6RUTH 69I of itself" that it satisfies Q (x). If Q (x) is the predicate''is false', the Liar paradox results. As an example, let P (x) abbreviate the predicate'has tokens printed in copies of the Journal of Philosophy, November 6, 1975, p. 691, line 5'. Then the sentence:(x)(P (x) n Q (x)) leads to paradox if Q (x) is interpreted as falsehood. The versions of the Liar paradox which use empirical predicates already point up one major aspect of the problem: many, probably most, of our ordinary assertions about truth and falsity are liable, if the empiricalfacts are extremely unfavorable, to exhibit paradoxicalfeatures. Consider the ordinary statement, made by Jones:(1) Most (ie, a majority) of Nixon's assertions about Watergate are false.

Clearly, nothing is intrinsically wrong with (1), nor is it ill-formed. Ordinarily the truth value of (1) will be ascertainable through an enumeration of Nixon's Watergate-related assertions, and an assess-ment of each for truth or falsity. Suppose, however, that Nixon's assertions about Watergate are evenly balanced between the true and the false, except for one problematic case,(2) Everything Jones says about Watergate is true. Suppose, in addition, that (1) is Jones's sole assertion about Watergate, or alternatively, that all his Watergate-related assertions except perhaps (1) are true. Then it requires little expertise to show