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Wealth Inequality, Wealth Constraints and Economic Performance. (1999). Gintis, Herbert ; Bardhan, Pranab ; Bowles, Samuel.
In: Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series.
RePEc:cdl:ciders:qt3bh899fh.

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  1. Asset inequality in the MENA: The missing dimension?. (2019). Hlasny, Vladimir ; al Azzawi, Shireen ; Alazzawi, Shireen.
    In: The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance.
    RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:73:y:2019:i:c:p:44-55.

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  2. Household asset wealth and female labor supply in MENA. (2019). Hlasny, Vladimir ; al Azzawi, Shireen ; Alazzawi, Shireen.
    In: The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance.
    RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:73:y:2019:i:c:p:3-13.

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  3. Chinas (uneven) progress against poverty. (2007). Ravallion, Martin ; Chen, Shaohua.
    In: Journal of Development Economics.
    RePEc:eee:deveco:v:82:y:2007:i:1:p:1-42.

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  4. Inequality is bad for the poor. (2005). Ravallion, Martin.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3677.

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  5. Measuring inequality with asset indicators. (2005). McKenzie, David.
    In: Journal of Population Economics.
    RePEc:spr:jopoec:v:18:y:2005:i:2:p:229-260.

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  6. Chinas (uneven) progress against poverty. (2004). Ravallion, Martin ; Chen, Shaohua.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3408.

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  7. Pro-poor growth : A primer. (2004). Ravallion, Martin.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3242.

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  8. Network Effects and the Dynamics of Migration and Inequality: Theory and Evidence from Mexico. (2004). Rapoport, Hillel ; McKenzie, David.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:biu:wpaper:2004-3.

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  9. Economics of common property management regimes. (2003). Baland, Jean-Marie ; Platteau, Jean-Philippe.
    In: Handbook of Environmental Economics.
    RePEc:eee:envchp:1-04.

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  10. Can there be growth with equity : an initial assessment of land reform in South Africa. (2000). Deininger, Klaus ; May, Julian .
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2451.

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  11. Beyond Homo economicus: evidence from experimental economics. (2000). Gintis, Herbert.
    In: Ecological Economics.
    RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:35:y:2000:i:3:p:311-322.

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  12. Why is Inequality Back on the Agenda?. (1999). Lustig, Nora ; Kanbur, Ravi.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ags:cudawp:127690.

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  14. Trust, reciprocity, and contract enforcement : experiments on satisfaction guaranteed. (2005). Andreoni, James.
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  15. Wages and Reciprocity in the Workplace. (2004). Serneels, Pieter ; Barr, Abigail.
    In: Development and Comp Systems.
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  16. Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection. (2004). Harbring, Christine.
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  17. Deferred Compensation and Gift Exchange: An Experimental Investigation into Multi-Period Labor Markets. (2004). Wallace, Brian ; Seltzer, Andrew ; Huck, Steffen.
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  18. Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay – An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting. (2004). Villeval, Marie Claire ; Eriksson, Tor.
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  19. Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students. (2004). Villeval, Marie Claire ; Rullière, Jean-Louis ; Montmarquette, Claude ; Rulliere, Jean-Louis ; Zeiliger, Romain .
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  20. Parity, Sympathy, and Reciprocity. (2004). Yaari, Menahem E. ; Guth, Werner ; WERNER GÜTH, .
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  21. Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay – An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting. (2004). Villeval, Marie Claire ; Eriksson, Tor.
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  22. Promises and Partnership. (2004). Charness, Gary ; Dufwenberg, Martin.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
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  23. Efficient Contracts for Digital Content. (2004). Regner, Tobias.
    In: The Centre for Market and Public Organisation.
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  24. Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior. (2003). Sliwka, Dirk.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
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  25. Career Concerns in a Simple Experimental Labour Market. (2003). Sliwka, Dirk.
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  26. Promises & Partnership. (2003). Charness, Gary ; Dufwenberg, Martin.
    In: Research Papers in Economics.
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  27. Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students. (2003). Villeval, Marie Claire ; Rullière, Jean-Louis ; Montmarquette, Claude ; Zeiliger, Romain .
    In: CIRANO Working Papers.
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  28. Thünen-Vorlesung: Unternehmensführung und ökonomische Rationalität. (2003). Hax, Herbert .
    In: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik.
    RePEc:bla:perwir:v:4:y:2003:i:3:p:295-312.

