EP2625360A1

EP2625360A1 - Method and device for contactless transmission of electric energy and/or electric signals between a wall and a wing fastened to said wall

Info

Publication number: EP2625360A1
Application number: EP11763683.7A
Authority: EP
Inventors: Tibor Herglotz; Ingo Steinfeld; Wolfgang Staude; Sascha Puppel
Original assignee: Staude Kunststofftechnik GmbH; Dr Hanh GmbH and Co KG
Current assignee: Dr Hanh GmbH and Co KG
Priority date: 2010-10-04
Filing date: 2011-09-29
Publication date: 2013-08-14
Also published as: US8928477B2; CN103210430A; EP2625675A1; US20130181830A1; US9214274B2; CN103154413A; RU2013120291A; BR112013007199A2; RU2013120281A; CN103154413B; US20130181543A1; BR112013007197A2; WO2012045659A1

Abstract

A method and device for contactless transmission of electric energy and/or electric signals between a wall and a wing fastened to said wall, in which control signals and response and control signals are transmitted bidirectionally between a first coil fastened to the wall and a second coil fastened to the wing.

Description

Method and device for contactless transmission of electrical energy and / or electrical signals between a wall and a wing attached to this wall

In particular, wings of doors for objects such as houses, shops or production halls increasingly comprise safety or comfort improving devices, the current state of operation of which is monitored or actuated by monitoring or actuating devices located outside the door and which operating state changes or send any signals received from sensors in the form of data to the monitoring or actuation devices.

By way of example, a burglar alarm panel installed in a building may be mentioned here, which communicates with devices provided on the door, for example for opening, breakthrough, lock, sabotage or motor lock monitoring.

To transmit corresponding state changes or data between the monitoring device and the devices located at the door. the use in the prior art cables that are flexibly routed between the wing and the frame and are often surrounded for protection by a flexible metal hose. These cable transitions significantly affect the visual appearance and can be pinched when closing the sash, which can damage or even destroy the cables. In addition, the cable transitions are weak points with regard to possible manipulations, for which reason a so-called Z-wiring of sensors or contacts is also realized in the cable transition for sabotage protection.

From DE 10 2004 017 341 A1, a band with a built-in transformer for contactless energy transmission is known. This band comprises a primary coil arranged in a frame band part and a secondary coil arranged in a leaf band part. The magnetic coupling of the secondary coil to the primary coil, which are spaced apart in the direction of the hinge axis, serves a coil passing through both iron core, which also forms the hinge pin. Although in principle a contactless transmission of electrical energy and / or electrical signals between a wall and attached to this wall wings with this arrangement is possible, a continuous formation of this Z wiring is not possible in this inductive energy and / or signal transmission, under which sabotage protection suffers.

In DE 43 22 81 1 A1 a device is described with which by a transformer coupling bidirectional data between arranged in vehicle doors door modules and arranged in the vehicle outside the doors, central control unit can be transferred. Tamper protection is not provided for this facility.

The invention is based on the object, with regard to the sabotage protection improved method and provided for performing this method device for contactless transmission of electrical energy and / or of electrical signals between a wall and a wing fixed to said wall, wherein a first coil fixed to the wall and a second coil attached to the wing are provided, which are in inductive operative connection.

This object is achieved by the method set forth in claim 1 and by the reproduced in claim 1 1 device.

In the method according to the invention, the first coil is subjected to at least one first control signal in a specific, repetitive control time interval, and the at least one first signal induced thereupon in the second coil is detected. Furthermore, in this control time interval, the second coil is acted on by at least one response control signal and the at least one signal induced thereon in the first coil is also detected. If, in this bidirectional signal transmission, a coil is not subjected to at least part of the expected control signals or induced signals in the control time interval, a fault signal is generated. If this, for example, a reporting group, for example, a burglar alarm center transmitted to trigger an alarm, the sabotage protection is significantly improved by the inventive method. However, the fault signal can also be supplied to a so-called "watchdog" so as to avoid false alarm triggering when a technical fault occurs.

