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Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?. (2002). Acharya, Viral.
In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3253.

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Cites: 38

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Cocites: 50

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  1. How to reach all Basel requirements at the same time?. (2017). Durant, Dominique ; Dietsch, Michel ; Birn, M.
    In: Débats économiques et financiers.
    RePEc:bfr:decfin:28.

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  2. Regole di Basilea e modelli di vigilanza: quale convergenza? (Basel rules and supervisory models: What convergence?). (2013). Montanaro, Elisabetta .
    In: Moneta e Credito.
    RePEc:psl:moneta:2013:43.

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  3. Capital Regulation and Tail Risk. (2011). Vlahu, Razvan ; Ratnovski, Lev ; Perotti, Enrico.
    In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:tin:wpaper:20110039.

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  4. Regulation of Multinational banks: A Theoretical Inquiry. (2004). Calzolari, Giacomo ; Loranth, Gyongyi.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4232.

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  5. Multinational Bank Regulation with Deposit Insurance and Diversification Effects. (2003). Morrison, Alan ; Loranth, Gyongyi.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4148.

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References

References cited by this document

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