[1] Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James Robinson (2001). The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation. American Economic Review 91: 5, 1369 -- 1401.
- [10] Bratton, Michael and Nicholas van de Walle (1998). Neopatrimonial regimes and political transitions in Africa. In Peter Lewis, ed., 273 -- 309.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [11] Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, et al. (2003). The logic of political survival. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [12] Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn, Morris Fiorina (1987). The personal vote: con- stituency service and electoral independence. Cambridge: Harvard Univer- sity Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [13] Ceara Hatton, Miguel (1996). De reactivación desordenada hacia el ajuste con liberalización y apertura (1987 -- 1990 y 1991 -- 1992). Chapter 2, 33- 73, in Emilio Betances and Hobart A. Spalding, Jr. (1996). The Dominican Republic Today: Realities and Perspectives. New York: Bildner Center for Western Hemisphere Studies.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [14] Clague, Christopher, Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack and Mancur Olson (1996) Property and Contract Rights under Democracy and Dictatorship. The Journal of Economic Growth. 1:2, 243-276 (June).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [15] Coppedge, Michael (1993). Parties and Society in Mexico and Venezuela: Why Competition Matters. Comparative Politics 25: 253-74.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [16] Cox, Gary W. (1987). The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the devel- opment of political parties in Victorian England. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [17] DÃaz-Cayeros, Alberto, Federico Estévez, and Beatriz Magalonà (2004). The Erosion of Party Hegemony, Clientelism and Portfolio Diversifica- tion: The Program Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL) in Mexico. Working paper, Department of Political Science, Stanford University.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
[18] Dixit, Avinash and John Londregan (1996). The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics. Journal of Politics 58: 1132- 1155.
- [19] Duncan Baretta, Silvio R. and John Markoff (1987). Brazils Abertura: A transition from what to what? In Seligson and Malloy, eds., 43 -- 66.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [2] Antlöv, Hans (1994). Village Leaders and the New Order. In Hans Antlöv and Sven Cederroth, editors. Leadership on Java: Gentle Hints, Author- itarian Rule. Richmond, Surrey, UK: Curzon Press. Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Studies in Asian Topics No. 16, 73-96.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [20] Fearon, James D. (1999). Why ethnic politics and `pork tend to go to- gether. Mimeo, Stanford University (June 16).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
[22] (1986). Incumbent performance and electoral control. Public Choice 50: 5-26.
[23] Feyzioglu, Tarhan, Vinay Swaroop and Min Zhu (1998). A Panel Data Analysis of the Fungibility of Foreign Aid. World Bank Economic Review 12:1, 29-58.
- [24] Gazdar, Haris (2000). State, community and universal education: A polit- ical economy of public schooling in rural Pakistan. Mimeo. Asia Research Centre, London School of Economics (October).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [25] Gellner, Ernest and John Waterbury, eds. (1977). Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies. London: Duckworth Center for Mediterranean Studies.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
[26] Gleaser, Edward L. and Andrei Shleifer (2002). The Curley Effect. Mimeo, Harvard University Department of Economics (May 2).
- [27] Jackson, R. H. and Rosberg, C. G. (1982). Personal Rule in Black Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [28] Johannes, John R. (1983). Explaining Congressional Casework Styles.American Journal of Political Science 27: 3 (August): 530- 547.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
[29] Keefer, Philip (2004). Democratization and Clientelism: Why are young democracies badly governed? Mimeo, Development Research Group, The World Bank.
[3] Aragones, Enriqueta and Andrew Postlewaite (2000). Campaign Rhetoric: A Model of Reputation. Economics and Business Working Paper 525, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (September).
- [30] and Stephen Knack (2002). Boondoggles and Expropria- tion: When are property rights secure and public investment growth- promoting? Policy Research Working Paper 2910, The World Bank.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [31] Krishna, Anirudh (2002). Seizing the Middle Ground: New Political En- trepreneurs in India. Mimeo, Department of Public Policy, Duke Univer- sity.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [32] Kryzanek, Michael J. and Howard J. Wiarda (1988). The Politics of exter- nal influence in the Dominican Republic. New York: Praeger Publishers.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
[33] Lemarchand, Rene (1972). Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropi- cal Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building. American Political Science Review 66: 1, 68 -- 90 (March).
- [34] Lewis, Peter (1998). Political Transition and the Dilemma of Civil Soci- ety in Africa. In Peter Lewis, ed. Africa: Dilemmas of Development and Change, Boulder: Westview Press., 137 -- 158.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
[35] Lizzeri, Alessandro and Nicola Persico (2001). The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives. The American Economic Review 91:1, 225 -- 239 (March).
- [36] Malloy, James M. and Eduardo A. Gamarra (1987). The transition to democracy in Bolivia. In Malloy and Seligson, eds., 93 -- 120.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [37] Malloy, James M. and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds. (1987). Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
[38] Mani, A., and S. Mukand. 2002. Democracy, Visibility and Public Good Provision. Mimeo. Department of Economics, Williams College.
- [39] Mayhew, David (1974). Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [4] Archer, Ronald P. (1990). The Transition form Traditional to Broker Clientelism in Colombia: Political Stability and Social Unrest. Working Paper 140, Kellog Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame (July).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [40] Medina, Luis Fernando and Susan Stokes (2002). Clientelism as Political Monopoly. Mimeo, University of Chicago Department of Political Science.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [41] OGorman, Frank (2001). Patronage and the reform of the state in Eng- land, 1700-1860. In Simona Piattoni, ed. Clientelism, Interests and De- mocratic Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
[42] Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2000a). Political Economics: Ex- plaining Public Policy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
[44] Powell, John Duncan (1970). Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics. American Political Science Review. 64: 2, 411-425 (June).
[45] Robinson, James and Thierry Verdier (2002). The Political Economy of Clientelism. CEPR Working Paper 3205, February.
[46] Robinson, James and Ragnar Torvik (2002). White Elephants. CEPR Working Paper 3459, July.
- [47] Rosenberg, Mark (1987). Political Obstacles to Democracy in Central America. In Malloy and Seligson, eds, p. 193 -- 218.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
[48] Scott, James C. (1972). Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia. American Political Science Review 66: 1, 91 -- 113 (March).
[49] Strömberg, David (2004). Radios Impact on Public Spending. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 119:1, 265-84 (January).
- [5] and Matthew Soberg Shugart (1997). The Unrealized Potential of Presidential Dominance in Colombia. in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart, eds. Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [50] Wilder, Andrew (1999). The Pakistani Voter: Electoral Politics and Voting Behavior in the Punjab. Karachi: Oxford University Press. Observability is certainly a key issue.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [52] Nash, Manning (1963). Party Building in Upper Burma. Asian Survey 3, 196 -- 202 (April). In Scott (110).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
[53] Tanzi, Vito and Hamid Davoodi (1997). Corruption, public investment and growth. International Monetary Fund Working Paper WB/97/139.
[54] Wantchekon, Leonard (2003). Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin. World Politics. 55:3, 399-422.
[6] Baron, David P. (1989). Service-induced campaign contributions and the electoral equilibrium. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 104: 1, 45-72 (February).
[7] Beck, Thorsten, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer and Patrick Walsh (2001). New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Data- base of Political Institutions. World Bank Economic Review. 15: 1, 165- 176.
[8] Besley, T., and R. Burgess (2003). The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 117 (4): 1415--51.
- [9] Bista, Dor Bahadur (1991). Fatalism and Development: Nepals Struggle for Modernization. Calcutta: Orient Longman Limited.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now