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Immediate Demand Reduction in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions (new title: Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions: a uniqueness result). (2004). Wolfstetter, Elmar ; Riedel, Frank.
In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1315.

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Cites: 10

References cited by this document

Cocites: 50

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Citations received by this document

  1. Procurement of Goods and Services – Scope and Government. (2005). Wolfstetter, Elmar.
    In: Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems.
    RePEc:trf:wpaper:93.

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References

References cited by this document

  1. Ausubel, L., and Cramton, P. (2002). Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions. Working Paper, University of Maryland.

  2. Ausubel, L., and Milgrom, P. (2002). Ascending auctions with package bidding.

  3. Berkeley Economic Press: Frontiers of Theoretical Economics, 1(1), 1-42. Back, K., and Zender, J. (1993). Auctions of divisible goods. Review of Financial Studies, 6, 733-764.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  4. Brusco, S., and Lopomo, G. (2002). Collusion via signalling in open ascending auctions with multiple objects and complementarities. Review of Economic Studies, 69, 1-30.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  5. Cramton, P. (2005). Simultaneous ascending auctions. In P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, and R. Steinberg (Eds.), Combinatorial auctions (chap. 4).

  6. Grimm, V., Riedel, F., and Wolfstetter, E. (2003). Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: The gsm spectrum auction in germany. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(10), 1557-1569.

  7. Menezes, F. M. (1996). Multiple-unit english auctions. European Journal of Political Economy, 12, 671-684.

  8. Milgrom, P. (2000). Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction. Journal of Political Economy, 108, 245-272.

  9. Milgrom, P. (2004). Putting auction theory to work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  10. Weber, R. J. (1997). Making more from less: strategic demand reduction in the fcc spectrum auctions. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6, 529-548.

Cocites

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  3. Strategic Behavior in Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets for Electricity: Offer Cost or Payment Cost Minimization?. (2005). Shunda, Nicholas.
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  4. Understanding Strategic Bidding in Restructured Electricity Markets: A Case Study of ERCOT. (2005). Puller, Steven ; Hortacsu, Ali.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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  5. Multi-Unit Auctions to Allocate Water Scarcity Simulating bidding behaviour with agent based models. (2005). Thoyer, Sophie ; Hailu, Atakelty.
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  9. Informational Free Rides in Uniform Price Auctions: Exception or Norm?. (2005). Daripa, Arup.
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  10. How (Not) to Sell Money. (2005). Daripa, Arup.
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  12. The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design. (2004). Milgrom, Paul ; Cramton, Peter ; Ausubel, Lawrence M..
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  13. Simultaneous Ascending Auction. (2004). Cramton, Peter.
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  14. Auctioning Many Divisible Goods. (2004). Cramton, Peter ; Ausubel, Lawrence M..
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  15. Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets. (2004). Cramton, Peter.
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  16. BIDDING BEHAVIOR IN MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS - AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION AND SOME THEORETICAL INSIGHTS. (2004). Grimm, Veronika ; Engelmann, Dirk.
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  17. Optimal Allocation Mechanisms When Bidders Ranking for the objects is common. (2004). Feng, Juan.
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  18. Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Privately Known Budget Constraints. (2004). Lopomo, Giuseppe (Pino) ; Brusco, Sandro.
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  19. Immediate Demand Reduction in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions (new title: Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions: a uniqueness result). (2004). Wolfstetter, Elmar ; Riedel, Frank.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1315.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  20. Rebuttal Addendum: Assessment of Submissions of the California Parties. (2003). Cramton, Peter.
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  21. Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets. (2003). Cramton, Peter.
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  22. Underpricing in Discriminatory and Uniform-Price Treasury Auctions. (2003). Goldreich, David .
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  23. Design for Optimized Multi-Lateral Multi-Commodity Markets. (2003). Bourbeau, Benoit ; Crainic, Teodor Gabriel ; Gendreau, Michel ; Robert, Jacques .
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  25. Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding. (2002). Milgrom, Paul ; Ausubel, Lawrence M..
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  26. Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather. (2002). Kerr, Suzi ; Cramton, Peter.
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  27. Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions. (2002). Cramton, Peter ; Schwartz, Jesse .
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  28. What Really Matters in Auction Design. (2002). Klemperer, Paul.
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  41. Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction. (1998). Milgrom, Paul.
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  42. Tradable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather. (1998). Kerr, Suzi ; Cramton, Peter.
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  47. The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment. (1998). Cramton, Peter.
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