (2013). Piaser, Gwenael ; campioni, eloisa ; attar, andrea.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:49:y:2013:i:1:p:62-70.

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  8. Eliciting information from a committee. (2013). Zapechelnyuk, Andriy.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:5:p:2049-2067.

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  9. Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information. (2013). McGee, Andrew ; Yang, Huanxing .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:79:y:2013:i:c:p:181-191.

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  10. Decision rules revealing commonly known events. (2013). Zapechelnyuk, Andriy ; Mylovanov, Tymofiy.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:119:y:2013:i:1:p:8-10.

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  11. Eliciting Information from a Committee. (2012). Zapechelnyuk, Andriy.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp692.

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  12. Eliciting Information from a Committee. (2012). Zapechelnyuk, Andriy.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:692.

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  13. Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions. (2012). MARTIMORT, David ; Koessler, Frederic.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:5:p:1850-1881.

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  14. Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games. (2011). Piaser, Gwenael ; campioni, eloisa ; attar, andrea.
    In: CEIS Research Paper.
    RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:205.

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  15. Coordination and the provision of incentives to a common regulated firm. (2011). Burnett, Johann Caro ; Carrasco, Vinicius.
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:5:p:606-627.

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  16. Decision Rules for Experts with Opposing Interests. (2010). Zapechelnyuk, Andriy ; Mylovanov, Tymofiy.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp674.

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  17. Decision Rules for Experts with Opposing Interests. (2010). Zapechelnyuk, Andriy ; Mylovanov, Tymofiy.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:674.

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  18. Competencia e incentivos a la cooperación en la interacción de grupos de interés que pretenden aumentar su influencia política directa: ¿cuál es la importancia de la presión política?. (2010). Prado-Dominguez, A. Javier ; Lorenzo, Antonio Garcia ; Javier A. Prado Dominguez, .
    In: Hacienda Pública Española.
    RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2010:v:192:i:4:p:102-105.

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  19. CPB and Dutch fiscal policy in view of the financial crisis and ageing. (2010). Westra, Paul.
    In: CPB Document.
    RePEc:cpb:docmnt:218.rdf.

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  20. Communication for Public Goods. (2008). Kawamura, Kohei .
    In: SIRE Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:edn:sirdps:38.

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  21. Communication for Public Goods. (2008). Kawamura, Kohei .
    In: ESE Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:edn:esedps:182.

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  22. Bureaucratic Advice and Political Governance. (2008). Boadway, Robin ; Sato, Motohiro.
    In: Journal of Public Economic Theory.
    RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:10:y:2008:i:4:p:503-527.

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  2. Non-Exclusive Financial Advice. (2015). Vasconcelos, Luis ; Puopolo, Giovanni ; Piccolo, Salvatore.
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  3. Expert advising under checks and balances. (2014). Li, Tao.
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  11. The expert problem: a survey. (2013). Valsecchi, Irene.
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  13. Optimal limited authority for principal. (2013). Li, Hao ; Kolotilin, Anton.
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  15. Legislative committees as information intermediaries: A unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules. (2013). Azevedo, Eduardo ; Ambrus, Attila ; Takagi, Yuki ; Kamada, Yuichiro.
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  49. Relational Delegation. (2005). Alonso, Ricardo ; Matouschek, Niko .
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