Papers by Isabelle Guinaudeau
This article analyses a paradoxical effect of the 2012 presidential campaign: the rise of public ... more This article analyses a paradoxical effect of the 2012 presidential campaign: the rise of public support for nuclear energy production less than a year after the Fukushima disaster. Based on analyses of survey data, media coverage and party manifestos, this article shows at the macro and micro-level that the rise of public support was a result of extensive mediatisation of the nuclear issue, its unprecedented politicisation by the political parties, and its reframing by the mainstream conservative UMP and the pro-nuclear interest groups in terms of economic efficiency rather than risks. These results allow us to draw several conclusions regarding campaign effects, connections between individual positions and party identification, and media impact on political competition.
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Do Elections (Still) Matter?
The absence of significant agenda-setting effects of party platforms in the UK, as found in all o... more The absence of significant agenda-setting effects of party platforms in the UK, as found in all other countries, seems counterintuitive: the comparative literature would predict the greatest impact in majoritarian systems, while counter-majoritarian institutions are meant to dilute governing parties’ policymaking powers. Comparing different political and institutional configurations in each country over time, we can confirm such a moderating impact of counter-majoritarian institutions and coalition constraints. We then show that party incentives may help to disentangle the British paradox. High incentives in electoral periods are associated with strong programme-to-policy linkages, in particular in the UK. We conclude that majoritarian systems provide governing parties with extended institutional powers to implement their mandate, although this may limit their incentives: opposition parties have less opportunity to pressurize them and scrutinize any drift away from mandate prioritie...
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Do Elections (Still) Matter?
This chapter explores the implications of mandate theories of democracy through the lens of agend... more This chapter explores the implications of mandate theories of democracy through the lens of agenda-setting, looking at the impact of priorities emphasized in party manifestos on the legislative agenda. It examines the respective impact of the priorities in the manifesto of the party of the prime minister, the parties in the government coalition (where applicable), and all parliamentary parties (systemic attention). Using panel negative binomial regressions of legislative and electoral priorities, the conclusion is that mandate priorities do affect government policies to a greater extent than scholarship has so far acknowledged. And this does not seem to have changed over time. The agenda-setting impact of mandates is supported by qualitative observations on promises and policy in France and Germany. The only exception to this effect is the UK, which is surprising in view of arguments on institutional capacity, clarity of responsibility, and enhanced accountability in majoritarian sy...
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Do Elections (Still) Matter?
This chapter presents a general theoretical framework to analyse party competition and its effect... more This chapter presents a general theoretical framework to analyse party competition and its effects on policymaking. There are two perspectives: that parties still matter for policymaking despite signs of decline and that parties are driven by instrumental considerations and will do what it takes to get elected. This chapter adopts an intermediary perspective, arguing that campaign priorities not only reflect partisan preferences, but also respond to rival parties’ campaigns. This leads to an important common ground across different parties regarding their issue emphasis, i.e. the ‘tunnel’ of attention. Moving away from the heart of the tunnel is possible, but potentially costly. Post election, the victorious party will deliver on its programme priorities not least because of the pressure of junior coalition partners and the opposition. The tunnel of attention thus constrains party competition, but triggers mandate implementation.
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Do Elections (Still) Matter?
This introduction briefly presents the central debates, challenges and puzzles addressed in the b... more This introduction briefly presents the central debates, challenges and puzzles addressed in the book. The focus is on the policy relevance of election campaigns, approached through the lens of two core requirements, i.e. differentiation in the electoral supply and mandate responsiveness. The chapter describes the climate of scepticism that prevails as to how contemporary democracies meet these principles. It points to current approaches limitations’ in conceptual and empirical terms. It then delineates the main arguments of the book’s alternative approach. Based on an agenda-setting perspective, our theoretical framework bridges studies of policy and issue competition, relying on unique empirical evidence covering five West European countries since the 1980s. Finally, the chapter provides an outline of the remaining chapters.
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Revue Francaise de Science Politique, 2018
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Handwörterbuch der deutsch-französischen Beziehungen, 2015
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The design of government portfolios, i.e. the distribution of competencies among government minis... more The design of government portfolios, i.e. the distribution of competencies among government ministries and office holders, constitutes a largely ignored aspect of executive and coalition politics. In this manuscript, we argue that portfolio design is a substantively and theoretically relevant phenomenon with major implications for the study of institutional design and coalition politics. Based on comparative data on portfolio design changes in nine Western European countries since the 1970s, we show how the design of government portfolios changes over time. Specifically, we show that portfolio design is changed frequently (on average about once a year) and that these reforms are more likely after changes in the prime ministership and the party composition of the government. Our findings suggest a political logic behind these reforms based on the preferences and power of political parties and politicians. They have major implications for the study of institutional design and coalitio...
