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On Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Ex-Post Individually Rational Traders. (2008). Galavotti, Stefano.
In: Working Papers.
RePEc:vnm:wpaper:161.

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  2. [21 T.A.GREsIK. Ex Ante Efficient, Ex Post Individually Rational Trade. Journal of Economic Theory 53 (1991), 131-145.

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  9. [91 U.SCHWEIZER. Universal possibility and impossibility results. Games and Economic Behavior 57 (2006), 73-85.
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  1. Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval. (2021). Renault, Jerome ; Forges, Franoise.
    In: TSE Working Papers.
    RePEc:tse:wpaper:125607.

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  2. Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval. (2021). Renault, Jérôme ; Forges, Franoise.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:50:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-021-00757-1.

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  3. Strategic information transmission with senders approval. (2021). Renault, Jerome ; Forges, Franoise.
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02440627.

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  4. Strategic information transmission with senders approval. (2020). Renault, Jerome ; Forges, Franoise.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02440627.

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  5. Contract Design by Service Providers with Private Effort. (2018). Rajagopalan, Sampath ; Kong, Guangwen ; Zhang, Hao.
    In: Management Science.
    RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:64:y:2018:i:6:p:2672-2689.

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  6. Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values. (2016). Vermeulen, Dries ; Schröder, Marc ; Flesch, Janos ; Schroder, Marc .
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:84:y:2016:i:c:p:68-75.

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  7. Fee-Setting Mechanisms: On Optimal Pricing by Intermediaries and Indirect Taxation. (2014). Loertscher, Simon ; Niedermayer, Andras.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:mnh:wpaper:35362.

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  8. Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights. (2014). Strausz, Roland ; Krahmer, Daniel.
    In: SFB 649 Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2014-045.

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  9. The role of commitment in bilateral trade. (2014). Maestri, Lucas ; Hörner, Johannes ; Gerardi, Dino ; Horner, Johannes.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:154:y:2014:i:c:p:578-603.

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  10. The bilateral trade model in a discrete setting. (2013). Vermeulen, Dries ; Flesch J., ; Vermeulen A. J., ; Schr?der M. J. W., .
    In: Research Memorandum.
    RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013025.

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  11. AUCTION DESIGN WITHOUT COMMITMENT. (2013). Vartiainen, Hannu.
    In: Journal of the European Economic Association.
    RePEc:bla:jeurec:v:11:y:2013:i:2:p:316-342.

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  12. Fee-Setting Mechanisms: On Optimal Pricing by Intermediaries and Indirect Taxation. (2012). Niedermayer, Andras ; Loertscher, Simon ; Simon Loertscher & Andras Niedermayer, .
    In: Department of Economics - Working Papers Series.
    RePEc:mlb:wpaper:1162.

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  13. Bilateral trading with naive traders. (2011). Saran, Rene.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:2:p:544-557.

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  14. Auction Design without Commitment. (2009). Vartiainen, Hannu.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp44.

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  15. Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types. (2009). Jehiel, Philippe ; Compte, Olivier.
    In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
    RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:1:y:2009:i:1:p:182-206.

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  16. On Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Ex-Post Individually Rational Traders. (2008). Galavotti, Stefano.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:vnm:wpaper:161.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  17. Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types. (2006). Jehiel, Philippe ; Compte, Olivier.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000085.

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  18. Irrigation Technology Adoption and Gains from Water Trading under Asymmetric Information. (2004). Khanna, Madhu ; Dridi, Chokri.
    In: Others.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpot:0409005.

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  19. Auction Design without Commitment. (2003). Vartiainen, Hannu.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.24.

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  20. EFFICACY OF WATER TRADING UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION. (2003). Khanna, Madhu ; Dridi, Chokri.
    In: 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada.
    RePEc:ags:aaea03:22140.

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  21. Status Quo Bias in Bargaining: An Extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem with an Application to the Coase Theorem. (2002). RICHARD D. Mc KELVEY, ; Page, Talbot ; MCKELVEY, RICHARD D..
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:107:y:2002:i:2:p:336-355.

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