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Mind the Gap – Analyzing the Divergence between Constitutional Text and Constitutional Reality. (2020). Voigt, Stefan.
In: ILE Working Paper Series.
RePEc:zbw:ilewps:32.

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  1. Post?socialist constitutions: The de jure–de facto gap, its effects and determinantsa. (2021). Metelskaszaniawska, Katarzyna.
    In: Economics of Transition and Institutional Change.
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  2. Institutional Framework of Central Bank Independence: Revisited. (2021). Woźniak, Michał ; Lewkowicz, Jacek ; Woniak, Micha ; Wrzesiski, Micha.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:war:wpaper:2021-06.

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