Experiments have shown that bi-directional transmission and detection of the control signals and the induced signals can lead to signal disturbances in individual cases. In order to avoid that such a disturbance in each case leads to an alarm triggering, in a preferred embodiment of the method according to the invention within a control time interval, the first and the second coil are each subjected to two control signals. The Störungssig- is signal generated only when non-application or non-detection of two control signals in the first and / or the second coil.

In a particularly preferred development of a method according to the invention, after the generation of the signal induced by the control signal, the second coil is th signal with a response control signal applied, which in turn generates an induced signal in the first coil.

The repetitive control time interval in which correlated signals are generated or detected is preferably between 100 ms and 500 ms, particularly preferably about 200 ms.

Two consecutive control signals are preferably generated within a first time interval of 70 ms to 350 ms, preferably about 140 ms.

A control signal and an associated response control signal are preferably generated within a second time period of 20 ms to 100 ms, particularly preferably of about 40 ms. In principle, the control signal can be of any type that allows a signal to be generated in the other coil in an inductive manner. However, it is particularly preferred if the control signal - particularly preferably the response control signal - is generated by modulation of a carrier voltage. In principle, all methods known for modulating signals come into consideration. However, it is particularly preferred if, for bidirectional transmission, the carrier voltage is amplified in order to generate the control signal, and the carrier voltage is frequency-modulated in order to generate the response control signal. The carrier voltage preferably has a carrier frequency of at least 20 kHz, more preferably between about 30 kHz and 200 kHz. Most preferably, the carrier frequency is about 40 kHz.

Although the method described above increases protection against sabotage already considerably. In order to increase the protection against expensive sabotage even further, a development of the method according to the invention before the query of the value of a wing side imitated control resistor within the time interval before. If the transmitted value differs from a stored reference value by preferably 40%, this is indicated as an indication of a sabotage attempt. evaluates. The result of the comparison is transmitted within the control time interval.

The control and response control signal packets are encrypted to further enhance security by means of a switch code which can be decrypted by the receiving side.

To further increase security against sabotage, the inventive method may include the step of mutual authentication of a primary electronics electrically connected to the first coil and a secondary electronics connected to the second coil.

The inventive device for carrying out the above-described, inventive method comprises a provided on a wall primary coil, provided on a wing secondary coil, wherein the primary and the secondary coils are in inductive operative connection, connected to the primary coil primary electronics and one with the Secondary coil connected secondary electronics, wherein the primary and the secondary electronics comprise means for generating and detecting control signals and response control signals.

Preferably, the primary and the secondary electronics comprise means for modulating a carrier voltage with the control signals, in the case of bidirectional data transmission preferably a frequency modulator on the primary side and an amplitude modulator on the secondary side.

In addition, preferably means for authenticating the primary and secondary electronics are provided. So that the primary and the secondary electronics can not be reached without destruction with the wing closed, the primary and the secondary electronics each comprise a housing which, for installation in a frame profile or in a wing profile, in particular in profile recesses on the sides facing each other with the wing closed, suitable is. On the one hand to avoid interference of the primary or secondary electronics by external electric magnetic fields, on the other hand to prevent leakage of electromagnetic radiation from the housings, they can be formed shielded. Also, the housing may be provided with lid and / or Abhebesensoren that generate an alarm signal when attempting to open or take off.

In order to prevent overheating of the electronic components provided in the housings, which themselves regularly develop a certain amount of heat, the housings are preferably made of a heat-conducting material, more preferably made of a heat-conducting plastic material because of the simplification of the production. Further, the primary and secondary electronics preferably include modems for 8-bit encoding and decoding of signals and control signals to be transmitted. The transmission rate can be 9600 baud, for example. With the aid of these modems, analog signals transmitted by, for example, devices and sensors provided on the wing can be modulated and transmitted insensitive to interference. The primary and secondary electronics can furthermore each comprise a BUS system, to each of which several sensors can be connected. The transmission of measured values or status information provided with the aid of the sensors can then take place serially after modulation and demodulation, for example using protocols which can correspond to the RS 485 standard, for example.

