US8005460B2 - Group authentication method - Google Patents
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- US8005460B2 US8005460B2 US12/025,771 US2577108A US8005460B2 US 8005460 B2 US8005460 B2 US 8005460B2 US 2577108 A US2577108 A US 2577108A US 8005460 B2 US8005460 B2 US 8005460B2
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/065—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for group communications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
- H04L9/0833—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] involving conference or group key
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
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- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
- H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
Definitions
- the present invention generally relates to an authentication method, in particular, to a group authentication method.
- AKA authentication and key agreement
- UMTS universal mobile telecommunications system
- an AKA mechanism usually includes two procedures: a. registration and authentication data distribution; and b. user authentication and key agreement.
- the serving network requests the related authentication data of the mobile station from a home network of the mobile station.
- the serving network and the mobile station generate a series of challenge messages and response messages, and generate a master session key which can be used after the authentication succeeds.
- FIG. 1 is a flowchart of the UMTS AKA authentication method adaptable to a communication system.
- the communication system includes a mobile station MS 1 , a serving network SN, and a home network HN.
- the mobile station MS 1 and the home network HN have a pre-distributed secret key K (referring to FIG. 2 ), and the home network HN and the mobile station MS 1 have a message authentication code (MAC) generation function f 1 , an authentication message generation function f 2 , a cipher key generation function f 3 , and a integrity key generation function f 4 .
- the home network HN further has an authentication key generation function f 5 and a plurality of authentication management fields (AMFs).
- AMFs authentication management fields
- the serving network SN and the home network HN respectively have a database for recording the required data during the authentication process.
- the mobile station MS 1 roamings, the mobile station MS 1 has to perform a full authentication with the serving network SN, wherein the full authentication includes an identification step 100 , an authentication vector obtaining step 101 , and a user authentication and key distribution step 102 .
- the identification step 100 and the authentication vector obtaining step 101 belong to aforementioned registration and authentication data distribution procedure, and the user authentication and key distribution step 102 belongs to abovementioned user authentication and key agreement procedure.
- the UMTS AKA authentication method includes the following steps while it is applied to a communication system.
- the identification step 100 is executed as follows.
- the serving network SN requests the mobile station MS 1 for an identification data.
- the mobile station MS 1 generates the identification data and sends the identification data to the serving network SN.
- the identification data contains an ID of the mobile station MS 1 so that the serving network SN can identify the mobile station MS 1 based on the ID.
- the serving network SN receives the identification data from the mobile station MS 1 and identifies the mobile station MS 1 , and an exclusive information field of the mobile station MS 1 is established in the database of the serving network SN based on the identification data.
- the authentication vector obtaining step 101 is executed.
- the serving network SN sends the identification data to the home network HN and requests the authentication vectors of the mobile station MS 1 from the home network HN.
- the home network HN receives the identification data and generates a plurality of authentication vectors AV( 1 ), AV( 2 ), . . . , AV(n) based on the identification data, and then the home network HN sends the authentication vectors AV( 1 ) ⁇ AV(n) to the serving network SN.
- the authentication vectors AV( 1 ) ⁇ AV(n) are stored in the database of the serving network SN.
- the user authentication and key distribution step 102 is executed in following steps to complete the authentication of the mobile station MS 1 .
- the serving network SN selects an authentication vector AV(i) from the database thereof and sends RAND(i) and AUTN(i) in the authentication vector AV(i) to the mobile station MS 1 (will be described below with reference to FIG. 2 ).
- the mobile station MS 1 authenticates the home network HN based on RAND(i) and AUTN(i) in the authentication vector AV(i) (will be described below with reference to FIG. 3 ).
- step 102 c the mobile station MS 1 generates a mobile station authentication data RES(i) based on RAND(i) in the authentication vector AV(i) and the pre-distributed secret key K and sends the mobile station authentication data RES(i) to the serving network SN if the mobile station MS 1 successfully authenticates the home network HN.
- the serving network SN receives the mobile station authentication data RES(i), and the serving network SN authenticates the mobile station MS 1 based on the mobile station authentication data RES(i) and generates an authentication result.
- step 102 e the serving network SN sends the authentication result to the mobile station MS 1 .
- step 102 f the mobile station MS 1 receives and confirms the authentication result.
- step 102 g if the authentication result shows that the serving network SN has successfully authenticated the mobile station MS 1 , the serving network SN selects a cipher key CK(i) and a integrity key IK(i) to secure the later communication, and the mobile station MS 1 inputs RAND(i) and the pre-distributed secret key K into the cipher key generation function f 3 and the integrity key generation function f 4 to calculate the cipher key CK(i) and the integrity key IK(i) correspondingly.
- FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating how the authentication vector AV(i) is generated in the UMTS AKA authentication method.
- the home network HN searches for the secret key K of the mobile station MS 1 from the database of the home network HN based on the ID of mobile station MS 1 in the identification data (step 200 ), and generates a sequence number SQN(i) (step 201 ) and a random number RAND(i) (step 202 ).
- the home network HN inputs the random number RAND(i), the secret key K, the sequence number SQN(i), and a plurality of AMFs AMF into the MAC generation function f 1 to generate a MAC MAC(i); the home network HN inputs the random number RAND(i) and the secret key K into the authentication message generation function f 2 to generate an authentication message for eXpexted RESponse XRES(i); the home network HN inputs the random number RAND(i) and the secret key K into the cipher key generation function f 3 to generate the cipher key CK(i); the home network HN inputs the random number RAND(i) and the secret key K into the integrity key generation function f 4 to generate the integrity key IK(i); the home network HN inputs the random number RAND(i) and the secret key K into the anonymity key generation function f 5 to generate an anonymity key AK(i); and the home network HN further performs an XOR calculation on the sequence number S
- FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating how the mobile station MS 1 authenticates the home network HN and generates the mobile station authentication data RES(i) based on RAND(i) and AUTN(i) sent by the serving network SN.
- the mobile station MS 1 inputs the random number RAND(i) and the pre-distributed secret key K of the mobile station MS 1 into the anonymity key generation function f 5 to generate the anonymity key AK(i).
- the mobile station MS 1 performs an XOR calculation on the result of SQN(i) ⁇ AK(i) in AUTN(i) with the anonymity key AK(i) generated by the mobile station MS 1 to acquire the sequence number SQN(i).
- the mobile station MS 1 inputs the AMFs AMF, the sequence number SQN(i) derived by the mobile station MS 1 , and the secret key K of the mobile station MS 1 into the MAC generation function f 1 to generate an eXpected MAC XMAC(i).
- the mobile station MS 1 compares the MAC XMAC(i) with the MAC MAC(i) in the AUTN(i) received from the serving network SN to authenticate the home network HN.
- the mobile station MS 1 If the result of comparison shows match which means that the mobile station MS 1 successfully authenticates the home network HN, the mobile station MS 1 inputs the random number RAND(i) received from the serving network SN and the secret key K of the mobile station MS 1 into the authentication message generation function f 2 to generate the mobile station authentication data RES(i). Meanwhile, the mobile station MS 1 also inputs the secret key K of the mobile station MS 1 and the random number RAND(i) received from the serving network SN into the cipher key generation function f 3 and the integrity key generation function f 4 to generate the cipher key CK(i) and the integrity key IK(i) which will be used to provide security for subsequent communication. The mobile station MS 1 sends the mobile station authentication data RES(i) to the serving network SN. The serving network SN then compares the mobile station authentication data RES(i) with the authentication message expected RESponse XRES(i) in order to authenticate the mobile station MS 1 .
