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Incomplete Contingent Labor Contract, Asymmetric Residual Rights and Authority, and the Theory of the Firm. (2000). Yang, Xiaokai.
In: CID Working Papers.
RePEc:wop:cidhav:45.

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  1. Inframarginal analysis of division of labor: A survey. (2004). Yang, Xiaokai ; Cheng, Wenli.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:55:y:2004:i:2:p:137-174.

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References

References cited by this document

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