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Information Design: A Unified Perspective. (2017). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2075r.

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Cited: 17

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  1. Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure. (2022). Teneketzis, Demosthenis ; Farhadi, Farzaneh.
    In: Dynamic Games and Applications.
    RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:12:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s13235-021-00392-1.

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  2. Persuading Customers to Buy Early: The Value of Personalized Information Provisioning. (2021). Jain, Shobhit ; Drakopoulos, Kimon ; Randhawa, Ramandeep.
    In: Management Science.
    RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:67:y:2021:i:2:p:828-853.

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  3. Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection. (2021). Fuchs, William ; Green, Brett ; Asriyan, Vladimir.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:191:y:2021:i:c:s0022053120301174.

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  4. Regime change games with an active defender. (2021). Schottmuller, Christoph ; Jann, Ole.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:129:y:2021:i:c:p:96-113.

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  5. Framing, Information, and Welfare. (2020). Martin, Daniel ; Caplin, Andrew.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27265.

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  6. Dynamic interventions and informational linkages. (2020). Cong, Lin William ; Hu, Yunzhi ; Grenadier, Steven R.
    In: Journal of Financial Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:135:y:2020:i:1:p:1-15.

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  7. Why Echo Chambers are Useful. (2019). Schottmuller, Christoph.
    In: Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy.
    RePEc:zbw:vfsc19:203517.

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  8. Regulating a model. (2019). Yilmaz, Bilge ; Leitner, Yaron.
    In: Journal of Financial Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:131:y:2019:i:2:p:251-268.

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  9. Persuasion with limited communication capacity. (2019). Tomala, Tristan ; le Treust, Mael.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:184:y:2019:i:c:s0022053118305064.

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  10. Efficient real-time routing for autonomous vehicles through Bayes correlated equilibrium: An information design framework. (2019). Whinston, Andrew B ; Liu, Yixuan.
    In: Information Economics and Policy.
    RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:47:y:2019:i:c:p:14-26.

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  11. Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Large Elections. (2019). Lauermann, Stephan ; Heese, Carl.
    In: CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2019_128.

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  12. Identifying the effect of persuasion. (2018). Lee, Sokbae (Simon) ; Jun, Sung Jae.
    In: CeMMAP working papers.
    RePEc:ifs:cemmap:19/18.

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  13. Stress tests and information disclosure. (2018). Goldstein, Itay ; Leitner, Yaron.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:177:y:2018:i:c:p:34-69.

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  14. Information design and capital formation. (2018). Sublet, Guillaume ; Rostek, Marzena ; Carvajal, Andres.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:176:y:2018:i:c:p:255-292.

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  15. Identifying the Effect of Persuasion. (2018). Lee, Sokbae (Simon) ; Jun, Sung Jae.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:1812.02276.

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  16. Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness. (2017). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:744-759.

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  17. An Economic Model of the Evolution of Food Retail and Supply Chains from Traditional Shops to Supermarkets to e-Commerce. (2017). Reardon, Thomas ; Lu, Liang.
    In: 2018 Allied Social Sciences Association (ASSA) Annual Meeting, January 5-7, 2018, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
    RePEc:ags:assa18:266301.

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