- FIG. 1 illustrates only the situation that both the authentications succeed.
- the UMTS AKA generates individual authentication data for each mobile stations which causes the signaling overhead between the serving network SN and the home network HN since the authentication data request and response messages are repeated and transmitted for all mobile stations in the same group.
- the database of the serving network SN requires a large storage space for storing the authentication vectors AV( 1 ) ⁇ AV(n) that support at most n authentications.
- the home network HN cannot authenticate the mobile station MS 1 , namely, the home network HN cannot determine whether the mobile station MS 1 , who requests the authentication vectors AV( 1 ) ⁇ AV(n) from the home network HN through the serving network SN, is legitimate or not.
- FIG. 4 illustrates an authentication flow when a mobile station MS 1 hands off for the first time based on a UMTS X-AKA authentication method disclosed in the article “Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for UMTS with Low Bandwidth Consumption” published in IEEE AINA 2005.
- the UMTS X-AKA authentication method is suitable for a communication system which includes a mobile station MS 1 , a serving network SN, and a home network HN.
- the mobile station MS 1 and the home network HN both have a pre-distributed secret key.
- the serving network SN and the home network HN have a database respectively.
- the full authentication includes an identification step 400 , an authentication data obtaining step 401 , and a user authentication and key distribution step 402 , where the identification step 400 and the authentication data obtaining step 401 belong to the aforementioned registration and authentication data distribution procedure, and the user authentication and key distribution step 402 belongs to the abovementioned user authentication and key agreement procedure.
- the UMTS X-AKA authentication method includes the following steps while it is applied to a communication system.
- the serving network SN sends an identification data request to the mobile station MS 1 .
- the mobile station MS 1 generates the identification data and a timestamp t and then sends the identification data and the timestamp t back to the serving network SN, where the identification data contains an ID of the mobile station MS 1 so that the serving network SN can identify the mobile station MS 1 based on the ID.
- the serving network SN receives the identification data from the mobile station MS 1 and identifies the mobile station MS 1 in the database of the serving network SN.
- step 401 If the authentication data of the mobile station MS 1 is not recorded in the database, an exclusive information field for the mobile station MS 1 is established in the database of the serving network SN based on the identification data and step 401 is then executed; if the authentication data and a temporary authentication key of the mobile station MS 1 are recorded in the database, the serving network SN selects the authentication data and the temporary authentication key from the database, and step 501 as illustrated in FIG. 5 is executed consequently.
- the next step is assumed to be step 401 (for the convenience of description, the mobile station MS 1 is assumed to hand off for the first time).
- the authentication data obtaining step 401 is executed in following steps.
- the serving network SN sends the identification data and the timestamp t to the home network HN and requests the authentication data of the mobile station MS 1 from the home network HN.
- the home network HN receives the identification data and the timestamp t and generates the authentication data (containing a temporary authentication key) based on the identification data and the timestamp t, and then the home network HN sends the authentication data to the serving network SN.
- the authentication data and the temporary authentication key are stored in the database of the serving network SN.
- the user authentication and key distribution step 402 is executed by following the steps below to complete the full authentication of the mobile station MS 1 .
- the serving network SN generates a serving network authentication data and a random number and then sends the serving network authentication data and the random number to the mobile station MS 1 .
- the mobile station MS 1 authenticates the home network HN and the serving network SN based on the serving network authentication data and the random number.
- step 402 c the mobile station MS 1 generates a mobile station authentication data based on a part of the serving network authentication data and the temporary authentication key generated by the mobile station MS 1 , and then sends the mobile station authentication data to the serving network SN if the mobile station MS 1 in step 402 b successfully authenticates the serving network SN.
- step 402 d after the serving network SN receives the mobile station authentication data, the serving network SN authenticates the mobile station MS 1 based on the mobile station authentication data and generates an authentication result.
- step 402 e the serving network SN sends the authentication result to the mobile station MS 1 .
- step 402 f the mobile station MS 1 receives and confirms the authentication result.
- step 402 g if the authentication result shows that the serving network SN has successfully authenticated the mobile station MS 1 , the mobile station MS 1 and the serving network SN generate a master key respectively based on the temporary authentication key and the random number generated by the serving network SN to secure the later data transmission.
- FIG. 5 illustrates an authentication flow based on the UMTS X-AKA authentication method for the subsequent authentication requests after the mobile station MS 1 hands off for the first time.
- This procedure includes an identification step 500 and a user authentication and key distribution step 501 , wherein the identification step 500 belongs to aforementioned registration and authentication data distribution procedure, and the user authentication and key distribution step 501 belongs to aforementioned user authentication and key agreement procedure.
- the serving network SN determines whether the authentication data and temporary authentication key of the mobile station MS 1 already existed in the database of the serving network SN. If the authentication data and temporary authentication key of the mobile station MS 1 have been stored in the database of the serving network SN, the serving network SN stops requesting the authentication data and temporary authentication key from the home network HN. The authentication data and temporary authentication key of the mobile station MS 1 can be found in the database of the serving network SN since it is not the first time that the mobile station MS 1 hands off.
- the identification step 500 is executed as follows.
- the serving network SN sends an identification data request to the mobile station MS 1 .
- the mobile station MS 1 generates the identification data and a timestamp t and sends the identification data and the timestamp t to the serving network SN, where the identification data contains an ID of the mobile station MS 1 so that the serving network SN can identify the mobile station MS 1 based on the ID.
- the serving network SN receives the identification data generated by the mobile station MS 1 and identifies the mobile station MS 1 .
- the serving network SN searches for the authentication data and temporary authentication key of the mobile station MS 1 in the database of the serving network SN.
- FIG. 5 illustrates the situation that the authentication data and temporary authentication key of the mobile station MS 1 have been stored in the database of the serving network SN, thus, the serving network SN can locate the authentication data and temporary authentication key of the mobile station MS 1 in the database.
- the user authentication and key distribution step 501 is executed in the following steps to complete the authentication of the mobile station MS 1 .
- the serving network SN generates a serving network authentication data and a random number and sends the serving network authentication data and the random number to the mobile station MS 1 .
- the mobile station MS 1 authenticates the serving network SN based on the serving network authentication data and the random number.
- the mobile station MS 1 generates a mobile station authentication data based on a part of the authentication data and the temporary authentication key generated previously by the mobile station MS 1 and sends the mobile station authentication data to the serving network SN if the mobile station MS 1 successfully authenticates the serving network SN.
- step 501 d the serving network SN receives the mobile station authentication data, authenticates the mobile station MS 1 based on the mobile station authentication data, and generates an authentication result.
- step 501 e the serving network SN sends the authentication result to the mobile station MS 1 .
- step 501 f the mobile station MS 1 receives and confirms the authentication result.
- step 501 g if the authentication result shows that the serving network SN has successfully authenticated the mobile station MS 1 , the mobile station MS 1 and the serving network SN respectively generate a master key based on the temporary authentication key and the random number to secure the subsequent data transmission.