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This article studies the link between electoral pledges to voters and the policies effectively im... more This article studies the link between electoral pledges to voters and the policies effectively implemented once in power, with a focus on Nicolas Sarkozy’s term in office (2007-2012). In order to bridge the gap between representative mandate theories and contrasting results in the “do-parties-matter” literature, we treat this question from a new angle, focused on pledges made in electoral manifestos. We start by systematically evaluating each pledge made by Nicolas Sarkozy in the 2007 campaign. Then, we assess how far these pledges were respected during the presidential term. Finally, we try to evaluate whether some types of pledges are more likely to be fulfilled than others. If more than half of the 164 pledges made in Nicolas Sarkozy’s manifesto have been at least partially implemented, some types of pledges tend to be more respected than others. This is notably the case of “hard” (precisely formulated) pledges, as well as pledges regarding means (rather than ends).
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National audienc
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National audienc
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JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 2021
This article complements analyses of the partisan politicization of the European Parliament from ... more This article complements analyses of the partisan politicization of the European Parliament from roll-call votes with an analysis of political groups' use of parliamentary questions. Questions offer an institutional opening for issue politicization and for partisan differentiation. Parliamentary groups have incentives to shape EU policies by drawing the attention to their topics of predilection and by controlling ongoing action. We make use of a new dataset on questions for oral answer (2004–19) to test if this results in European party groups emphasizing differentiated topics in their questions to the Commission and the Council. Our analyses confirm groups' differentiated issue attention. These findings have important implications for understanding the partisan politicization of EU policies and confirming the truly political nature of deliberation in the EP. They reveal patterns of partisan opposition different from those expressed in votes and emphasize the relevance of parliamentary questions as a key institutional window for politicization.
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Revue française de science politique, 2018
Cet article explore les facteurs et les mecanismes qui interviennent dans la realisation des prom... more Cet article explore les facteurs et les mecanismes qui interviennent dans la realisation des promesses electorales – un aspect central du fonctionnement du gouvernement representatif. Apres un tour d’horizon de la litterature disponible, nous presentons le modele conditionnel de respect des promesses qui structure ce numero : une promesse electorale a d’autant plus de chances d’etre tenue que le pouvoir executif est motive a tenir parole et qu’il a la capacite pour le faire. Nous explicitons ensuite la maniere dont chaque cas d’etude a ete selectionne pour evaluer la pertinence et les limites de ce modele, puis nous presentons chacune des contributions, en mettant en evidence des pistes de lecture transversales. En combinant sociologie politique et sociologie de l’action publique, ce numero ameliore notre comprehension des logiques de motivations et de capacite qui conditionnent le respect, ou non, des promesses electorales. La capacite du pouvoir executif a tenir parole releve de dimensions institutionnelles, operationnelles et politiques ; ses motivations s’averent, elles, largement determinees par les caracteristiques des publics cibles par les promesses electorales.
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Gouvernement et action publique, 2017
A partir de l’exemple de la presidence de Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012), cet article etudie le lien... more A partir de l’exemple de la presidence de Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012), cet article etudie le lien entre les politiques promises aux electeurs lors de la campagne et celles qui sont effectivement mises en œuvre pendant le quinquennat. Face au decalage entre les theories du mandat representatif et les resultats des travaux sur l’influence des partis sur les politiques publiques, nous adoptons une approche differente, centree sur les promesses electorales. A partir d’un recensement systematique des promesses presentes dans le programme electoral de Nicolas Sarkozy, nous retracons le devenir de chaque promesse, puis nous cherchons a identifier des types de promesses mieux tenues. Si un peu plus de la moitie des 164 promesses presentes dans le programme de Nicolas Sarkozy de 2007 ont ete tenues, certains types de promesses sont mieux respectes que d’autres. C’est notamment le cas des engagements formules precisement, ainsi que de ceux qui annoncent la mise en œuvre d’un moyen, plutot que la realisation d’un objectif.
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West European Politics, 2016
Abstract Do prime ministers pay an electoral penalty for using procedural force to pass laws? Inf... more Abstract Do prime ministers pay an electoral penalty for using procedural force to pass laws? Influential theories of parliamentary governance and legislative bargaining assume that the use of the confidence vote procedure – parliamentary governments’ most powerful legislative weapon – entails an electoral cost, but evidence on this important claim has been scarce. This article provides the first estimates of how prime ministers’ public approval responds to their use of the confidence vote. Analysing time series data from France 1979–2008, it is found that prime ministers experience a considerable drop in approval after their use of the confidence vote that is not accounted for by standard economic and political covariates. The effect size is similar to a 1 per cent decline in economic growth. The findings help explain French prime ministers’ selective use of the confidence vote procedure. They also suggest that political costs constrain the bargaining power conferred by the confidence vote.
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West European Politics, 2017
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Handwörterbuch der deutsch-französischen Beziehungen, 2015
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Papers by Isabelle Guinaudeau