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Intermediated Asymmetric Information, Compensation, and Career Prospects. (2020). Kaniel, Ron ; Orlov, Dmitry.
In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14586.

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Cited: 3

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Cites: 30

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Cocites: 24

Documents which have cited the same bibliography

Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Financing breakthroughs under failure risk. (2022). Mayer, Simon.
    In: Journal of Financial Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:144:y:2022:i:3:p:807-848.

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  2. A dynamic theory of bank lending, firm entry, and investment fluctuations. (2022). Hu, Yunzhi.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:204:y:2022:i:c:s0022053122001053.

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  3. A Theory of Zombie Lending. (2021). Varas, Felipe ; Hu, Yunzhi.
    In: Journal of Finance.
    RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:76:y:2021:i:4:p:1813-1867.

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References

References cited by this document

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  10. Intermediated Asymmetric Information, Compensation, and Career Prospects. (2020). Kaniel, Ron ; Orlov, Dmitry.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14586.

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  11. Monitor Reputation and Transparency. (2019). Szydlowski, Martin ; Marinovic, Ivan.
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  13. Experimentation with reputation concerns – Dynamic signalling with changing types. (2019). Thomas, Caroline.
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  14. Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation. (2019). Suen, Wing ; Ishida, Junichiro ; Chen, Chia-Hui.
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Authors registered in RePEc who have wrote about the same topic

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