- [2] Examples: Indonesian occupation of East-Timor versus Iraqi occupation of Kuwait; the 1997 Turkish invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan; Angola, Rwanda and Burundi support to Kabila’s rebels in Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) versus South-African support to UNITA rebels in Angola. According to The Economist - see its November 16th, 1996 issue - Zairian rebels were boosted by the imposition of international sanctions on Burundi’s military regime. According to this newspaper, these sanctions induced the Burundi’s government to do nothing about guerrilla infiltration along the Zairian borders. [3] We realize that investments in predation do not necessarily lead to war.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [4] For example, on its 30th March 1996 issue, The Economist argued that the UN arms embargo in Bosnia exacerbated the conflict: both sides started bombing UN peacekeepers to endanger soldiers’ lives and force them to go.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [5] We are fully aware of the controversy surrounding such distinction between offensive and defensive weapons. See Glaser and Kauffman (1998) for a review of the so-called Offense-Defense theory. [6] Debreu-Glicksberg-Fan Theorem. [7] There are many options in modeling how decisions are taken in the UN. Some stylized facts can be observed: first, it is usually a majority rule; second, within this majority rule the size of the majority may vary according to the importance of the issue but it is usually a simply majority rule; in the General Assembly, we observe one vote per country.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Abbot, S. and Snidal, D. (1998). Why states act through formal international organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution 42 (1): 3-32.
Becker, G. (1983). A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98: 371-400.
Becker, G. (1985). Public policies, pressure groups and dead weight costs. Journal of Public Economics 28: 329-347.
- Brito and Intriligator (1984, 1985), Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1988), and Fearon (1995) argue that investment in predation activities may deter actual predation: whether or not such investments will lead to war will typically depend on factors such as the player’s beliefs about each other’s military strength, their relative strength, and possibly many other factors one could subsume in a random term. A review of the literature can be found in O’Neill (1994).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Brito, D. and Intriligator, M. (1984). Can arms races lead to the outbreak of war. Journal of Conflict Resolution 28 (1): 63-84.
Brito, D. and Intriligator, M. (1985). Conflict, war, and redistribution, American Political Science Review 79: 943-957.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., and Lalman, D. (1988). Arms races and the opportunity for peace. Synthese 76: 263-283.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Diehl, P., Reifschneider, J., and Hensel, P. (1996). United Nations intervention and recurring conflict. International Organization 50 (4): 683-700.
Downs, G., Rocke, D., and Barsoon, P. (1996). Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation? International Organization 50 (3): 379-406.
- Endnotes [1] In support of the first argument, Pape (1997) mentions Iraq - or the Iraqi regime - as an illustrative example of a target of sanctions which has, at least until now, shown a remarkable degree of endurance against what have been the most extreme package of sanctions ever have applied to a country in recent history. As an example supporting the latter argument it is often pointed out that the economic recession that apartheid and early post-apartheid SouthAfrica underwent due, at least partially, to the desinvestment that followed the imposition of international economic sanctions during the apartheid days, was especially harmful to more vulnerable economically, i.e., to the same people that were discriminated against by the apartheid regime. Also for a discussion of the South-African case see Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1986).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Fearon, J. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization 49 (3): 379-414.
Frey, B. S. (1997). The public choice of international organizations. In D. C. Mueller (Ed.), Perspectives on public choice: a handbook, 106-123. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Garfinkel, M. (1990). Arming as a strategic investment in cooperative equilibrium.
- Glaser, C., and Kaufman, C. (1998). What is the offense-defense balance and can we measure it? International Security 22 (4): 44-82.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Grossman, H. and Kim, M. (1995). Swords or plowshares? A theory of the security of claims to property. Journal of Political Economy 103 (6): 1275-1288.
- Hirshleifer, J. (1988). The analytics of continuing conflict. Synthese 76: 201-233.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Hirshleifer, J. (1989). Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: ratio vs. difference models of relative success. Public Choice 63: 101-112.
Hirshleifer, J. (1991a). The technology of conflict as an economic activity. American Economic Review 81 (2): 130-134.
Hirshleifer, J. (1991b). The paradox of power. Economics and Politics 3 (3): 177-200.
Hirshleifer, J. (1995a). Anarchy and its breakdown. Journal of Political Economy 103 (1): 26-52.
- Hirshleifer, J. (1995b). Theorizing about conflict. In K. Hartley and T. Sandler (Eds.), Handbook of defense economics, 165-189. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: North-Holland/Elsevier Science.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Kaempfer, W. and Lowenberg, A. (1986). A model of the political economy of international investment sanctions: the case of South Africa. Kyklos 39 (3): 377-396.
Kaempfer, W. and Lowenberg, A. (1988). The theory of international economic sanctions: a public choice approach. American Economic Review 78 (4): 786-793.
Kaempfer, W. and Lowenberg, A. (1989). The theory of international economic sanctions - a public choice approach: reply. American Economic Review 79 (5): 1304-1306.
Kaufman, S. and Duncan, G. (1992). A formal framework for mediator mechanisms and motivations. Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (4): 688708.
Leidy, M. (1989). The theory of international economic sanctions - a public choice approach: comment. American Economic Review 79 (5): 1300-1303.
Neary, H. (1997). Equilibrium structure in an economic model of conflict. Economic Inquiry 35: 480-494.
- O’Neill, B. (1994). Game theory models of war and peace. In R. Aumann and S. Hart (Eds.), Handbook of game theory, vol. II, 995-1053. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: North-Holland/Elsevier Science.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Pape, R. (1997). Why economic sanctions do not work. International Security 22 (2): 90-136.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Skaperdas, S. (1991). Conflict and attitudes toward risk. American Economic Review 81 (2): 116-120.
van Bergeijk, P. (1989). Success and failure of economic sanctions. Kyklos 42 (3): 385-404.
- White, N. (1994). UN peacekeeping - development or destruction? International Relations 12: 129-158.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now