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The impact of court errors on liability sharing and safety regulation for environmental/industrial accidents. (2011). porrini, donatella ; Boyer, Marcel.
In: International Review of Law and Economics.
RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:31:y:2011:i:1:p:21-29.

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Cited: 6

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Cites: 45

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Cocites: 26

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Coauthors: 0

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Citations

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  1. Tort reform and contingent incomplete liability. (2023). Wagner, Jeffrey ; Stranlund, John.
    In: Economics Bulletin.
    RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-23-00314.

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  2. Individual or Enterprise Liability? The Roles of Sanctions and Liability Under Contractible and Non-contractible Safety Efforts. (2020). Sverre, Grepperud.
    In: Review of Law & Economics.
    RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:16:y:2020:i:3:p:28:n:1.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Controlling Product Risks when Consumers Are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability versus Minimum-Quality-Standard Regulation. (2016). Grajzl, Peter ; Baniak, Andrzej.
    In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE).
    RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201606)172:2_274:cprwca_2.0.tx_2-h.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. A Comparative Study on Environment Credit Risk Management of Commercial Banks in the Asia‐Pacific Region. (2015). Wei, LI ; Mengze, HU.
    In: Business Strategy and the Environment.
    RePEc:bla:bstrat:v:24:y:2015:i:3:p:159-174.

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  5. Liability as a complement to environmental regulation: an empirical study of the French legal system. (2014). Bentata, Pierre.
    In: Environmental Economics and Policy Studies.
    RePEc:spr:envpol:v:16:y:2014:i:3:p:201-228.

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  6. Controlling Product Risks when Consumers are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability vs. Minimum Quality Standard Regulation. (2014). Grajzl, Peter ; Baniak, Andrzej.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5003.

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References

References cited by this document

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Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Individual or Enterprise Liability? The Roles of Sanctions and Liability Under Contractible and Non-contractible Safety Efforts. (2020). Sverre, Grepperud.
    In: Review of Law & Economics.
    RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:16:y:2020:i:3:p:28:n:1.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. The Complementary Role of Liability and Safety Regulation. (2019). Tabbach, Avraham D ; DAntoni, Massimo .
    In: American Law and Economics Review.
    RePEc:oup:amlawe:v:21:y:2019:i:1:p:150-183..

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  3. Managing Satellite Debris in Low-Earth Orbit: Incentivizing Ex Ante Satellite Quality and Ex Post Take-Back Programs. (2019). Wagner, Jeffrey ; Grzelka, Zachary.
    In: Environmental & Resource Economics.
    RePEc:kap:enreec:v:74:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s10640-019-00320-3.

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  4. Economic Motivations for Software Bug Bounties. (2018). Sprague, Christopher ; Wagner, Jeffrey.
    In: Economics Bulletin.
    RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-01024.

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  5. Joint Use of Liability and Regulation in Environmental Law. (2017). Michel, Stephan ; Zannini, Ugo ; Romano, Alessandro.
    In: ILE Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:zbw:ilewps:5.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. Controlling Product Risks when Consumers Are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability versus Minimum-Quality-Standard Regulation. (2016). Grajzl, Peter ; Baniak, Andrzej.
    In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE).
    RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201606)172:2_274:cprwca_2.0.tx_2-h.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. Regulations to Supplement Weak Environmental Liability. (2016). Paul, Calcott .
    In: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy.
    RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:16:y:2016:i:4:p:14:n:7.

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  8. Optimal Damages Multipliers in Oligopolistic Markets. (2015). Friehe, Tim ; Baumann, Florian.
    In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE).
    RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201512)171:4_622:odmiom_2.0.tx_2-h.

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  9. On the political economy of public safety investments. (2015). LANGLAIS, Eric ; Friehe, Tim.
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:41:y:2015:i:c:p:7-16.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  10. Liability as a complement to environmental regulation: an empirical study of the French legal system. (2014). Bentata, Pierre.
    In: Environmental Economics and Policy Studies.
    RePEc:spr:envpol:v:16:y:2014:i:3:p:201-228.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. The reasonable person standard: trading off static and dynamic efficiency. (2014). Friehe, Tim ; Endres, Alfred.
    In: European Journal of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:37:y:2014:i:2:p:249-267.

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  12. On the Political Economy of Public Safety Investments. (2014). Langlais, Eric ; Friehe, Tim.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04141360.

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  13. On the Political Economy of Public Safety Investments. (2014). LANGLAIS, Eric ; Friehe, Tim.
    In: EconomiX Working Papers.
    RePEc:drm:wpaper:2014-8.

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  14. Controlling Product Risks when Consumers are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability vs. Minimum Quality Standard Regulation. (2014). Grajzl, Peter ; Baniak, Andrzej.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5003.

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  15. Environmental Regulation and Civil Liability Under Causal Uncertainty: An Empirical Study of the French Legal System. (2013). Bentata, Pierre.
    In: Review of Law & Economics.
    RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:9:y:2013:i:2:p:239-263:n:1.

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  16. Optimal damages multipliers in oligopolistic markets. (2012). Friehe, Tim ; Baumann, Florian.
    In: DICE Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:dicedp:80.

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  17. Standards and Incentives under Moral Hazard with Limited Liability. (2012). Reinshagen, Felix .
    In: Discussion Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:lmu:muenec:12750.

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  18. Optimal Damages Multipliers in Oligopolistic Markets. (2012). Friehe, Tim ; Baumann, Florian.
    In: Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
    RePEc:knz:dpteco:1208.

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  19. Environmental Liability and Regulation: An Empirical Study of the French Institutional Division of Labour. (2012). Bentata, Pierre ; Barkat, Karim.
    In: CAE Working Papers.
    RePEc:cgm:wpaper:98.

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  20. Standards and Incentives in Safety Regulation. (2011). Reinshagen, Felix .
    In: Munich Dissertations in Economics.
    RePEc:lmu:dissen:13430.

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  21. The impact of court errors on liability sharing and safety regulation for environmental/industrial accidents. (2011). porrini, donatella ; Boyer, Marcel.
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:31:y:2011:i:1:p:21-29.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  22. Optimal Liability Sharing and Court Errors : An Exploratory Analysis. (2010). porrini, donatella ; Boyer, Marcel.
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
    RePEc:mtl:montec:05-2010.

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  23. Optimal liability sharing and court errors: an exploratory analysis. (2010). porrini, donatella ; Boyer, Marcel.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00463913.

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  24. Optimal Liability Sharing and Court Errors: An Exploratory Analysis. (2010). porrini, donatella ; Boyer, Marcel.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3073.

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  25. Industry self-regulation, subversion of public institutions, and social control of torts. (2009). Grajzl, Peter ; Baniak, Andrzej.
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:29:y:2009:i:4:p:360-374.

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  26. The joint use of regulation and strict liability with multidimensional care and uncertain conviction. (2008). Wagner, Jeffrey ; Bhole, Bharat.
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:28:y:2008:i:2:p:123-132.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

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