Communication Leading to Coalition Nash Equilibrium I
T Matsuhisa - Advanced Methods and Technologies for Agent …, 2013 - ebooks.iospress.nl
This paper is to introduce the new concept of coalition Nash equilibrium of a strategic game,
and to show that a communication among the players in a coalition leads to the equilibrium
through messages. A coalition Nash equilibrium for a strategic game consists of (1) a subset
S of players,(2) independent mixed strategies for each member of S,(3) the conjecture of the
actions for the other players not in S with the condition that each member of S maximises
his/her expected payoff according to the product of all mixed strategies for S and the other …
and to show that a communication among the players in a coalition leads to the equilibrium
through messages. A coalition Nash equilibrium for a strategic game consists of (1) a subset
S of players,(2) independent mixed strategies for each member of S,(3) the conjecture of the
actions for the other players not in S with the condition that each member of S maximises
his/her expected payoff according to the product of all mixed strategies for S and the other …
Communication leading to coalition Nash equilibrium II-S4n-knowledge case
T Matsuhisa - … Symposium on Operations Research and its …, 2013 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
In this paper the new concept of coalition Nash equilibrium of a strategic game is introduced,
and it is shown that a communication among the players in a coalition leads to the
equilibrium through messages. A coalition Nash equilibrium for a strategic game consists of
(1) a subset S of players,(2) independent mixed strategies for each member of S,(3) the
conjecture of the actions for the other players not in S with the condition that each member of
S maximises his/her expected payoff according to the product of all mixed strategies for S …
and it is shown that a communication among the players in a coalition leads to the
equilibrium through messages. A coalition Nash equilibrium for a strategic game consists of
(1) a subset S of players,(2) independent mixed strategies for each member of S,(3) the
conjecture of the actions for the other players not in S with the condition that each member of
S maximises his/her expected payoff according to the product of all mixed strategies for S …
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