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Efficiency in complementary partnerships with competition. (2009). Sand, Jan.
In: Managerial and Decision Economics.
RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:1:p:57-70.

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References cited by this document

  1. Aghion P, Dewatripont M, Rey P. 1990. On renegotiation design. European Economic Review 34:322-329.

  2. Bartling B, von Siemens F. 2007. Equal sharing rules in partnerships. Discussion Paper 2007-29, Department of Economics, University of Munich.

  3. Farrell J, Scotchmer S. 1988. Partnerships. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 103(2):279-297.

  4. Green JR, Laffont JJ. 1992. Renegotiation and the form of efficient contracts. Les Annales dEconomie et de Statistique 123-150.

  5. Hart O, Moore J. 1988. Incomplete contracts and renegotiation. Econometrica 56:755-786.

  6. Holmstrom B. 1982. Moral hazard in teams. Bell Journal of Economics 13:324-340.

  7. Hvide HK. 2001. Some comments on free-riding in Leontief partnerships. Economic Inquiry 39(3):467-473.

  8. Kandel E, Lazear EP. 1992. Peer pressure and partnerships. Journal of Political Economy 100: 801-817.

  9. Kline JJ. 1997. Efficiency and equilibria in complementary teams: a comment. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 32:621-623.

  10. Legros P, Matthews SA. 1993. Efficient and nearly-efficient partnerships. Review of Economic Studies 60(3):599-611.

  11. Maskin E, Moore J. 1999. Implementation and renegotiation. Review of Economic Studies 66:39-56.

  12. McAfee RP, McMillan J. 1991. Optimal contracts in teams. International Economic Review 32(3):561-577.

  13. Rasmussen E. 1987. Moral hazard in risk-averse teams. Rand Journal of Economics 18:428-435.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  14. Rubinstein A, Wolinsky A. 1994. Renegotiation-proof implementation and time preferences. American Economic Review 82:600-614.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  15. Tirole J. 1986. Procurement and renegotiation. Journal of Political Economy 94:235-259.

  16. Vislie J. 1994. Efficiency and equilibria in complementary teams. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 23:83-91.

Cocites

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  1. Bayesian implementation and rent extraction in a multi-dimensional procurement problem. (2020). Schmidt, Klaus M ; Herweg, Fabian.
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:70:y:2020:i:c:s0167718719300438.

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  2. Bayesian Implementation and Rent Extraction in a Multi-Dimensional Procurement Problem. (2018). Herweg, Fabian ; Schmidt, Klaus.
    In: Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:rco:dpaper:133.

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  3. Self-enforcing family rules, marriage and the (non)neutrality of public intervention. (2017). Luporini, Annalisa ; Komura, Mizuki ; Cigno, Alessandro.
    In: Journal of Population Economics.
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  4. Performance Measures in Earnings‐Based Financial Covenants in Debt Contracts. (2016). Li, Ningzhong.
    In: Journal of Accounting Research.
    RePEc:bla:joares:v:54:y:2016:i:4:p:1149-1186.

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  5. Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective. (2016). Nikolaev, Valeri V ; Christensen, Hans B ; Wittenberg-Moerman, Regina.
    In: Journal of Accounting Research.
    RePEc:bla:joares:v:54:y:2016:i:2:p:397-435.

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  6. Equal Pay for Unequal Work: Limiting Sabotage in Teams. (2010). Sappington, David ; Pal, Debashis ; Bose, Arup ; David E. M. Sappington, .
    In: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
    RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:19:y:2010:i:1:p:25-53.

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  7. Team Formation and Self‐serving Biases. (2010). Corgnet, Brice.
    In: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
    RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:19:y:2010:i:1:p:117-135.

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  8. Efficiency in complementary partnerships with competition. (2009). Sand, Jan.
    In: Managerial and Decision Economics.
    RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:1:p:57-70.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. Team production with inequity-averse agents. (2009). Li, Jianpei.
    In: Portuguese Economic Journal.
    RePEc:spr:portec:v:8:y:2009:i:2:p:119-136.

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  10. THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS – A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS. (2008). Richter, Rudolf ; Furubotn, Eirik G..
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  11. Les fondements incomplets de l’incomplétude : Une revue critique de la théorie des contrats incomplets*. (2007). Chaserant, Camille.
    In: L'Actualité Economique.
    RePEc:ris:actuec:v:83:y:2007:i:2:p:227-253.

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  12. Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle. (2005). Antras, Pol.
    In: Scholarly Articles.
    RePEc:hrv:faseco:3196324.

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  13. Specific investments, holdup, and the outside option principle. (2004). Sonnemans, Joep ; Sloof, Randolph ; Oosterbeek, Hessel.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:48:y:2004:i:6:p:1399-1410.

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  14. Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure. (2003). Antras, Pol.
    In: Scholarly Articles.
    RePEc:hrv:faseco:3196328.

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  15. On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem. (2002). Schmitz, Patrick.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:12530.

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  16. Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem. (2002). Schmitz, Patrick.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:46:y:2002:i:1:p:169-188.

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  17. The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory. (2001). Schmitz, Patrick.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:12562.

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  18. On the optimality of resetting executive stock options. (2000). John, Kose ; Acharya, Viral ; Viral, Acharya ; Sundaram Rangarajan K., ; Kose, John.
    In: Journal of Financial Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:57:y:2000:i:1:p:65-101.

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  19. Holdups, simple contracts and information acquisition. (2000). Zhu, Tian.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:42:y:2000:i:4:p:549-560.

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  20. Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment. (1995). Reichelstein, Stefan ; Edlin, Aaron.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5007.

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