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Balancing Complexity and Rent-Seeking in Multi-Attribute Conservation Procurement Auctions: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment. (2017). Conte, Marc ; Banerjee, Simanti.
In: 2018 Allied Social Sciences Association (ASSA) Annual Meeting, January 5-7, 2018, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
RePEc:ags:assa18:266293.

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