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  29. Effiziente Fixlohnverträge für arbeitsfreudige Arbeitnehmer mit Berichtspflichten. (2002). Neunzig, Alexander R..
    In: CSLE Discussion Paper Series.
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  30. Redesigning Teams and Incentives: A Real Effort Experiment with Managers of a Merged Company. (2002). Villeval, Marie Claire ; Rullière, Jean-Louis ; Montmarquette, Claude ; Zeiliger, Romain .
    In: CIRANO Working Papers.
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  31. Trust and Reputation Building in E-Commerce. (2002). Keser, Claudia.
    In: CIRANO Working Papers.
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  32. On the Nature of Fair Behaviour. (2001). Fischbacher, Urs ; Fehr, Ernst ; Falk, Armin.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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  33. Do market conditions affect gift exchange? Evidence from experimental markets with excess supply and excess demand. (2001). Charness, Gary ; Brandts, Jordi.
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  34. Do market conditions affect preferences? Evidence from experimental markets with excess supply and excess demand. (2000). Charness, Gary ; Brandts, Jordi.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
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  35. Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment. (2000). Charness, Gary ; Cabrales, Antonio.
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  36. Strategically Planned Behavior in Public Good Experiments. (2000). Keser, Claudia.
    In: CIRANO Working Papers.
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  37. Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments. (2000). Gächter, Simon ; Fehr, Ernst.
    In: American Economic Review.
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  38. ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition. (2000). Ockenfels, Axel ; Bolton, Gary.
    In: American Economic Review.
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  39. What Price Fairness? A Bargaining Study. (1999). Zwick, Rami ; Chen, Xiao-Ping.
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  40. Tit for Tat: Foundations of Preferences for Reciprocity in Strategic Settings. (1999). Sobel, Joel ; Segal, Uzi.
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  41. Group Lending and Its Implications in Credit Markets for Poor People. (1999). Woerz, Julia.
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  42. Reciprocity in a Two Part Dictator Game. (1999). Putterman, Louis ; Ben-Ner, Avner.
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  43. Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games: Comment. (1999). Frey, Bruno ; Bohnet, Iris.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:89:y:1999:i:1:p:335-339.

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  44. A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition. (1997). Ockenfels, Axel ; Bolton, Gary.
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  45. The Hidden Costs of Control. (). Kosfeld, Michael ; Falk, Armin.
    In: IEW - Working Papers.
    RePEc:zur:iewwpx:250.

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  46. Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocitys. (). Gächter, Simon ; Fehr, Ernst.
    In: IEW - Working Papers.
    RePEc:zur:iewwpx:040.

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  47. Contractual Incompleteness and the Nature of Market Interactions. (). Fehr, Ernst ; Falk, Armin ; Brown, Martin.
    In: IEW - Working Papers.
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  48. Do Incentive Contracts Crowd out Voluntary Cooperation?. (). Gächter, Simon ; Fehr, Ernst.
    In: IEW - Working Papers.
    RePEc:zur:iewwpx:034.

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  49. On the Nature of Fair Behavior. (). Fischbacher, Urs ; Fehr, Ernst ; Falk, Armin.
    In: IEW - Working Papers.
    RePEc:zur:iewwpx:017.

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  50. Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments. (). Gächter, Simon ; Fehr, Ernst.
    In: IEW - Working Papers.
    RePEc:zur:iewwpx:010.

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