Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]
create a website
Deep and shallow thinking in the long run. (2022). Newton, Jonathan ; Nax, Heinrich Harald.
In: Theoretical Economics.
RePEc:the:publsh:4824.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Cited: 2

Citations received by this document

Cites: 52

References cited by this document

Cocites: 50

Documents which have cited the same bibliography

Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Transitions between equilibria in Bilingual Games under Probit Choice. (2024). Arigapudi, Srinivas.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:111:y:2024:i:c:s0304406824000181.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

References

References cited by this document

  1. Alós-Ferrer, C. and Netzer, N. (2010). The logit-response dynamics. Games and Economic Behavior, 68:413–427.

  2. Battalio, R., Samuelson, L., and Van Huyck, J. (2001). Optimization incentives and coordination failure in laboratory stag hunt games. Econometrica, 69(3):749–764.

  3. Block, H. and Marschak, J. (1959). Random orderings and stochastic theories of response. Working paper, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

  4. Blume, L. E. (1993). The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction. Games and Economic Behavior, 5(3):387 – 424.

  5. Blume, L. E. (1996). Population games. Working Papers 96-04-022, Santa Fe Institute.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  6. Blume, L. E. (2003). How noise matters. Games and Economic Behavior, 44(2):251–271. –27– Cabrales, A., Nagel, R., and Armenter, R. (2007). Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study. Experimental Economics, 10(3):221–234.

  7. Conlisk, J. (1993a). Adaptation in games: Two solutions to the crawford puzzle. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 22(1):25–50.

  8. Conlisk, J. (1993b). Adaptive tactics in games: Further solutions to the crawford puzzle. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 22(1):51–68.

  9. Cox, D. R. (1958). The regression analysis of binary sequences. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological), pages 215–242.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  10. Crawford, V. (2007). Modeling behavior in novel strategic situations via level-k thinking. Conference slides - North American Economic Science Association Meetings.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  11. Crawford, V. P. (1974). Learning the optimal strategy in a zero-sum game. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 885–891.

  12. Crawford, V. P. (2019). Experiments on cognition, communication, coordination, and cooperation in relationships.

  13. Duffy, J. and Nagel, R. (1997). On the robustness of behaviour in experimental ‘beauty contest’ games. The Economic Journal, 107(445):1684–1700.

  14. Foster, D. and Young, H. P. (1990). Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics. Theoretical Population Biology, 38:219–232.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  15. Geanakoplos, J. and Gray, L. (1991). When seeing further is not seeing better. Bulletin of the Santa Fe Institute, 6(2):1–6.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  16. Gill, D. and Prowse, V. (2016). Cognitive ability, character skills, and learning to play equilibrium: A level-k analysis. Journal of Political Economy, 124(6):1619–1676.

  17. Goeree, J. K. and Holt, C. A. (2004). A model of noisy introspection. Games and Economic Behavior, 46(2):365–382.

  18. Harsanyi, J. C. and Selten, R. (1988). A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. MIT Press Books, 1.

  19. Heinemann, F., Nagel, R., and Ockenfels, P. (2004). The theory of global games on test: experimental analysis of coordination games with public and private information. Econometrica, 72(5):1583–1599.

  20. Heller, Y. (2015). Three steps ahead. Theoretical Economics, 10(1):203–241.

  21. Ho, T.-H. and Su, X. (2013). A dynamic level-k model in sequential games. Management Science, 59(2):452–469. –28– Hwang, S.-H., Lim, W., Neary, P., and Newton, J. (2018). Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: Equality without symmetry. Games and Economic Behavior, 110:273 – 294.

  22. Iijima, R. (2015). Iterated generalized half-dominance and global game selection. Journal of Economic Theory, 159:120–136.

  23. Kandori, M., Mailath, G. J., and Rob, R. (1993). Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games. Econometrica, 61(1):29–56.

  24. Khan, A. and Peeters, R. (2014). Cognitive hierarchies in adaptive play. International Journal of Game Theory, 43(4):903–924.

  25. Lim, W. and Neary, P. R. (2016). An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics. Games and Economic Behavior, 100:208–219.

  26. Mäs, M. and Nax, H. H. (2016). A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games. Journal of Economic Theory, 162:195–208.

