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STATIC COMMON AGENCY AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE: AN EVALUATIVE SURVEY. (2014). Mallard, Graham.
In: Journal of Economic Surveys.
RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:28:y:2014:i:1:p:17-35.

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  1. Reform for Sale: a Common Agency Model with Moral Hazard Frictions. (2023). Martimort, David ; Lefebvre, Perrin.
    In: TSE Working Papers.
    RePEc:tse:wpaper:127953.

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  2. Delegation, Capture and Endogenous Information Structures. (2023). Martimort, David ; Lefebvre, Perrin.
    In: TSE Working Papers.
    RePEc:tse:wpaper:127952.

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  3. Optimal contract design with a common agency in last-mile logistics. (2020). Gong, Daqing ; Ren, Long ; Liu, Jun ; Chu, Xiang.
    In: Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review.
    RePEc:eee:transe:v:139:y:2020:i:c:s1366554520306074.

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  4. Electoral Accountability and Selection with Personalized News Aggregation. (2020). Segal, Ilya ; Hu, Lin ; Li, Anqi.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2009.03761.

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  5. Regulating whale watching: A common agency analysis. (2019). Mallard, Graham .
    In: Annals of Tourism Research.
    RePEc:eee:anture:v:76:y:2019:i:c:p:191-199.

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  29. Tit for Tat: Foundations of Preferences for Reciprocity in Strategic Settings. (1999). Sobel, Joel ; Segal, Uzi.
    In: UWO Department of Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:uwo:uwowop:9905.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  30. Tit for Tat: Foundations of Preferences for Reciprocity in Strategic Settings. (1999). Segal, Uzi ; Sobel, Joel.
    In: University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:qt9xf8836g.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

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