- the communication system terminates the entire communication or request re-authentication.
- FIG. 4 and FIG. 5 illustrate only the situation that both the authentications succeed.
- the home network HN According to the UMTS X-AKA authentication method, the home network HN generates a temporary authentication key for the serving network SN and authorizes the serving network SN to authenticate the mobile station MS 1 , so that the traffic load between the home network HN and the serving network SN can be reduced when the mobile station MS 1 requests for re-authenticated. Moreover, in the UMTS X-AKA authentication method, the storage space required by the database of the serving network SN is also reduced. However, in the UMTS X-AKA authentication method, the home network HN still cannot authenticate the mobile station MS 1 .
- the UMTS X-AKA When a group of mobile stations perform hand off together, the UMTS X-AKA generates individual authentication data for each mobile stations which causes the signaling overhead between the serving network SN and the home network HN since the authentication data request and response messages are repeated and transmitted for all mobile stations in the same group.
- FIG. 6 is a flowchart of an authentication method disclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 6,711,400.
- the authentication method is adaptable to a communication system which includes a mobile station MS 1 , a serving network SN, and a home network HN.
- the mobile station MS 1 and the home network HN have a pre-distributed secret key, and the serving network SN and the home network HN respectively have a database.
- the mobile station MS 1 hands off, the mobile station MS 1 has to perform a full authentication.
- the authentication method includes an identification step 600 , an authentication data obtaining step 601 , and a user authentication and key distribution step 602 , where the identification step 600 and the authentication data obtaining step 601 belong to the abovementioned registration and authentication data distribution procedure, and the user authentication and key distribution step 602 belongs to the abovementioned user authentication and key agreement procedure.
- the full authentication refers to the execution of the authentication data obtaining step 601 and the user authentication and key distribution step 602 .
- the authentication method includes following steps while it is applied to a communication system.
- the identification step 600 is executed in following steps.
- the mobile station MS 1 generates an identification data by using the pre-distributed secret key and a first random number.
- the mobile station MS 1 then sends the identification data and the first random number to the serving network SN, wherein the identification data contains an ID of the mobile station MS 1 so that the serving network can identity the mobile station MS 1 based on the ID.
- the serving network SN receives the identification data generated by the mobile station MS 1 and identifies the mobile station MS 1 .
- An exclusive information field of the mobile station MS 1 is established in the database of the serving network SN based on the identification data.
- the authentication data obtaining step 601 is executed in following steps.
- the serving network SN sends the identification data and the first random number to the home network HN and requests an authentication data of the mobile station MS 1 from the home network HN.
- the home network HN receives the identification data and the first random number and selects the secret key based on the identification data.
- the home network HN generates a second random number, and then the authentication data, a cipher key, and a comparison data based on the first random number, the second random number, and the secret key.
- the home network HN sends the authentication data, the cipher key, the comparison data, and the second random number to the serving network SN.
- step 601 d after the serving network SN receives the authentication data, the cipher key, the comparison data, and the second random number, and the cipher key and the comparison data are stored in the database of the serving network SN.
- the user authentication and key distribution step 602 is executed in following steps to complete the authentication of the mobile station MS 1 .
- the serving network SN sends the authentication data and the second random number from the database thereof to the mobile station MS 1 .
- the mobile station MS 1 authenticates the home network HN based on the authentication data.
- the mobile station MS 1 in step 602 c generates a mobile station authentication data and a cipher key based on the pre-distributed secret key and the second random number and sends the mobile station authentication data to the serving network SN.
- step 602 d the serving network SN receives the mobile station authentication data and authenticates the mobile station MS 1 based on the mobile station authentication data and the comparison data in the database and then generates an authentication result.
- step 602 e the serving network SN sends the authentication result to the mobile station MS 1 .
- step 602 f the mobile station MS 1 receives and confirms the authentication result.
- step 602 g if the authentication result shows that the serving network SN has successfully authenticated the mobile station MS 1 , the mobile station MS 1 and the serving network SN calculate a master key to secure the subsequent communication.
- the communication system terminates the entire communication or requests re-authentication.
- FIG. 6 only illustrates the situation that both the authentications succeed.
- the mobile station MS 1 allocates a first random number to the home network HN to ensure the freshness of the authentication data.
- the serving network SN is used only for relaying the authentication data generated by the home network HN and for verifying the mobile station authentication data used for authenticating the mobile station MS 1 ; the serving network SN is not responsible for generation any authentication data.
- this authentication method only one authentication data is generated every time and the generated authentication data can be used for exactly one mobile station just once.
- signalling overhead between the serving network SN and the home network HN is increased if the re-authentication is required or a group of mobile stations perform authentication procedures together, namely, both the traffic load between the serving network SN and the home network HN and the bandwidth wasted are increased.
- Foregoing authentication methods are all designed for the authentication of a single mobile station.
- the serving network SN has to relay an authentication request regarding each mobile station to the same home network HN and then receive the authentication data of each mobile station from the home network HN at the same time.
- This patent proposes a new idea about shared group data for authentication. the group authentication key pre-distribution is achieved through group authentication data sharing, and on the other hand, the bandwidth used for data transmission between the serving network and the home network is reduced by adopting local authentications.
- the present invention relates to a group authentication method adaptable to any communication system which requires remote authentication.
- the communication system includes a user group, a serving network, and a home network.
- the user group includes at least one mobile station.
- the serving network has a database for recording group lists and group authentication data received from the home network.
- the home network pre-distributes a group authentication key and a mobile station authentication key to the mobile station and itself.
- the home network has a database for recording the group lists generated by the home network.
- the serving network identifies the mobile station. in order to determine whether the home network has to provide an authentication data or not.
- the serving network can directly perform a local authentication to the mobile station without informing the home network. If the authentication data of the mobile station does not exist in the database of the serving network, the serving network has to obtain the authentication data from the home network in order to perform a full authentication with the mobile station.
- the mobile station and the home network have a group authentication key and a mobile station authentication key.
- the home network has a group list.
- the mobile station has a mobile station ID, a group number, and an initial value.
- the serving network has a database for recording the group list received from the home network.
- the group authentication method includes the following steps. In step (a), the mobile station generates the identification data which contains the first message authentication code (MAC) and the mobile station ID. In step (b), the identification data is transmitted to the serving network. In step (c), the serving network searches the mobile station ID in the group list in the database.
- MAC message authentication code
- the identification data is transmitted to the home network; the home network generates the second MAC based on the identification data and then compares it with the first MAC; if the first MAC is equal to the second MAC, the home network successfully authenticates the mobile station; the home network generates a group transient key (GTK) based on the group authentication key; the home network transmit the group list and the group authentication data including GTK to the serving network; the serving network records the group list and the group authentication data in the database of the serving network.
- GTK group transient key
- step (d) the serving network generates third MAC based on the group authentication data.
- step (e) the serving network transmits a serving network authentication data which contains the third MAC to the mobile station.
- step (f) the mobile station generates a GTK based on the serving network authentication data, and a fourth MAC based on the GTK just generated.
- step (g) the mobile station compares the third MAC with the fourth MAC. If the third MAC is equal to the fourth MAC, the mobile station successfully authenticates the serving network and the home network.