  27. Matros, A. (2003). Clever agents in adaptive learning. Journal of Economic Theory, 111(1):110–124.

  28. Mohlin, E. (2012). Evolution of theories of mind. Games and Economic Behavior, 75(1):299–318.

  29. Morris, S., Rob, R., and Shin, H. S. (1995). p-dominance and belief potential. Econometrica, 63:145–157.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  30. Myatt, D. P. and Wallace, C. (2003). Sophisticated play by idiosyncratic agents. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 13(3):319–345.

  31. Myerson, R. (1978). Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept. International Journal of Game Theory, 7:73–80.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  32. Nagel, R. (1995). Unraveling in guessing games: An experimental study. American Economic Review, 85(5):1313–1326.

  33. Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1):48–49.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  34. Newton, J. (2017). Shared intentions: The evolution of collaboration. Games and Economic Behavior, 104:517 – 534.

  35. Newton, J. (2018). Evolutionary game theory: A renaissance. Games, 9(2):31.

  36. Newton, J. (2019). Combining strictly asymmetric choice rules. SSRN Working Paper Series 3433736. –29– Newton, J. (2020). Conventions under heterogeneous behavioural rules. Review of Economic Studies, (https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa063).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  37. Peski, M. (2010). Generalized risk-dominance and asymmetric dynamics. Journal of Economic Theory, 145(1):216 – 248.

  38. Proto, E., Rustichini, A., and Sofianos, A. (2019). Intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation in repeated interactions. Journal of Political Economy, 127(3):1351–1390.

  39. Robalino, N. and Robson, A. (2016). The evolution of strategic sophistication. American Economic Review, 106(4):1046–1072.

  40. Rusch, H. (2019). The evolution of collaboration in symmetric 2×2-games with imperfect recognition of types. Games and Economic Behavior, 114:118–127.

  41. Sáez-Martı, M. and Weibull, J. W. (1999). Clever agents in young’s evolutionary bargaining model. Journal of Economic Theory, 86(2):268–279.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  42. Sandholm, W. H. (2010). Population games and evolutionary dynamics. Economic learning and social evolution. Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  43. Selten, R. (1991). Anticipatory learning in two-person games. In Game equilibrium models I, pages 98–154. Springer.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  44. Stahl, D. O. (1993). Evolution of smartn players. Games and Economic Behavior, 5(4):604– 617.

  45. Stahl, D. O. (1999). Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games. International Journal of Game Theory, 28(1):111–130.

  46. Stahl, D. O. (2000). Rule learning in symmetric normal-form games: theory and evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 32(1):105–138.

  47. Stahl, D. O. and Wilson, P. W. (1994). Experimental evidence on players’ models of other players. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 25(3):309–327.

  48. Stennek, J. (2000). The survival value of assuming others to be rational. International Journal of Game Theory, 29(2):147–163.

  49. Tang, F.-F. (2001). Anticipatory learning in two-person games: some experimental results. Journal of economic behavior & organization, 44(2):221–232.

  50. Van Huyck, J. B., Battalio, R. C., and Beil, R. O. (1990). Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure. American Economic Review, pages 234–248.

