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Forward Guidance Contracts. (2015). Hahn, Volker ; Gersbach, Hans ; Liu, Yulin.
In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5375.

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Cited: 6

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Cites: 24

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Cocites: 50

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Coauthors: 0

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  1. Versatile forward guidance: escaping or switching?. (2021). Liu, Yulin ; Gersbach, Hans ; Tischhauser, Martin.
    In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
    RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:127:y:2021:i:c:s0165188921000221.

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  2. Versatile Forward Guidance: Escaping or Switching?. (2018). Liu, Yulin ; Gersbach, Hans ; Tischhauser, Martin.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12559.

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  3. Money Creation and Destruction. (2017). Gersbach, Hans ; Faure, Salomon .
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6565.

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  4. COMMUNICATION ABOUT FUTURE POLICY RATES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: A SURVEY. (2017). Moessner, Richhild ; Jansen, David-Jan ; de Haan, Jakob.
    In: Journal of Economic Surveys.
    RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:31:y:2017:i:3:p:678-711.

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  5. Money creation and destruction. (2016). Gersbach, Hans ; Faure, Salomon .
    In: CFS Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:zbw:cfswop:555.

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  6. Money Creation, Monetary Policy, and Capital Regulation. (2016). Gersbach, Hans ; Faure, Salomon .
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11368.

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References

References cited by this document

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  6. Economist (2014). Fixing forward guidance, February 15, 2014.
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  7. Eggertsson, G. B. (2003). How to fight deflation in a liquidity trap: Committing to being irresponsible. International Monetary Fund Working Paper 03/64.

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  9. Eggertsson, G. B. (2006). The deflation bias and committing to being irresponsible. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 38(2):283–321.

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Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Designing monetary policy committees. (2016). Hahn, Volker.
    In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
    RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:65:y:2016:i:c:p:47-67.

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  2. Designing Monetary Policy Committees. (2015). Hahn, Volker.
    In: Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy.
    RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:112811.

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  3. Optimal Conservatism and Collective Monetary Policymaking under Uncertainty. (2015). Hefeker, Carsten ; Zimmer, Blandine.
    In: Open Economies Review.
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  4. Forward Guidance Contracts. (2015). Hahn, Volker ; Gersbach, Hans ; Liu, Yulin.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5375.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. Inflation forecast contracts. (2014). Hahn, Volker ; Gersbach, Hans.
    In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
    RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:48:y:2014:i:c:p:26-40.

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  6. .

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  7. Robust delegation with uncertain monetary policy preferences. (2013). Sorge, Marco.
    In: Economic Modelling.
    RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:30:y:2013:i:c:p:73-78.

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  8. Optimal linear contracts under common agency and uncertain central bank preferences. (2012). Marchetti, Enrico ; Ciccarone, Giuseppe.
    In: Public Choice.
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  9. Robust Delegation with Uncertain Monetary Policy Preferences. (2012). Sorge, Marco.
    In: EERI Research Paper Series.
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  10. Inflation contract, central bank transparency and model uncertainty. (2012). Spyromitros, Eleftherios ; Dai, Meixing.
    In: Economic Modelling.
    RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:29:y:2012:i:6:p:2371-2381.

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  11. Inflation Forecast Contracts. (2012). Hahn, Volker ; Gersbach, Hans.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8933.

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  12. Inflation Forecast Contracts. (2011). Hahn, Volker ; Gersbach, Hans.
    In: CER-ETH Economics working paper series.
    RePEc:eth:wpswif:11-149.

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  13. The optimal choice of central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty. (2011). Hefeker, Carsten ; Zimmer, Blandine .
    In: Journal of Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:33:y:2011:i:4:p:595-606.

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  14. Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?. (2010). ZIMMER, Blandine ; Hefeker, Carsten.
    In: Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge.
    RePEc:sie:siegen:140-10.

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  15. Accountability and Transparency about Central Bank Preferences for Model Robustness.. (2009). Spyromitros, Eleftherios ; Dai, Meixing.
    In: Working Papers of BETA.
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  16. Aggregate demand shocks, central bank preferences and macroeconomic outcomes with imperfect information. (2009). James, Jonathan G. ; Lawler, Phillip .
    In: Economics Letters.
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  17. Linear Contracts, Common Agency and Central Bank Preference Uncertainty. (2008). Marchetti, Enrico ; Ciccarone, Giuseppe .
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  18. The conservative central banker revisited: Too conservative is more costly than too liberal. (2008). Tillmann, Peter ; PeterTillmann, .
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  19. How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union?. (2007). Berger, Helge ; Mueller, Till.
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  20. Inflation, government transfers, and optimal central bank independence. (2007). Weymark, Diana N..
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  21. Supply shocks, private sector information and monetary policy: Is there inevitably a stabilization trade-off?. (2007). James, Jonathan G. ; Lawler, Phillip .
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  22. Supply- side Fiscal Policy,Conservativeness, and Central Bank trasparency. (2005). Marchetti, Enrico ; Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; Ciccarone, Giuseppe .
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  23. How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union?. (2004). Berger, Helge ; Muller, Till .
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  24. Is the Walsh Contract Really Optimal?. (2004). Campoy-Miarroy, Juan Cristobal ; Candel-Sanchez, Francisco.
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  25. Monetary policy uncertainty and interest rate targeting. (2004). Kobayashi, Teruyoshi.
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  26. Monetary Policy and Lexicographic Preference Ordering. (2004). Driffill, Edward ; Rotondi, Zeno.
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  27. How Should Large and Small Countries Be Represented in a Currency Union?. (2004). Berger, Helge ; Mueller, Till.
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  28. Unabhängigkeit und Verantwortlichkeit der Europäischen Zentralbank. (2003). Ullrich, Katrin.
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  29. Accountability, Transparency, and Inflation Targeting.. (2003). Walsh, Carl.
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  30. Multiplicative uncertainty in a model without inflationary bias. (2003). Kobayashi, Teruyoshi.
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  49. The optimality of a monetary union without a fiscal union. (1998). Bovenberg, Lans ; Beetsma, Roel ; Beetsma, R. M. W. J., .
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  50. Incentive schemes for central bankers under uncertainty: inflation targets versus contracts. (1998). Schaling, Eric ; Hoeberichts, Marco ; Eijffinger, Sylvester.
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