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Evaluating the Impact of Results-Based Financing on Health Worker Performance: Theory, Tools and Variables to Inform an Impact Evaluation. (2013). Torsvik, Gaute ; Mæstad, Ottar ; Leonard, Kenneth ; Lemiere, Christophe ; Herbst, Christopher H ; Mastad, Ottar .
In: Health, Nutrition and Population (HNP) Discussion Paper Series.
RePEc:wbk:hnpdps:98269.

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