  51. Young, H. P. (1993a). The evolution of conventions. Econometrica, 61(1):57–84.

  52. Young, H. P. (1993b). An evolutionary model of bargaining. Journal of Economic Theory, 59(1):145 – 168. –30–

Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes. (2020). Boncinelli, Leonardo ; Bilancini, Ennio.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:69:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s00199-019-01174-y.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under logit choice. (2020). Arigapudi, Srinivas.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:86:y:2020:i:c:p:24-34.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Replicator based on imitation for finite and arbitrary networked communities. (2020). Zazo, S ; Sanz, Jose M.
    In: Applied Mathematics and Computation.
    RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:378:y:2020:i:c:s0096300320301351.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. Repeated minimum-effort coordination games. (2019). Lee, Dongryul ; Kim, Pilwon.
    In: Journal of Evolutionary Economics.
    RePEc:spr:joevec:v:29:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s00191-018-0587-z.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. Learning to Play Efficient Coarse Correlated Equilibria. (2019). Shamma, Jeff S ; Marden, Jason R ; Borowski, Holly P.
    In: Dynamic Games and Applications.
    RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:9:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s13235-018-0244-z.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. Bursts in three-strategy evolutionary ordinal potential games on a square lattice. (2019). Szabo, Gyorgy ; Hodsagi, Kristof .
    In: Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications.
    RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:525:y:2019:i:c:p:1379-1387.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems. (2019). Sawa, Ryoji.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:113:y:2019:i:c:p:633-650.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. Coordination and evolutionary dynamics: When are evolutionary models reliable?. (2019). Stephenson, Daniel.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:113:y:2019:i:c:p:381-395.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. Improved bounds on equilibria solutions in the network design game. (2018). Montemezzani, Simone ; Mihalak, Matu ; Mamageishvili, Akaki.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:47:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-017-0600-z.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  10. The price of anarchy and stability in general noisy best-response dynamics. (2018). Penna, Paolo.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:47:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s00182-017-0601-y.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. Social coordination with locally observable types. (2018). Boncinelli, Leonardo ; Bilancini, Ennio.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:65:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-017-1047-y.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  12. Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance. (2018). Newton, Jonathan.
    In: Games.
    RePEc:gam:jgames:v:9:y:2018:i:2:p:31-:d:148859.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  13. Bifurcation analysis of the rock–paper–scissors game with discrete-time logit dynamics. (2018). Umezuki, Yosuke.
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:95:y:2018:i:c:p:54-65.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  14. Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: Equality without symmetry. (2018). Lim, Wooyoung ; Newton, Jonathan ; Neary, Philip ; Hwang, Sung-Ha.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:110:y:2018:i:c:p:273-294.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  15. Perturbed best response dynamics in a hawk-dove game. (2017). Martínez-Martínez, Ismael ; Martinez-Martinez, Ismael ; Benndorf, Volker.
    In: DICE Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:dicedp:243.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  16. Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games. (2017). Newton, Jonathan ; Hwang, Sung-Ha.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:64:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-016-0988-x.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  17. On the convergence of logit-response to (strict) Nash equilibria. (2017). Netzer, Nick ; Alós-Ferrer, Carlos ; Alos-Ferrer, Carlos.
    In: Economic Theory Bulletin.
    RePEc:spr:etbull:v:5:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-016-0104-1.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  18. Perturbed best response dynamics in a hawk–dove game. (2017). Martínez-Martínez, Ismael ; Benndorf, Volker ; Martinez-Martinez, Ismael.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:153:y:2017:i:c:p:61-64.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  19. Conventional Contracts, Intentional behavior and Logit Choice: Equality Without Symmetry. (2016). Newton, Jonathan ; Lim, Wooyoung ; Hwang, Sung-Ha ; Neary, Philip .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:syd:wpaper:2016-13.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  20. Payoff Dependent Dynamics and Coordination Games. (2016). Newton, Jonathan ; Hwang, Sung-Ha.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:syd:wpaper:2016-12.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  21. An evolutionary approach to social choice problems with q-quota rules. (2016). Sawa, Ryoji ; Okada, Akira.
    In: KIER Working Papers.
    RePEc:kyo:wpaper:936.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  22. Online Discrete Optimization in Social Networks in the Presence of Knightian Uncertainty. (2016). Raginsky, Maxim ; Nedi, Angelia .
    In: Operations Research.
    RePEc:inm:oropre:v:64:y:2016:i:3:p:662-679.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  23. An Adjusted Payoff-Based Procedure for Normal Form Games. (2016). Bravo, Mario .
    In: Mathematics of Operations Research.
    RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:41:y:2016:i:4:p:1469-1483.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  24. A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games. (2016). Mas, Michael ; Nax, Heinrich H.
    In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