- step (h) the serving network calculates a master key based on the group authentication data.
- step (i) the mobile station generates the master key and a fifth MAC based on the serving network authentication data and the GTK.
- step (j) the fifth MAC is transmitted to the serving network.
- step (k) the serving network generates a sixth MAC based on the group authentication data.
- step (l) the serving network compares the fifth MAC with the sixth MAC. If the fifth MAC is equal to the sixth MAC, the serving network successfully authenticates the mobile station.
- step (m) the data transmitted between the serving network and the mobile station is protected by the master key so that a secure communication between the serving network and the mobile station is ensured.
- this invention provides a group authentication method based on a group authentication key, i.e. all the mobile stations in the same group share a group authentication key.
- a group authentication key i.e. all the mobile stations in the same group share a group authentication key.
- the serving network obtains the authentication data of the mobile station and a GTK from a home network of the mobile station. Subsequently, all the other mobile stations in the same group can use this GTK for authentication directly. If the serving network tries to authenticate another mobile station of the same group, local authentication can be performed by using the GTK stored in the database of the serving network without requesting the authentication data of the mobile station from the home network again.
- group authentication key can be pre-distributed without extra message exchange. Moreover, handoff delay caused by authentications can be reduced considerably by local authentication.
- FIG. 1 is a flowchart of an UMTS AKA authentication method.
- FIG. 2 illustrates how to generate an authentication vector AV(i) in the UMTS AKA authentication method.
- FIG. 3 illustrates how a mobile station MS 1 authenticates a home network HN and generates a mobile station authentication data RES(i) based on Rand(i) and AUTN(i) sent from the serving network.
- FIG. 4 illustrates an authentication flow when a mobile station MS 1 hands off for the first time based on a UMTS X-AKA authentication method.
- FIG. 5 illustrates an authentication flow after the mobile station MS 1 hands off for the first time based on the UMTS X-AKA authentication method.
- FIG. 6 is a flowchart of an authentication method disclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 6,711,400.
- FIG. 7 is a flowchart of a group authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 8 illustrates a method for generating a message authentication code (MAC) MAC M1-1 in an identification data AUTH M1 provided by the mobile station MS M1-1 in step 700 b illustrated in FIG. 7 .
- MAC message authentication code
- FIG. 9 illustrates how a home network HN authenticates a mobile station MS M1-1 based on the identification data AUTH M1 in step 701 b illustrated in FIG. 7 .
- FIG. 10 illustrates how the home network HN generates a group authentication data AUTH H in step 701 c illustrated in FIG. 7 .
- FIG. 11 illustrates a method for generating a serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-1 in step 702 a illustrated in FIG. 7 .
- FIG. 12 illustrates how the mobile station MS M1-1 authenticates a serving network SN in step 702 b illustrated in FIG. 7 .
- FIG. 13 illustrates a method for calculating a master key MK in step 702 c illustrated in FIG. 7 .
- FIG. 14 illustrates a method for calculating the master key MK and generating a fifth MAC MAC M1 in step 702 d illustrated in FIG. 7 .
- FIG. 15 illustrates a method for generating an authentication result in step 702 e illustrated in FIG. 7 .
- FIG. 16 is a flowchart of a group authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 17 illustrates a method for generating an identification data AUTH M1 in step 1600 b illustrated in FIG. 16 .
- FIG. 18 illustrates a method for generating a serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-2 in step 1602 a illustrated in FIG. 16 .
- FIG. 19 illustrates how a mobile station MS M1-2 authenticates a serving network SN in step 1602 b illustrated in FIG. 16 .
- FIG. 20 illustrates a method for calculating a master key MK in step 1602 c illustrated in FIG. 16 .
- FIG. 21 illustrates a method for calculating the master key MK and generating a fifth MAC MAC M1 in step 1602 d illustrated in FIG. 16 .
- FIG. 22 illustrates a method for generating an authentication result in step 1602 e illustrated in FIG. 16 .
- FIG. 23 illustrates an application of a group authentication method provided by the present invention in an 802.11 network.
- FIG. 24 illustrates an application of a group authentication method provided by the present invention for mobile routers.
- the present invention proposes a concept and an infrastructure of group authentication to allow the mobile stations in the same group to share a group authentication data to enhance the authentication efficiency when a group of mobile stations hand off.
- FIG. 7 is a flowchart of a group authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention, in which a mobile station hands off for the first time among all the mobile stations in the same group.
- the group authentication method is adaptable to a communication system which includes a mobile station group M 1 , a serving network SN, and a home network HN.
- the mobile station group M 1 includes mobile stations MS M1-1 and MS M1-2 .
- the home network HN allocates the mobile stations MS M1-1 and MS M1-2 to the mobile station group M 1 before the communication system starts to transmit data.
- the home network HN distributes a mobile station authentication key and a group authentication key to the mobile stations MS M1-1 and MS M1-2 and the home network HN (i.e. the mobile stations MS M1-1 and MS M1-2 and the home network HN already have respectively a mobile station authentication key and a group authentication key, and the mobile station authentication keys for MS M1-1 and MS M1-2 are different).
- the home network HN resets the group authentication key when new mobile stations join or the original mobile stations leave the mobile station group M 1 .
- the home network HN and the serving network SN respectively have a database for storing group lists, group authentication data AUTH H generated by the home network, and identification data AUTH M1 generated by the mobile stations.
- the group list records a group number, a group authentication key, a mobile station ID with an initial value exclusive to each member, and other group related information, such as billing pattern etc.
- the group list table is indexed by the Group Number.
- the mobile station ID and initial value for MS M1-1 are MS 1 - 1 and IV 1 - 1 ; for MS M1-2 IV 1 - 2 and MS 1 - 2 .
- the generation and distribution of the group authentication key can be referred to “An Authenticated Group Key Agreement for Wireless Networks” (by Chik How Tan and Joseph Chee Ming Teo) published in Wireless Communications and Networking Conference , Vol. 4, 2005, pp. 2100-2105 and “Key Management for Multicast: Issues and Architectures” (by D. Wallner, F. Harder and R. Agee) published in RFC 2626, June 1999.
- the group authentication keys for different groups are recorded and indexed by the corresponding group number in a key table stored only in the home network.
- the initial value IVi-j (wherein represents the i th group, j represents the i th mobile station) has too many bits to be speculated or repeated, so that the mobile stations in every group can have different initial values IVi-j. With this initial value IVi-j, a mobile station and a serving network can be synchronized in subsequent authentication procedure.
- the home network HN and the mobile station MS M1-1 have a mobile station authentication message generation function f 0 , a serving network authentication message generation function f 1 , a group authentication message generation function f 2 , and a key generation function f 3 .
- the home network HN has a plurality of authentication management fields (AMFs) AMF.
- AMFs authentication management fields
- the mobile station MS M1-1 hands off for the first time among all the mobile stations in the group M 1 , the mobile station MS M1-1 has to perform a full authentication with the serving network SN.
- the group authentication method provided by the present invention includes an identification step 700 , a home network authentication step 701 , and a mobile station authentication and key distribution step 702 .
