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Coalition governments, cabinet size, and the common pool problem: Evidence from the German states. (2013). Baskaran, Thushyanthan.
In: Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers.
RePEc:zbw:cegedp:165.

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Cited: 28

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  1. On the optimal size of legislatures: An illustrated literature review. (2023). le Maux, Benoit ; de Santo, Alessia.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:77:y:2023:i:c:s0176268022001203.

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  2. Taxation under direct democracy. (2022). Roesel, Felix ; Geschwind, Stephan.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:200:y:2022:i:c:p:536-554.

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  3. The influence of political fragmentation on public enterprises: Evidence from German municipalities. (2021). Sidki, Marcus ; Boll, David.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:67:y:2021:i:c:s0176268020301208.

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  4. More federal legislators lead to more resources for their constituencies: Evidence from exogenous differences in seat allocations. (2021). Stadelmann, David ; Frank, Marco.
    In: Journal of Comparative Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:49:y:2021:i:1:p:230-243.

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  5. Taxation under Direct Democracy. (2021). Roesel, Felix ; Geschwind, Stephan.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9166.

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  6. Qualifying the common pool problem in government spending: the role of positional externalities. (2020). Xefteris, Dimitros ; Pavlovi, Duan.
    In: Constitutional Political Economy.
    RePEc:kap:copoec:v:31:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s10602-020-09306-6.

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  7. Administrative Delegation of Budgetary Powers and Fiscal Performance. (2020). Sorensen, Rune J ; Geys, Benny.
    In: Kyklos.
    RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:73:y:2020:i:4:p:477-499.

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  8. .

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  9. Do more Federal Legislators Lead to More Resources for their Constituencies?. (2019). Stadelmann, David ; Frank, Marco.
    In: Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy.
    RePEc:zbw:vfsc19:203521.

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  10. Do political factors influence public health expenditures? Evidence pre- and post-great recession. (2019). Román-Aso, Juan ; Olmos, Lorena ; Bellido, Héctor ; Roman-Aso, Juan Antonio.
    In: The European Journal of Health Economics.
    RePEc:spr:eujhec:v:20:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s10198-018-1010-2.

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  11. More Federal Legislators Lead to More Resources for Their Constituencies: Evidence from Exogenous Differences in Seat Allocations. (2019). Stadelmann, David ; Frank, Marco.
    In: CREMA Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cra:wpaper:2019-05.

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  12. Government fragmentation and fiscal deficits: a regression discontinuity approach. (2018). Jurado, Ignacio ; Artes, Joaquin.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:175:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-018-0548-y.

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  13. Thrift culture and the size of government. (2018). Kler, Parvinder ; Carmignani, Fabrizio ; Pham, Hien Thuc.
    In: Economic Modelling.
    RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:70:y:2018:i:c:p:571-578.

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  14. Staatsverschuldung und Verschuldungsmentalität. (2017). Dilla, Diana .
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:79432.

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  15. Political alignment and intergovernmental transfers in parliamentary systems: evidence from Germany. (2017). Hessami, Zohal ; Baskaran, Thushyanthan.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:171:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-016-0398-4.

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  16. More for everyone: The effect of local interests on spending on infrastructure. (2016). Halse, Askill.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:43:y:2016:i:c:p:41-56.

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  17. Political determinants of municipal accounts: Quasi-experimental evidence from Portugal. (2015). Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana.
    In: Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:cegedp:238.

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  18. Incentive effects of fiscal rules on the finance ministers behavior: Evidence from revenue projections in Swiss Cantons. (2015). Chatagny, Florian.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:39:y:2015:i:c:p:184-200.

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  19. Common pool problems in voluntary municipal mergers. (2015). Tukiainen, Janne ; Saarimaa, Tuukka.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:38:y:2015:i:c:p:140-152.

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  20. Wider Boundaries: The Welfare State and International Remittances. (2015). Batu, Michael ; Amegashie, J. Atsu.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5456.

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  21. Incentive Effects of Fiscal Rules on the Finance Ministers Behaviour: Evidence from Revenue Projections in Swiss Cantons. (2015). Chatagny, Florian.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5223.

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  22. Importance of status quo when lobbying a coalition government. (2014). Aytimur, R. Emre.
    In: Economics of Governance.
    RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:15:y:2014:i:3:p:203-219.

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  23. Political alignment and intergovernmental transfers in parliamentary systems: Evidence from Germany. (2014). Hessami, Zohal ; Baskaran, Thushyanthan.
    In: Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
    RePEc:knz:dpteco:1417.

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  24. Austerity, inequality and politics. (2014). Weder, Martin ; Schaltegger, Christoph.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:35:y:2014:i:c:p:1-22.

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  25. Political corruption, public procurement, and budget composition: Theory and evidence from OECD countries. (2014). Hessami, Zohal.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:34:y:2014:i:c:p:372-389.

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  26. Importance of status quo when lobbying a coalition government. (2013). Aytimur, R. Emre.
    In: Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:cegedp:162.

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  27. Corruption, Public Procurement, and the Budget Composition: Theory and Evidence from OECD Countries. (2013). Hessami, Zohal.
    In: Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
    RePEc:knz:dpteco:1327.

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