- (2019). Panel (b) plots the implied weighted average savings tax rate in each bin. See Appendix D.1.2 for details. D.1.3 Measures of s0 inc A key input for our sufficient statistics is the marginal propensity to save out of earned income, s0 inc (z) := âs(z) âz θ=θ(z) , which relates changes in the amount of net-of-tax savings at the time of retirement to changes in the amount of pre-tax earnings z. We draw from two sources of empirical data to calibrate our marginal propensities to consume (or save), translated into measures of s0 inc (z). These results are plotted in Figure I.
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- Country Wealth Capital Gains Property Pensions Inheritance Australia â Other SL, SN SL â Austria â Other SL, SN SN â Canada â Other SL SN â Denmark â SN SL, SN SL, SN SN France â Other Other SL, SN SN Germany â Other SL SN SN Ireland â SN SL, SN SN SN Israel â Other Other SN â Italy SL, SN SL SL SL SL, SN Japan â SL, SN SN SN SN Netherlands SN SL SL, SN SN SN New Zealand â Other SN SL, LED â Norway SN SL SL SN â Portugal â SL Other SN SL Singapore â Other SN SN â South Korea â SN SN SN SN Spain SN SN SL, SN SN SN Switzerland SN SN SL, SN SN SN Taiwan â SL, SN SL, SN SN SN United Kingdom â Other SN SN SN United States â LED SL SN SN Notes: This table classifies tax systems applied to different savings vehicles across countries in 2020 according to the types of simple tax systems we consider.
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- These results are reported in the bottom two panels of Figure III, which display schedules of LED and SN savings tax rates computed under the assumption that (i) individuals with different income levels differ in their private rates of return, and that (ii) the savings tax is levied in period-2 dollars. We compute the tax schedules that satisfy the equations for the optimal tax conditions in Proposition 7. As in the case of multidimensional heterogeneity, we hold fixed the schedule of marginal social welfare weights g(z) proportional to those which rationalize the status quo income tax in our baseline inverse optimum calculation. Building on the findings of Fagereng et al. (2020), we follow Gerritsen et al.
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- This gives a constant s0 inc = 1â0.3 1/2.1+1.042â(1/2.1+0.01) = 0.71, which is much higher than our estimate. Leveraging the fact that s0 inc is constant, we can also infer that at an annual income of $125, 000, the annual amount of savings available for consumption in period 2 (including compounded interest) is approximately equal to s = s0 inc â $125, 000 = 0.71â125, 000 = $88, 750. Thus, s0 het = 1/2.1+0.02 1/2.1+1.042â(1/2.1+0.02)+0.02 â(34â10â9 )â88, 750 = 0.0015.58 These values for s0 inc and s0 het imply that in the calibration of Golosov et al. (2013), preference heterogeneity is substantially smaller than our estimate of across-income heterogeneity, as it only explains s0 het s0 het+s0 inc = 0.0015 0.71+0.0015 = 0.2% of the variation in savings between individuals earning $100, 000 annually and those earning $150, 000.
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- To obtain an approximation of s0 het(z) in their setting, we use the fact that Golosov et al. (2013) report in their simulation results that individuals with an annual income z = $100, 000 have an hourly wage w = $40 while those with an annual income z = $150, 000 have an hourly wage w = $62.5. We can thus approximate dα dz = α(62.5)âα(40) 150,000â100,000 = 1.0370â1.0387 50,000 = â34 â 10â9 . For T 0 z , we assume a linear income tax rate Ïz = 0.3, for R = 2.1 we use our real interest rate of 3.8% compounded over 20 years), and for T 0 s we assume a linear income tax rate Ïs = 0.01 which we show below (see equation (235)) to be consistent with a linear tax of 4% on capital gains (the approximate average in Figure A2b).
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