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- We denote Pm as the joint-profit maximizing price and show P* > Pm to remind ourselves that the equilibrium is not unique, but the results hold equally for P* = Pm. Marginal costs are assumed to be constant and equal across firms and are denoted as MC. Technology is assumed to be constant returns to scale, and thus there are no fixed costs. Then we have: ISCR July 1999
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