Bayesian combinatorial auctions: Expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers

S Alaei - SIAM Journal on Computing, 2014 - SIAM
SIAM Journal on Computing, 2014SIAM
We present a general framework for approximately reducing the mechanism design problem
for multiple agents to single agent subproblems in the context of Bayesian combinatorial
auctions. Our framework can be applied to any setting which roughly satisfies the following
assumptions:(i) agents' types are distributed independently (not necessarily identically),(ii)
objective function is additively separable over the agents, and (iii) there are no interagent
constraints except for the supply constraints (ie, that the total allocation of each item should …
We present a general framework for approximately reducing the mechanism design problem for multiple agents to single agent subproblems in the context of Bayesian combinatorial auctions. Our framework can be applied to any setting which roughly satisfies the following assumptions: (i) agents' types are distributed independently (not necessarily identically), (ii) objective function is additively separable over the agents, and (iii) there are no interagent constraints except for the supply constraints (i.e., that the total allocation of each item should not exceed the supply). Our framework is general in the sense that it makes no direct assumption about agents' valuations, type distributions, or single agent constraints (e.g., budget, incentive compatibility, etc.). We present two generic multiagent mechanisms which use single agent mechanisms as black boxes. If an -approximate single agent mechanism is available for each agent, and assuming no agent ever demands more than of all units of each item, our generic multiagent mechanisms are -approximations of the optimal multiagent mechanism, where is a constant which is at least . As a byproduct of our construction, we present a generalization of prophet inequalities where both gambler and prophet are allowed to pick numbers each to receive a reward equal to their sum. Finally, we use our framework to obtain multiagent mechanisms with improved approximation factor for several settings from the literature.
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