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Who does better for the economy? Presidents versus parliamentary democracies. (2017). Ozkan, Gulcin F ; McManus, Richard.
In: Discussion Papers.
RePEc:yor:yorken:17/03.

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  13. CBI Measure of central bank independence obtained from Cukierman et al. (1992), Polillo & Guillén (2005) and Crowe & Meade (2008), all of whom use the same methodology. HumanCap Index of human capital per person, based on years of schooling and returns to education; data obtained from the Penn World Table. Instrumental variables DemAge Measure of the length of time in which the Polity score (see above) has been positive non-stop; that is, how long a country has been consistently operating within a democracy. Data obtained from the Polity IV Project.
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  17. ColEsp Binary variable determining if the country was colonised by Spain; data obtained from Persson and Tabellini (2003).
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  18. ColOther Binary variable determining if the country was colonised by another country; data obtained from Persson and Tabellini (2003).
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  19. ColUK Binary variable determining if the country was colonised by the United Kingdom; data obtained from Persson and Tabellini (2003).
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  23. EngFrac Fraction of the country which speaks English; data obtained from Persson and Tabellini (2003).
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  24. EurFrac Fraction of the country which speaks one of the main European languages; data obtained from Persson and Tabellini (2003).
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  31. Independent variables Pres A binary measure determining if a country is operating under a presidential regime; data obtained from both Bormann and Golder (2013) and Persson and Tabellini (2003). A more detailed discussion of the definitions applied can be found in Section 2.2. Semi-Pres A binary measure determining if a country is operating under a semi-presidential regime; data obtained from Bormann and Golder (2013). A more detailed discussion of the definition applied can be found in Section 2.2. Maj A binary measure indicating if a country is operating under a majoritarian voting system; data obtained from Bormaan and Golder (2013). InitialGDP Log of the GDP per capita (expressed in current US Dollars) at the start of the panel period; data obtained from the World Bank.
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  38. NumParties Effective number of electoral parties in an election where an average is taken over the course of the panel; data obtained from Bormann and Golder (2013).
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  39. OECD (2015), In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All, OECD Publishing, Paris.
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  40. Persson, T. (2005), Forms of democracy, policy and economic development, Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.

  41. Persson, T. & Tabellini, G. E. (2003), The economic effects of constitutions, MIT press.
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  42. Polillo, S. & Guillén, M. F. (2005), ‘Globalization pressures and the state: The worldwide spread of central bank independence’, American Journal of Sociology 110(6), 1764– 1802.
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  44. Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A. & Trebbi, F. (2004), ‘Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development’, Journal of Economic Growth 9(2), 131–165.

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  47. Woodford, M. (2003), Interest and prices: Foundations of a theory of monetary policy, Princeton University Press. A Appendix TABLE A1: Data appendix (variables in order of appearance) Variable Description and Source Dependent variables GDP growth Annual growth rate of GDP per capita; data obtained from the World Bank. GDP growth volatility Standard deviation of ’GDP growth’ above over the panel period. Inflation GDP deflator as an annual percentage taken from the World Bank. Inflation volatility Standard deviation of ’Inflation’ above over the panel period. Gini coefficient Gini coefficient measure of income inequality; data obtained from World Income Inequality Database.
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