- the identification step 700 and the home network authentication step 701 belong to the aforementioned registration and authentication data distribution procedure
- the mobile station authentication and key distribution step 702 belongs to the aforementioned user authentication and key agreement procedure.
- a full authentication action consists of the execution of the home network authentication step 701 and the mobile station authentication and key distribution step 702 .
- the serving network SN authenticates the mobile station MS M1-1 and the mobile station MS M1-1 also authenticates the serving network SN.
- the home network HN authenticates the mobile station MS M1-1 and the mobile station MS M1-1 also authenticates the home network HN.
- the identification step 700 includes steps 700 a ⁇ 700 c .
- the serving network SN requests an identification data from the mobile station MS M1-1 .
- the mobile station MS M1-1 generates the identification data AUTH M1 and sends the identification data AUTH M1 containing the mobile station ID to the serving network SN so that the serving network SN can identify the mobile station MS M1-1 based on the mobile station ID MS 1 - 1 .
- the serving network SN receives the identification data AUTH M1 generated by the mobile station MS 1 and identifies the mobile station MS M1-1 .
- the serving network SN determines whether the mobile station ID MS 1 - 1 has been recorded in the group list in the database thereof. Since the mobile station MS M1-1 is the first mobile station in the group M 1 who enters the serving network SN, the mobile station ID MS 1 - 1 does not exist in the database of the serving network SN. Thus, the home network authentication step 701 is then executed.
- the next step may vary if the mobile station ID can be found in the group list stored in the database of the serving network SN, and which will be described below with reference to step 1601 illustrated in FIG. 16 .
- the home network authentication step 701 further includes steps 701 a ⁇ 701 d .
- the serving network SN sends the identification data AUTH M1 to the home network HN and requests the group list and the group authentication data AUTH H of the group M 1 to which the mobile station MS M1-1 belongs from the home network HN.
- the home network HN authenticates the mobile station MS M1-1 based on the identification data AUTH M1 . If the authentication succeeds, step 701 b is then executed; otherwise, the communication is terminated. In FIG. 7 , it is assumed that the home network HN successfully authenticates the mobile station MS M1-1 .
- step 701 c the home network HN generates a group authentication data AUTH H based on the identification data AUTH M1 and sends the group authentication data AUTH H and the requested group list to the serving network SN.
- step 701 d the group list and the group authentication data AUTH H are stored in the database of the serving network SN.
- the serving network SN requests the group authentication data AUTH H from the home network HN on behalf of the mobile station MS M1-1 , it is ensured by foregoing authentication mechanism (the comparison between the first MAC MAC M1-1 and the second MAC XMAC M1-1 ) that the serving network SN does request the group authentication data AUTH H from the home network HN instead of requesting randomly.
- the mobile station authentication and key distribution step 702 further includes steps 702 a ⁇ 702 h .
- the serving network SN generates a serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-1 based on the group authentication data AUTH H , the group list, and the identification data AUTH M1 and sends the serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-1 to the mobile station MS M1-1 .
- the mobile station MS M1-1 after receiving the serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-1 , the mobile station MS M1-1 authenticates the serving network SN based on the serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-1 in order to determine whether the serving network SN is a legitimate serving network authorized by the home network HN.
- step 702 d is executed; otherwise, the communication is terminated or re-authentication is requested.
- the serving network SN is assumed to be authorized by the home network HN as a legitimate serving network to the mobile station MS M1-1 .
- the serving network SN calculates a master key MK in advance for subsequent secured communication while the mobile station MS M1-1 authenticates the serving network SN.
- the mobile station MS M1-1 calculates the master key MK and a fifth MAC MAC M1 based on the serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-1 and sends the fifth MAC MAC M1 to the serving network SN.
- the serving network SN receives the fifth MAC MAC M1 and generates a sixth MAC XMAC M1 based on the group list recorded in the database thereof and a group transient key (GTK) GTK M1 .
- GTK group transient key
- the serving network SN compares the fifth MAC MAC M1 with the sixth MAC XMAC M1 and generates an authentication result.
- the serving network SN sends the authentication result to the mobile station MS M1-1 .
- the mobile station MS M1-1 receives and confirms the authentication result. If the authentication result shows that the authentication succeeds, the serving network SN and the mobile station MS M1-1 enter step 702 h ; otherwise, the communication is terminated.
- the serving network SN and the mobile station MS M1-1 generate a cipher key or an integrity key to secure subsequent communication by using the master key MK.
- the home network HN authenticates the mobile station MS M1-1 . If the authentication operation fails, besides terminating the entire communication, the authentication procedure may be performed again starting from step 700 a or re-transmission of the identification data AUTH M1 is requested.
- the mobile station MS M1-1 authenticates the serving network SN in order to determine whether the serving network SN is a legitimate serving network authorized by the home network HN to the mobile station MS M1-1 . If the serving network SN is not legitimate to the mobile station MS M1-1 , the authentication procedure may be performed again (i.e. starting from step 700 a ) or re-transmission of the group authentication data AUTH H or the serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-1 may be requested besides terminating the communication.
- step 702 g if the authentication result shows that the authentication fails, the authentication may be performed again (i.e. starting from step 700 a ) or re-transmission of the fifth MAC MAC M1 may be requested besides terminating the communication.
- FIG. 8 illustrates a method for generating the identification data AUTH M1 in step 700 b illustrated in FIG. 7 according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
- the mobile station MS M1-1 generates a first random number RN M1-1 .
- the mobile station MS M1-1 inputs the first random number RN M1-1 and a mobile station authentication key K M1-1 into the mobile station authentication message generation function f 0 to generate the first MAC MAC M1-1 .
- FIG. 9 illustrates how the home network HN authenticates the mobile station MS M1-1 based on the identification data AUTH M1 in step 701 b illustrated in FIG. 7 according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
- the home network HN obtains the first random number RN M1-1 in the identification data AUTH M1 and the first MAC MAC M1-1 .
- the home network then inputs the first random number RN M1-1 and the mobile station authentication key K M1-1 stored in the home network HN into the mobile station authentication message generation function f 0 to generate a second MAC XMAC M1-1 , the eXpected MAC of the mobile station MS M1-1 .
- the home network further compares the first MAC MAC M1-1 with the second MAC XMAC M1-1 generated by the home network HN. If the first MAC MAC M1-1 is equal to the second MAC XMAC M1-1 , step 701 c is then executed; otherwise, the communication is terminated.
- FIG. 10 illustrates a method for generating the group authentication data AUTH H in step 701 c illustrated in FIG. 7 according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
- the home network HN first generates a second random number RN H , and inputs the second random number RN H , the group authentication key GAK 1 , a plurality of AMFs AMF, and the first random number RN M1-1 in the identification data AUTH M1 into the key generation function f 3 to calculate a GTK GTK M1 which can be used to authenticate all mobile stations in the group M 1 in the serving network SN.
- the other mobile stations in the group M 1 is unaware of the random number RN M1-1 or may change the input of the key generation function f 3 to generate a new GTK
- the other parameters (the second random number RN H , the AMFs AMF, and the first random number RN M1-1 ) excluding the group authentication key GAK 1 still have to be sent to the mobile station MS M1-1 so that the mobile station MS M1-1 can generate the GTK GTK M1 accordingly.
