We report experimental results from long sequences of decisions in environments that are
theoretically prone to severe information cascades. Observed behaviour is much different—…

We combine survey data on friendship networks and individual characteristics with
experimental observations from dictator games. Dictator offers are primarily explained by social …

This paper applies the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model to study overbidding in
private-values auctions. Experimental evidence shows that the prevalence of overbidding …

An increase in the common marginal value of a public good has two effects: it increases the
benefit of a contribution to others, and it reduces the net cost of making a contribution. These …

This paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once. These games span
the standard categories: static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information…

We show that standard winner‐pay auctions are inept fund‐raising mechanisms because of
the positive externality bidders forgo if they top another’s high bid. Revenues are …

The structural Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) generalizes the Nash equilibrium by
augmenting payoffs with random elements that are not removed in some limit. This approach …

In experimental studies of behavior in 2×2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria,
observed choice frequencies are systematically different from mixed-strategy Nash predictions. …

This paper considers auctions where bidders compete for an advantage in future strategic
interactions. When bidders wish to exaggerate their private information, equilibrium bidding …

We study the effects of deliberation on collective decisions. In a series of experiments, we
vary groups' preference distributions (between common and conflicting interests) and the …