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Socio-political conflict, social distance, and rent extraction in historical perspective. (2010). Thaize Challier, M.-Christine, .
In: European Journal of Political Economy.
RePEc:eee:poleco:v:26:y:2010:i:1:p:51-67.

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  1. The Great Divergence Revisited: Industrialization, Inequality and Political Conflict in the Unified Growth Model. (2015). Yarkin, Alexander ; Veselov, Dmitry.
    In: HSE Working papers.
    RePEc:hig:wpaper:118/ec/2015.

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  2. Does inequality lead to civil wars? A global long-term study using anthropometric indicators (1816–1999). (2013). Baten, Joerg ; Mumme, Christina .
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:32:y:2013:i:c:p:56-79.

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  44. Dynamic Enfranchisement. (2003). Lagunoff, Roger ; Jack, William.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000030.

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  45. Distributional Disputes and Civil Conflict. (2003). Grossman, Herschel.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-14.

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  46. ...and six hundred thousand men were dead. (2003). Grossman, Herschel.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-13.

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  47. The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque Country. (2003). Gardeazabal, Javier ; Abadie, Alberto.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:1:p:113-132.

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  48. Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights. (2002). Sonin, Konstantin.
    In: William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series.
    RePEc:wdi:papers:2003-544.

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  49. Boondoogles and expropriation : rent-sseking and policy distortion when property rights are insecure. (2002). Knack, Stephen ; Keefer, Philip.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2910.

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  50. The Role of Freedom, Growth and Religion in the Taste for Revolution. (2002). Pezzini, Silvia ; MacCulloch, Robert.
    In: STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cep:stidep:36.

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