- FIG. 11 illustrates a method for generating the serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-1 in step 702 a illustrated in FIG. 7 according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
- the serving network SN adds the authentication counter of the mobile station MS M1-1 in the serving network SN to the initial value IV 1 - l of the mobile station MS M1-1 in the group list to obtain a first transient total.
- the serving network SN multiplies the first random number RN M1-1 in the identification data AUTH M1 by the first transient total to obtain a first transient product.
- the serving network SN inputs the GTK GTK M1 in the group authentication data AUTH H and the first transient product into the serving network authentication message generation function f 1 to calculate a third MAC MAC S .
- the serving network SN generates a third random number RN SM1-1 .
- FIG. 12 illustrates how the mobile station MS M1-1 authenticates the serving network SN in step 702 b illustrated in FIG. 7 according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
- the mobile station MS M1-1 receives the serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-1
- the mobile station MS M1-1 inputs the AMFs AMF, the second random number RN H , and the first random number RN M1-1 in the serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-1 and the group authentication key GAK 1 stored in the mobile station MS M1-1 into the key generation function f 3 to generate the GTK GTK M1 .
- the mobile station MS M1-1 calculates a fourth MAC XMAC S .
- the mobile station MS M1-1 adds the initial value IV 1 - 1 of the mobile station MS M1-1 to the authentication counter i of the mobile station MS M1-1 in the serving network SN to obtain a second transient total.
- the mobile station MS M1-1 then multiplies the second transient total by the first random number RN M1-1 to obtain a second transient product.
- the mobile station MS M1-1 inputs the second transient product and the GTK GTK M1 into the serving network authentication message generation function f 1 to generate the fourth MAC XMAC S .
- the mobile station MS M1-1 compares the fourth MAC XMAC S with the third MAC MAC S in the serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-1 .
- the mobile station MS M1-1 has successfully authenticated the serving network SN, and meanwhile, the mobile station MS M1-1 has successfully authenticated the home network HN as well for the mobile station MS M1-1 has to generate a correct GTK GTK M1 in order to pass the subsequent authentication.
- FIG. 13 illustrates a method for calculating the master key MK in step 702 c illustrated in FIG. 7 according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
- the serving network SN calculates the master key MK when the mobile station MS M1-1 verifies the serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-1 of the serving network SN, so that the time for calculating the master key MK can be saved when later on the mobile station MS M1-1 sends the MAC M1 for authenticating the mobile station MS M1-1 back to the serving network SN and the serving network SN successfully authenticates the mobile station MS M1-1 .
- the serving network SN inputs the first random number RN M1-1 , the third random number RN SM1-1 , the first transient total (IV 1 - 1 +i), and the GTK GTK M1 into the key generation function f 3 to calculate the master key MK.
- step 702 c may also be executed after the mobile station MS M1-1 sends the fifth MAC MAC M1 to the serving network SN and the serving network SN successfully authenticates the mobile station MS M1-1 .
- the time required by the serving network SN for calculating the master key MK can be saved.
- FIG. 14 illustrates a method for calculating the master key MK and generating the fifth MAC MAC M1 in step 702 d illustrated in FIG. 7 according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
- the mobile station MS M1-1 After the mobile station MS M1-1 successfully authenticates the serving network SN as a legitimate serving network, the mobile station MS M1-1 generates the fifth MAC MAC M1 which allows the serving network SN to authenticate the mobile station MS M1-1 .
- the mobile station MS M1-1 first adds the initial value IV 1 - 1 which is only known to the serving network SN and the mobile station MS M1-1 to the authentication counter i of the mobile station MS M1-1 in the serving network SN to obtain a third transient total, and then the mobile station MS M1-1 multiplies the third transient total by the third random number RN SM1-1 in the serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-1 to obtain a third transient product.
- the mobile station MS M1-1 inputs the GTK GTK M1 and the third transient product into the group authentication message generation function f 2 to calculate the fifth MAC MAC M1 for the serving network SN to authenticate the mobile station MS M1-1 .
- the mobile station MS M1-1 also inputs the first random number RN M1-1 , the third random number RN SM1-1 , the third transient total, and the GTK GTK M1 into the key generation function f 3 to calculate the master key MK for subsequent secured communication between the mobile station MS M1-1 and the serving network SN.
- FIG. 15 illustrates a method for generating the authentication result in step 702 e illustrated in FIG. 7 according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
- the serving network SN first adds the number i, the authentication times performed by the mobile station MS M1-1 to the serving network SN, to the initial value IV 1 - 1 to obtain a fourth transient total, and then the serving network SN multiplies the fourth transient total by the third random number RN SM1-1 to obtain a fourth transient product.
- the serving network SN inputs the fourth transient product and the GTK GTK M1 into the group authentication message generation function f 2 to calculate a sixth MAC XMAC M1 .
- the serving network SN compares the sixth MAC XMAC M1 with the fifth MAC MAC M1 to obtain an authentication result.
- FIG. 16 is a flowchart of a group authentication method according to an another exemplary embodiment of the present invention, wherein the mobile station MS M1-2 is not the first mobile station which hands off among all the mobile stations in the same group M 1 . Since the mobile station MS M1-2 is not the first handoff mobile station in the group M 1 , the serving network SN can directly obtain the GTK GTK M1 from the database thereof and transmits the necessary parameters for generating GTK M1 to the mobile station MS M1-2 . Thus, after the mobile station MS M1-2 has obtained the parameters for generating the GTK GTK M1 and has calculated the GTK GTK M1 , the mobile station MS M1-2 and the serving network SN can directly authenticate each other without requesting assistant from the home network HN. The traffic load between the home network HN and the serving network SN can be reduced.
- the mobile station MS M1-2 may also request the serving network SN to perform a full authentication as illustrated in FIG. 7 , namely, the serving network SN can determine whether a full authentication is to be performed based on the message received from the mobile station MS M1-2 , and the serving network SN can send an authentication message back to the home network HN and request a fresh group authentication data AUTH H .
- the group authentication method illustrated in FIG. 16 includes an identification step 1600 , a GTK retrieving step 1601 , and a mobile station authentication and key distribution step 1602 , wherein the identification step 1600 and the GTK retrieving step 1601 belong to aforementioned registration and authentication data distribution procedure, and the mobile station authentication and key distribution step 1602 belongs to aforementioned user authentication and key agreement procedure.
- local authentication refers to the execution of the GTK retrieving step 1601 and the mobile station authentication and key distribution step 1602 .
- the serving network SN only authenticates the mobile station MS M1-2 and does not request the home network HN to authenticate the mobile station MS M1-2 .
- the identification step 1600 further includes steps 1600 a - 1600 c .
- the serving network SN requests an identification data from the mobile station MS M1-2 .
- the mobile station MS M1-2 generates the identification data AUTH M1 and sends the identification data AUTH M1 to the serving network SN, wherein the identification data AUTH M1 contains a mobile station ID MS 1 - 2 of the mobile station MS M1-2 so that the serving network SN can identify the mobile station MS M1-2 based on the mobile station ID MS 1 - 2 .
- the serving network SN receives the identification data AUTH M1 generated by the mobile station MS M1-2 and identifies the mobile station MS M1-2 .
