Acemoglu, D. (2005), ‘Constitutions, politics, and economics: A review essay on Persson and Tabellini’s the economic effects of constitutions’, Journal of Economic Literature 43, 1025–1048.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. & Robinson, J. A. (2005), ‘Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth’, Handbook of economic growth 1, 385–472.
Alesina, A. & Perotti, R. (1996), ‘Income distribution, political instability, and investment ’, European Economic Review 40(6), 1203–1228.
- Barro, R. (2007), Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study, The MIT Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Barro, R. J. & Gordon, D. B. (1983), ‘Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy’, Journal of Monetary Economics 12(1), 101–121.
Barro, R. J. & Lee, J. W. (2013), ‘A new data set of educational attainment in the world, 1950–2010’, Journal of Development Economics 104, 184–198.
- Bell, D. & Machin, S. (2016), Brexit and wage inequality, Technical report, VOX EU.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Blume, L., Müller, J., Voigt, S. & Wolf, C. (2009), ‘The economic effects of constitutions: replicating - and extending - Persson and Tabellini’, Public Choice 139(1-2), 197–225.
- Bormann, N.-C. (2010), ‘Patterns of democracy and its critics’, Living Reviews in Democracy 2(2), 1–14.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Bormann, N.-C. & Golder, M. (2013), ‘Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946–2011’, Electoral Studies 32(2), 360–369.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Campos, N. F. & Nugent, J. B. (2002), ‘Who is afraid of political instability?’, Journal of Development Economics 67(1), 157–172.
Carey, J. M. (2005), Presidential versus parliamentary government, in ‘Handbook of new institutional economics’, Springer, pp. 91–122.
- CBI Measure of central bank independence obtained from Cukierman et al. (1992), Polillo & GuilleÌn (2005) and Crowe & Meade (2008), all of whom use the same methodology. HumanCap Index of human capital per person, based on years of schooling and returns to education; data obtained from the Penn World Table. Instrumental variables DemAge Measure of the length of time in which the Polity score (see above) has been positive non-stop; that is, how long a country has been consistently operating within a democracy. Data obtained from the Polity IV Project.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Chandra, S. & Rudra, N. (2015), ‘Reassessing the links between regime type and economic performance: Why some authoritarian regimes show stable growth and others do not’, British Journal of Political Science 45(02), 253–285.
- Cheibub, J. (2003), Systems of government: Parliamentarism and presidentialism, Technical report, Harvard University.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J. & Vreeland, J. R. (2010), ‘Democracy and dictatorship revisited ’, Public Choice 143(1-2), 67–101.
- ColEsp Binary variable determining if the country was colonised by Spain; data obtained from Persson and Tabellini (2003).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- ColOther Binary variable determining if the country was colonised by another country; data obtained from Persson and Tabellini (2003).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- ColUK Binary variable determining if the country was colonised by the United Kingdom; data obtained from Persson and Tabellini (2003).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Crowe, C. & Meade, E. E. (2008), ‘Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness’, European Journal of Political Economy 24(4), 763–777.
Cukierman, A., Web, S. & Neyapti, B. (1992), ‘Measuring the independence of central banks and its effect on policy outcomes’, World Bank Economic Review 6(3), 353–398.
- Elgie, R. (2005), ‘From Linz to Tsebelis: three waves of presidential/parliamentary studies ?’, Democratization 12(1), 106–122.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- EngFrac Fraction of the country which speaks English; data obtained from Persson and Tabellini (2003).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- EurFrac Fraction of the country which speaks one of the main European languages; data obtained from Persson and Tabellini (2003).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Frankel, J. A. & Romer, D. H. (1996), ‘Trade and growth: An empirical investigation’, NBER Working Paper (w5476).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- FrankRom Predicted trade share of an economy, based on a gravity model of international trade that only uses a country’s population and geographical features adapted from Frankel & Romer (1996); data obtained from Hall & Jones (1999).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Gerring, J., Thacker, S. C. & Moreno, C. (2009), ‘Are parliamentary systems better?’, Comparative Political Studies 42(3), 327–359.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Gregorini, F. & Longoni, E. (2009), Inequality, political systems and public spending, Technical report.
Hall, R. E. & Jones, C. I. (1999), ‘Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than others?’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(1), 83–116.
Hayo, B. & Voigt, S. (2010), ‘Determinants of constitutional change: Why do countries change their form of government?’, Journal of Comparative Economics 38(3), 283–305.
- Independent variables Pres A binary measure determining if a country is operating under a presidential regime; data obtained from both Bormann and Golder (2013) and Persson and Tabellini (2003). A more detailed discussion of the definitions applied can be found in Section 2.2. Semi-Pres A binary measure determining if a country is operating under a semi-presidential regime; data obtained from Bormann and Golder (2013). A more detailed discussion of the definition applied can be found in Section 2.2. Maj A binary measure indicating if a country is operating under a majoritarian voting system; data obtained from Bormaan and Golder (2013). InitialGDP Log of the GDP per capita (expressed in current US Dollars) at the start of the panel period; data obtained from the World Bank.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Knutsen, C. H. (2009), The economic growth effect of constitutions revisited, Technical report, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Lijphart, A. (1984), Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian & Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Lijphart, A. (1999), Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Linz, J. J. (1990), ‘The perils of presidentialism’, Journal of Democracy 1(1), 51–69.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Mainwaring, S. (1993), ‘Presidentialism, multipartism, and democracy the difficult combination ’, Comparative Political Studies 26(2), 198–228.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Mainwaring, S. & Shugart, M. S. (1997), ‘Juan Linz, presidentialism, and democracy a critical appraisal’, Comparative Politics 29(4), 449–471.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- NumParties Effective number of electoral parties in an election where an average is taken over the course of the panel; data obtained from Bormann and Golder (2013).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- OECD (2015), In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All, OECD Publishing, Paris.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Persson, T. (2005), Forms of democracy, policy and economic development, Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Persson, T. & Tabellini, G. E. (2003), The economic effects of constitutions, MIT press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Polillo, S. & GuilleÌn, M. F. (2005), ‘Globalization pressures and the state: The worldwide spread of central bank independence’, American Journal of Sociology 110(6), 1764– 1802.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Rockey, J. (2012), ‘Reconsidering the fiscal effects of constitutions’, European Journal of Political Economy 28(3), 313–323.
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A. & Trebbi, F. (2004), ‘Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development’, Journal of Economic Growth 9(2), 131–165.
Shugart, M. S. (1999), ‘Presidentialism, parliamentarism, and the provision of collective goods in less-developed countries’, Constitutional Political Economy 10(1), 53–88.
Shugart, M. S. & Carey, J. M. (1992), Presidents and assemblies: Constitutional design and electoral dynamics, Cambridge University Press.
- Woodford, M. (2003), Interest and prices: Foundations of a theory of monetary policy, Princeton University Press. A Appendix TABLE A1: Data appendix (variables in order of appearance) Variable Description and Source Dependent variables GDP growth Annual growth rate of GDP per capita; data obtained from the World Bank. GDP growth volatility Standard deviation of ’GDP growth’ above over the panel period. Inflation GDP deflator as an annual percentage taken from the World Bank. Inflation volatility Standard deviation of ’Inflation’ above over the panel period. Gini coefficient Gini coefficient measure of income inequality; data obtained from World Income Inequality Database.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now