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The Future of the Euro: A Public Choice Approach. (2004). Vaubel, Roland.
In: Cato Journal.
RePEc:cto:journl:v:24:y:2004:i:1:p:151-161.

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  1. Die Europäische Währungsunion aus traditioneller und moderner ordnungsökonomischer Perspektive. (2018). Nientiedt, Daniel ; Köhler, Ekkehard ; Feld, Lars ; Ekkehard, Kohler ; Lars, Feld ; Daniel, Nientiedt.
    In: ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft.
    RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:69:y:2018:i:1:p:65-84:n:6.

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  2. Fundamental Flaws in the Architecture of the European Central Bank: The Possible End of the Euro Zone and its Effects to East African Community (EAC) Countries. (2014). Moyo, Nothando .
    In: Eurasian Journal of Economics and Finance.
    RePEc:ejn:ejefjr:v:2:y:2014:i:2:p:21-33.

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  3. The Euro and the German Veto. (2010). Vaubel, Roland.
    In: Econ Journal Watch.
    RePEc:ejw:journl:v:7:y:2010:i:1:p:82-90.

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  4. Freiheit in Deutschland: Wettbewerb der Staaten, Einfluss der Kirche, amerikanisches Erbe – Versuch einer historischen Erklärung – / Freedom in Germany: Interjurisdictional Competition, the Influ. (2010). Vaubel, Roland ; Roland, Vaubel .
    In: ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft.
    RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:61:y:2010:i:1:p:53-74:n:6.

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  5. The fiscal stability impact of monetary unions - looking beneath the Stability Pact debate. (2004). Paulus, Philipp .
    In: Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:kln:owiwdp:dp_05_2004.

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References

References cited by this document

  1. (1990) “Currency Competition and Monetary Union.” Economic Journal 100: 936–46.
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  2. (1997) “The Bureaucratic and Partisan Behavior of Independent Central Banks: German and International Evidence.” European Journal of Political Economy 13: 201–24.
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  3. (2003a) “The Future of the Euro: A Public Choice Perspective.” In F. H. Capie and G. E. Wood (eds.) Monetary Unions: Theory, History, Public Choice, 146–81. London: Routledge.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  4. (2003b) “Die Ursachen der Euro-Schwäche 1999–2001.” In J. Ahrens and R. Ohr (eds.) Zehn Jahre Vertrag von Maastricht, 47–56. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
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  5. Feist, H. (2001) “The Enlargement of the European Union and the Redistribution of Seigniorage Wealth.” Kyklos 54: 533–46. The real exchange rate (q) is defined as the nominal exchange rate (e) multiplied by the ratio of the two price levels (PE and P*). Taking rates of change we obtain ⌬% q ≡ ⌬% e − ⌬;%PE + ⌬%P*. With a large equilibrium real appreciation (i.e., a highly negative ⌬% q) and a given low inflation average in the three “best” member states (⌬% PE ), the East European countries cannot permanently keep both their nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro and their price level stable.
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  6. Hayo, B. (1998) “Inflation Culture, Central Bank Independence and Price Stability.” European Journal of Political Economy 14: 241–63.

  7. McGregor, R. R. (1996) “FOMC Voting Behavior and Electoral Cycles: Partisan Ideology and Partisan Loyalty.” Economics and Politics 8: 17–32.

  8. Roesl, G. (2003) “Die Umverteilung der Eurosystem-Geldschöpfungsgewinne seit Anfang 2002.” Wirtschaftsdienst 82 (6): 352–56.
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  9. Rogoff, K. (1985) “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 100: 1169–89.

  10. Since monetary expansion affects the nominal exchange rate immediately and the price level with a lag of two years, the East European countries can meet both the inflation and the exchange rate criterion for two years by first attaining inflation parity with the three best eurozone countries and then preventing the currency from appreciating vis-à-vis the euro by means of an expansionary monetary policy. The inflationary effects of the expansionary monetary policy will hardly be felt during the two-year test period. Moreover, it is not clear whether the exchange rate criterion still refers to the narrow 2.25 percent band of 1991 or to the wide 15 percent band introduced in August 1993.
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  11. Vaubel, R. (1978) “Real Exchange Rate Changes in the European Community: A New Approach to the Determination of Optimum Currency Areas.” Journal of International Economics 8: 319–39.

  12. Williamson, J. (1985) “International Agencies and the Peacock Critique.” In D. Greenaway and G. K. Shaw (eds.). Public Choice, Public Finance and Public Policy, 167–75. Oxford: Blackwell. A PUBLIC CHOICE APPROACH
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  2. The Credibility of Monetary Policy Announcements - Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1960s. (2012). schneider, friedrich ; Keil, Jonas ; Freytag, Andreas ; Belke, Ansgar.
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  5. The Credibility of Monetary Policy Announcements: Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1960s. (2012). schneider, friedrich ; Keil, Jonas ; Freytag, Andreas ; Belke, Ansgar.
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  8. Duisenberg and Trichet : Measures of their Degree of Conservatism. (2010). Pépin, Dominique ; Pepin, Dominique ; Diouf, Ibrahima .
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  11. Independent agencies: more than a cheap copy of independent central banks?. (2009). Quintyn, Marc.
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  12. On the determinants of Central Bank independence in open economies. (2009). Pistoresi, Barbara ; D'Amato, Marcello ; Salsano, Francesco.
    In: International Journal of Finance & Economics.
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  13. Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?. (2009). Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; Hellstrom, Jorgen ; Landstrom, Mats .
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  15. Intergenerational Transmission of Inflation Aversion: Theory and Evidence. (2008). .
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    In: Cato Journal.
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