- the serving network SN determines whether the mobile station ID MS 1 - 2 is recorded in the group list in the database of the serving network SN.
- the mobile station MS M1-2 Since the mobile station MS M1-2 is not the first mobile station which enters the serving network SN among all the mobile stations in the group M 1 , mobile station ID MS 1 - 2 is already recorded in the group list in the database of the serving network SN, thus, the entire procedure proceeds to the GTK retrieving step 1601 .
- the mobile station MS M1-2 may also request the serving network SN to perform a full authentication action as illustrated in FIG. 7 .
- a flag is further attached into the identification data AUTH M1 to indicate whether the serving network SN has to perform a full authentication or not even though the mobile station ID MS 1 - 2 has been recorded in the group list in the database of the serving network SN.
- FIG. 16 it is assumed that the mobile station MS M1-2 does not request the serving network SN to perform a full authentication action as illustrated in FIG. 7 .
- the GTK retrieving step 1601 includes the following step.
- the mobile station authentication and key distribution step 1602 further includes steps 1602 a ⁇ 1602 h .
- the serving network SN generates a serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-2 based on the group authentication data AUTH H and sends the serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-2 to the mobile station MS M1-2 .
- the mobile station MS M1-2 receives the serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-2 and authenticates the serving network SN based on the serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-2 in order to determine whether the serving network SN is a legitimate serving network authorized by the home network HN. If the serving network SN is legitimate to the mobile station MS M1-2 , step 1602 d is executed; otherwise, the communication is terminated. In FIG. 16 , it is assumed that the serving network SN is legitimate to the mobile station MS M1-2 .
- the serving network SN calculates a master key MK for subsequent secured communication while the mobile station MS M1-2 authenticates the serving network SN.
- the mobile station MS M1-2 calculates the master key MK and a fifth MAC MAC M1 based on the serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-2 and sends the fifth MAC MAC M1 to the serving network SN.
- the serving network SN receives the fifth MAC MAC M1 and then generates a sixth MAC XMAC M1 , the eXpected MAC of the aforementioned fifth MAC MAC M1 , based on the GTK GTK M1 and the information recorded in the group list in the database thereof, and the serving network SN then compares the fifth MAC MAC M1 and the sixth MAC XMAC M1 and generates an authentication result.
- step 1602 f the serving network SN sends the authentication result to the mobile station MS M1-2 .
- step 1602 g the mobile station MS M1-2 confirms the authentication result. If the authentication result shows that the authentication succeeds, the serving network SN and the mobile station MS M1-2 enter step 1602 h ; otherwise, if the authentication result shows that the authentication fails, the communication is terminated. In FIG. 16 , it is assumed that the authentication is successful.
- step 1602 h the serving network SN and the mobile station MS M1-2 use the master key MK to secure the subsequent communication.
- the mobile station MS M1-2 authenticates the serving network SN and determines whether the serving network SN is a legitimate serving network authorized by the home network HN. If the serving network SN is not legitimate to the mobile station MS M1-2 , the authentication action may be performed again (starting from step 1600 a ) or the serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-1 may be re-transmitted besides terminating the communication. In step 1602 g , if the authentication result shows that the authentication fails, the authentication action may be performed again (starting from step 1600 a ) or the fifth MAC MAC M1 may be re-transmitted besides terminating the communication.
- FIG. 17 illustrates a method for generating the identification data AUTH M1 in step 1600 b illustrated in FIG. 16 according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
- the mobile station MS M1-2 generates a first random number RN M1-2 .
- the mobile station MS M1-2 inputs the first random number RN M1-2 and a mobile station authentication key K M1-2 into the mobile station authentication message generation function f 0 to generate a first MAC MAC M1-2 .
- FIG. 18 illustrates a method for generating the serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-2 in step 1602 a illustrated in FIG. 16 according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
- the serving network SN first adds the authentication counter i of the mobile station MS M1-2 in the serving network SN to the initial value IV 1 - 2 of the mobile station MS M1-2 in the group list to obtain a first transient total. After that, the serving network SN multiplies the first random number RN M1-2 in the mobile station identification data AUTH M1 by the first transient total to obtain a first transient product.
- the AMFs AMF, the second random number RN H , and the first random number RN M1-1 are used by the mobile station MS M1-2 to generate the GTK GTK M1
- the third MAC MAC S is for the mobile station MS M1-2 to authenticate the serving network SN
- the third random number RN SM1-2 is used by the mobile station MS M1-2 to calculate the MAC M1 which can be used by the serving network SN for authenticating the mobile station MS M1-2 .
- FIG. 19 illustrates how the mobile station MS M1-2 authenticates the serving network SN in step 1602 b illustrated in FIG. 16 according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
- the mobile station MS M1-2 receives the serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-2
- the mobile station MS M1-2 inputs the AMFs AMF, the second random number RN H , and the first random number RN M1-1 in the serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-2 and the group authentication key GAK 1 stored in the mobile station MS M1-2 into the key generation function f 3 to generate the GTK GTK M1 .
- the mobile station MS M1-2 continues to calculate the fourth MAC XMAC S , the eXpected MAC to authenticate the serving network SN.
- the mobile station MS M1-2 adds the initial value IV 1 - 2 of the mobile station MS M1-2 to the authentication counter i of the mobile station MS M1-2 in the serving network to get a second transient total, and then multiplies the second transient total by and the first random number RN M1-2 to obtain a second transient product.
- the mobile station MS M1-2 inputs the second transient product and the GTK GTK M1 into the serving network authentication message generation function f 1 to generate the fourth MAC XMAC S .
- the mobile station MS M1-2 compares the fourth MAC XMAC S with the third MAC MAC S in the serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-2 .
- the mobile station MS M1-2 has successfully authenticated the serving network SN, and meanwhile, the mobile station MS M1-2 has successfully authenticated the home network HN as well for that the mobile station MS M1-2 has to generate a correct GTK GTK M1 in order to pass the subsequent authentication.
- FIG. 20 illustrates a method for calculating the master key MK in step 1602 c illustrated in FIG. 16 according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
- the serving network SN calculates the master key MK while the mobile station MS M1-2 verifies the serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-2 of the serving network SN, so that the time for calculating the master key MK can be saved when later on the mobile station MS M1-2 sends the MAC M1 for the serving network SN to authenticate the mobile station MS M1-2 to the serving network SN and the serving network SN successfully authenticates the mobile station MS M1-2 .
- the serving network SN inputs the first random number RN M1-2 , the third random number RN SM1-1 , the second transient total (IV 1 - 2 +i), and the GTK GTK M1 into the key generation function f 3 to calculate the master key MK.
- the aforementioned step 1602 c may also be executed after the mobile station MS M1-2 sends the fifth MAC MAC M1 to the serving network SN and the serving network SN successfully authenticates the mobile station MS M1-2 .
- the time required by the serving network SN for calculating the master key MK can be saved.
- FIG. 21 illustrates a method for calculating the master key MK and generating a fifth MAC MAC M1 in step 1602 d illustrated in FIG. 16 according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
- the mobile station MS M1-2 after the mobile station MS M1-2 successfully authenticates the serving network SN as a legitimate serving network, the mobile station MS M1-2 generates the fifth MAC MAC M1 which allows the serving network SN to authenticate the mobile station MS M1-2 .
