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Sanctions for repeat offenders: a question of wealth?. (2017). Eggert, Wolfgang ; Ungern-Sternberg, Handirk ; Stephan, Maximilian ; Minter, Steffen .
In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy.
RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:64:y:2017:i:5:p:467-482.

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  1. Gambling bank behaviour, incentive mechanism, and sanctions: A two-stage model. (2024). Strecker, Isabel.
    In: Journal of Banking Regulation.
    RePEc:pal:jbkreg:v:25:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1057_s41261-023-00223-w.

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  8. Sanctions for repeat offenders: a question of wealth?. (2017). Eggert, Wolfgang ; Ungern-Sternberg, Handirk ; Stephan, Maximilian ; Minter, Steffen .
    In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy.
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