    RePEc:ehl:lserod:65422.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  25. A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games. (2016). Mas, Michael ; Nax, Heinrich H.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:162:y:2016:i:c:p:195-208.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  26. Large Deviations and Stochastic Stability in the Small Noise Double Limit, II: The Logit Model. (2016). Staudigl, Mathias ; Sandholm, William.
    In: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:bie:wpaper:506.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  27. Large Deviations and Stochastic Stability in the Small Noise Double Limit, I: Theory. (2016). Staudigl, Mathias ; Sandholm, William.
    In: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:bie:wpaper:505.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  28. Games with the Total Bandwagon Property. (2015). Honda, Jun.
    In: Department of Economics Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wiw:wus005:4582.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  29. Games with the Total Bandwagon Property. (2015). Honda, Jun.
    In: Department of Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:wiw:wiwwuw:wuwp197.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  30. Learning and market clearing: theory and experiments. (2015). Kirchsteiger, Georg ; Alós-Ferrer, Carlos ; Alos-Ferrer, Carlos.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:60:y:2015:i:2:p:203-241.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  31. Robust stochastic stability. (2015). Netzer, Nick ; Alós-Ferrer, Carlos ; Alos-Ferrer, Carlos.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:58:y:2015:i:1:p:31-57.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  32. Stochastic Stability in a Learning Dynamic with Best Response to Noisy Play. (2015). Kah, Christopher ; Walzl, Markus .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:inn:wpaper:2015-15.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  33. A piecewise-constant congestion taxing policy for repeated routing games. (2015). Farokhi, Farhad ; Johansson, Karl H.
    In: Transportation Research Part B: Methodological.
    RePEc:eee:transb:v:78:y:2015:i:c:p:123-143.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  34. Game Theory and Distributed Control****Supported AFOSR/MURI projects #FA9550-09-1-0538 and #FA9530-12-1-0359 and ONR projects #N00014-09-1-0751 and #N0014-12-1-0643.. (2015). Marden, Jason R. ; Shamma, Jeff S..
    In: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications.
    RePEc:eee:gamchp:v:4:y:2015:i:c:p:861-899.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  35. Coupled social and ecological dynamics of herders in Mongolian rangelands. (2015). Lee, Joung Hun ; Iwasa, Yoh ; Okuro, Toshiya ; Kakinuma, Kaoru .
    In: Ecological Economics.
    RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:114:y:2015:i:c:p:208-217.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  36. Stochastic stability in coalitional bargaining problems. (2014). Sawa, Ryoji.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:58037.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  37. A Game-Theoretic Approach to Graph Clustering. (2014). Kumara, Soundar ; Mandala, Supreet ; Chatterjee, Kalyan.
    In: INFORMS Journal on Computing.
    RePEc:inm:orijoc:v:26:y:2014:i:3:p:629-643.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  38. Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets. (2014). Sawa, Ryoji.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:88:y:2014:i:c:p:90-111.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  39. The Emergent Seed: A Representation Theorem for Models of Stochastic Evolution and two formulas for Waiting Time. (2014). Hasker, Kevin .
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000954.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  40. The evolution of conventions in minimum effort games. (2013). Negroni, Giorgio ; Bagnoli, Lidia .
    In: Research in Economics.
    RePEc:eee:reecon:v:67:y:2013:i:3:p:259-277.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  41. Dynamics in near-potential games. (2013). Ozdaglar, Asuman ; Parrilo, Pablo A. ; Candogan, Ozan.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:66-90.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  42. Evolution of repeated prisoners dilemma play under logit dynamics. (2013). Ochea, Marius-Ionut .
    In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
    RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:37:y:2013:i:12:p:2483-2499.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  43. Log-linear dynamics and local potential. (2012). tercieux, olivier ; Okada, Daijiro .
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:3:p:1140-1164.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  44. Revisiting log-linear learning: Asynchrony, completeness and payoff-based implementation. (2012). Marden, Jason R. ; Shamma, Jeff S..
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:788-808.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  45. Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games. (2012). Staudigl, Mathias.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:1:p:372-401.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  46. Nonspecific Networking. (2011). Solal, Philippe ; Durieu, Jacques ; Haller, Hans.
    In: Games.
    RePEc:gam:jgames:v:2:y:2011:i:1:p:87-113:d:11358.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  47. Potential games in volatile environments. (2011). Staudigl, Mathias.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:1:p:271-287.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  48. General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions. (2010). Kirchsteiger, Georg ; Alós-Ferrer, Carlos ; Alos-Ferrer, Carlos.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:44:y:2010:i:3:p:339-360.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  49. Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature. (2010). Weidenholzer, Simon.
    In: Games.
    RePEc:gam:jgames:v:1:y:2010:i:4:p:551-585:d:10210.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  50. Diversity-induced resonance in the response to social norms. (). Schweitzer, Frank ; Sanchez, Angel ; Tessone, Claudio J..
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:stz:wpaper:eth-rc-12-017.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Coauthors

Authors registered in RePEc who have wrote about the same topic

Report date: 2024-12-14 03:53:44 || Missing content? Let us know

CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Sponsored by INOMICS. Last updated October, 6 2023. Contact: CitEc Team.