- the mobile station MS M1-2 first adds the initial value IV 1 - 2 which is only known to the serving network SN and the mobile station MS M1-2 to the authentication counter i of the mobile station MS M1-2 in the serving network SN to get a third transient total, and then the mobile station MS M1-2 multiplies the third transient total by the third random number RN SM1-2 in the serving network authentication data AUTH SM1-2 to get a third transient product.
- the mobile station MS M1-2 inputs the GTK GTK M1 and the third transient product into the group authentication message generation function f 2 to calculate the fifth MAC MAC M1 which allows the serving network SN to authenticate the mobile station MS M1-2 .
- the mobile station MS M1-2 also inputs the first random number RN M1-2 , the third random number RN SM1-2 , the third transient total, and the GTK GTK M1 generated by the mobile station MS M1-2 into the key generation function f 3 to calculate the master key MK to secure subsequent communication between the mobile station MS M1-2 and the serving network SN.
- FIG. 22 illustrates a method for generating the authentication result in step 1602 e illustrated in FIG. 16 according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
- the serving network SN first adds the counter i, which records the times of authentications performed by the mobile station MS M1-2 to the serving network SN to the initial value IV 1 - 2 to get a fourth transient total, and then the serving network SN multiplies the fourth transient total by the third random number RN SM1-2 to obtain a fourth transient product.
- the serving network SN inputs the fourth transient product and the GTK GTK M1 into the group authentication message generation function f 2 to calculate a sixth MAC XMAC M1 .
- the serving network SN compares the sixth MAC XMAC M1 with the fifth MAC MAC M1 to get an authentication result.
- the mobile stations MS M1-1 and MS M1-2 illustrated in FIG. 7 and FIG. 16 belong to the group M 1 .
- the mobile stations MS M1-1 and MS M1-2 may also belong to other groups (i.e. the mobile stations MS M1-1 and MS M1-2 may belong to at least one group).
- the group authentication method proposed by the present invention may be applied to a cellular network.
- a first mobile station in a user group visits a serving network and passes the authentication, an authentication server of the visited serving network stores a group authentication data of the user group.
- the mobile station is not authenticated directly with the authentication server of the registered home network (home AAA server, H-AAA); instead, the mobile station is authenticated through the authentication server of the visited serving network (visited AAA server, V-AAA). Accordingly, in the present invention, the signalling overhead caused by the transmission of the group authentication data between the H-AAA and the V-AAA is reduced without losing the security thereof.
- the group authentication method proposed by the present invention may also be applied to an 802.11 network.
- FIG. 23 illustrates an application of the group authentication method provided by the present invention in an 802.11 network.
- the MN group includes a plurality of mobile stations MN 1 ⁇ MN n which hand off at the same access point (AP) AP 1 of the 802.11 network and the AP AP 1 authenticates the mobile stations MN 1 ⁇ MN n .
- the AP AP 1 requests a group authentication data and a group list from the AAA server of the home network.
- the AAA server sends the group authentication data and the group list used for authenticating the mobile stations MN 1 ⁇ MN n to the AP AP 1 .
- the AP AP 1 can authenticate the mobile station MN 2 by directly using the group authentication data previously obtained for authenticating the mobile station MN 1 .
- the group authentication method proposed by the present invention may also be applied to a handheld game device.
- Handheld game devices usually exchange messages by low power radio waves, thus, the operation of these handheld game devices may be affected by the environment and the distances between the devices. Moreover, when a user wants to play an online game through a wireless network, the quality of real-time communication may be damaged due to handoff of the device.
- two handheld game devices which perform end-to-end video/audio transmission are considered as two mobile stations in the same group. When the two handheld game devices roam together, one of the two devices can perform only a local authentication to the visited serving network after the other device has performed a full authentication. Therefore, the transmission of real-time data between the two handheld game devices will not be affected by the handoff authentication procedure.
- the group authentication method proposed by the present invention may also be applied to an access control system.
- the employee authentication data in the access control system of the company has to be discarded after an authentication is performed.
- the group authentication method in the present invention the employees in the same department or of the entire company are considered mobile stations in the same group.
- a simulated member can be regarded as the first member who requests for authentication so that all the authentication data can be pre-distributed from a user database to an authentication machine of the access control system before real users access the security system. In this way, when an employee is authenticated, the time required for transmitting authentication messages between the access control system and the user database can be saved.
- FIG. 24 illustrates an application of the group authentication method proposed by the present invention for mobile routers (MRs).
- MRs are disposed in buses BUS 1 ⁇ BUS 4 so that passengers on the buses BUS 1 ⁇ BUS 4 can access the Internet through these MRs.
- the MRs disposed in the buses BUS 1 ⁇ BUS 4 of the same route are considered mobile stations in the same group. These MRs tend to roam to the same serving network SN, follow the same route along with the buses BUS 1 ⁇ BUS 4 , and belong to the same home network HN.
- the MRs in the same group have a group authentication key.
- the group authentication method proposed by the present invention may also be applied to the group communication in a terrestrial trunked radio (TETRA) network.
- TETRA terrestrial trunked radio
- Mobile stations in the TETRA network have a group characteristic (group communication or group movement).
- group communication or group movement In other words, some mobile stations in the TETRA network may communicate with each other or move together at the same time for particular purposes. Accordingly, a group security mechanism is provided to protect the data transmitted when a mobile station group is performing group communication. Since the TETRA network itself already has a group characteristic, the group authentication method proposed by the present invention can be applied directly to the TETRA network without changing the structure of the TETRA network, so that the handoff efficiency of a mobile station group can be increased.
- group characteristic group communication or group movement
- the mobile station when a mobile station hands off for the first time among all the mobile stations in a user group, the mobile station performs a full authentication to the serving network.
- the serving network obtains a GTK from the home network of the mobile station, so that the subsequent mobile stations in the same group can be authenticated by the serving network through local authentication by using the GTK stored in the database of the serving network, and accordingly the authentication and re-authentication of all the mobile stations in the group can be simplified as long as the GTK is valid.
- the group authentication method proposed by the present invention is more suitable for a system which provides real-time video/audio communication or group communication.
- Two mobile stations on end-to-end video/audio communication can be considered as two mobile stations in the same group.
- one of the two mobile stations perform only a local authentication after the other mobile station has performed a full authentication to the serving network, so that the transmission of real-time data will not be affected by the handoff authentication procedure.
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Abstract
Description
Mobile Station | Group Related | ||
Group Number | ID | Initial Value | Information |
G1 | MS1-1 | IV1-1 | . . . |
MS1-2 | IV1-2 | . . . | |
. . . | . . . | . . . | |
. . . | . . . | . . . | . . . |
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TW96131436 | 2007-08-24 | ||
TW096131436A TWI378702B (en) | 2007-08-24 | 2007-08-24 | Group authentication method |
TW96131436A | 2007-08-24 |
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US8005460B2 true US8005460B2 (en) | 2011-08-23 |
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US12/025,771 Active 2030-05-17 US8005460B2 (en) | 2007-08-24 | 2008-02-05 | Group authentication method |
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US20090054036A1 (en) | 2009-02-26 |
TWI378702B (en) | 2012-12-01 |
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