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An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence. (2015). Netzer, Nick ; Bartling, Björn.
In: ECON - Working Papers.
RePEc:zur:econwp:153.

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  1. Mechanism Design and Intentions. (2016). Netzer, Nick ; Bierbrauer, Felix.
    In: Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2016_04.

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  2. Mechanism design and intentions. (2016). Netzer, Nick ; Bierbrauer, Felix.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:163:y:2016:i:c:p:557-603.

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References

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