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Strive to be first and avoid being last: An experiment on relative performance incentives. (2013). Sutter, Matthias ; Ryvkin, Dmitry ; Lindner, Florian ; Dutcher, E. ; Balafoutas, Loukas.
In: Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order.
RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79885.

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