These notes sketch a modification of Kripke's theory of truth, within which it seems possible to reconstruct so-called" naive semantics" in an unexpectedly systematic way. This is something which does not seem to have been undertaken before, and perhaps could not have been undertaken without the guidance of Kripke [9].

Various authors have used the term" naive semantics" to refer to some primordial beliefs about the concept of truth, which are held responsible for the semantic paradoxes. The term invokes some analogy with" naive set theory", but there is a prominent disanalogy: whereas naive set theory was a highly developed mathematical discipline, its counterpart in semantics has never been systematically worked out. In fact, there is a widespread opinion, expressed in the writings of Tarski and others, that naive semantics could not be systematically worked out because it is a fundamentally incoherent, or inconsistent, or otherwise logically defective body of beliefs (see [18] p. 267).