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Endogenous timing in the presence of non‐monotonicities. (2020). Hoffmann, Magnus ; Rotagraziosi, Gregoire.
In: Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique.
RePEc:wly:canjec:v:53:y:2020:i:1:p:359-402.

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  1. Endogenous timing in three-player Tullock contests. (2022). Lee, Seokho ; Baik, Kyung Hwan.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:59:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-022-01396-5.

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