The invention will be explained below with reference to the embodiment shown in the drawing. 1 shows, schematically, a device according to the invention in a partially torn view of the strip and wing parts in a perspective view, with schematically indicated primary and secondary electronics; Fig. 2 - again schematically - the arrangement of Figure 1 in on a frame and a wing profile, which is hingedly connected to a hinge axis with the frame attached state. Fig. 3 is an overview circuit diagram of this device;

4 is a block diagram of the frame-side primary electronics of this device; 5 shows a block diagram of the wing-side secondary electronics of this device;

Fig. 6 - schematically - the flow of the data transmission method; Fig. 7 shows the time course and the time dependence of control signals and response control signals containing data to be transmitted and / or state information, and the associated states at the outputs of the signaling group and the watchdog in an exemplary operating state, and

Fig. 8 is a Fig. 7 corresponding representation of a second operating state.

The device 100 in the drawing as a whole is optically simulated a so-called three-piece tape. You can - depending on your needs - at the same time carry supporting hinge function and thus replace a conventional tape. Or it merely serves for the non-contact transmission of electrical energy and / or electrical signals and is provided in addition to conventional bands on a wing / band assembly. The device 100 comprises a band part 1, which serves to fix on a fixed frame R. It has two hinge parts 2, 2 ', which are spaced apart in the longitudinal direction of a hinge axis S by a distance space 3 from each other. Between the upper hinge part 2 and the lower hinge part 2 ', the hinge part 4 of a wing part 5 is arranged in the clearance space 3, which is attached to a sash F in the exemplary embodiment shown in the drawing. For attachment, the band part 1 band fastening parts 6, 6 ', the wing part 5 comprises a wing attachment part. 7

The hinge axis S is defined by a hinge pin 2 passing through the hinge parts 2, 2 'and 4, which passes through the hinge parts in hinge pin receptacles, which are not shown in the drawing for the sake of clarity, in a known manner.

In the upper hinge part 2 of the hinge part 1, a primary coil 19 is provided, which is acted upon by a coil spring 18 with a downwardly acting spring force according to FIG. 1. The primary coil 19 is connected by means of a two-wire, preferably shielded electrical line 17 to a primary electronics PE.

In the hinge part 4 of the wing part 5, a secondary coil 20 is inserted, which is acted upon by means of a coil spring 21 with a spring force directed upwards as shown in FIG. The first and second coils are under the action of the coil springs 18, 21 to each other.

The secondary coil 20 is connected via an at least two-core, preferably shielded line 22 to a secondary electronics SE.

The primary electronics PE (Figure 4) comprises a primary processor 38 having an input 40 which serves to connect to a power source 41 via a switching regulator 54 which converts the voltage provided by the power source into the operating voltage of the primary processor. As can be seen in FIG. 3, these can be an emergency-current-buffered output of a power supply unit 42 of a hazard warning system GMA. It provides a DC supply voltage of, for example, 13.8V. The primary electronics PE comprises an inverter 52, which converts the DC input voltage into an AC voltage suitable for acting on the first coil 19. For example, converts ac voltage of 12 V and a carrier frequency of 40 kHz.

The primary processor 38 has connections 44a, 44b, to which, for example, signals from opening, breakthrough, closure and sabotage monitoring as well as control signals of a signaling group MG, for example a danger detection system GMA, for example, for latch operation. These control signals are converted into serial data sets by the primary electronics using a BUS system using, for example, protocols conforming to the RS 485 standard.

Also, the primary processor 38 includes a watchdog WD that monitors the functions of the primary and secondary electronics as well as the components and systems connected thereto. In the case of detection of a malfunction, this is signaled to the hazard alarm system via an output 58 of the primary processor 38 as such in order to avoid false alarm triggering when the malfunction occurs. Further, the watchdog may initiate program instructions of the primary processor 38 for troubleshooting. Furthermore, the primary electronics PE comprises a modulator 53, by means of which the carrier frequency is modulated by the data sets to be transmitted. The modulated carrier voltage is applied to a terminal 45 and is fed via the electrical line 17 of the primary coil 19. In the secondary coil 20, a secondary voltage is induced and fed via the line 22 to a terminal 46 of the secondary electronics SE. It comprises a demodulator 55, which demodulates the secondary voltage modulated by the signals and transmits the signals to a secondary processor 39, for example an opening, breakdown, closure or sabotage monitoring Ü. Sensors and devices for status inquiry and actuation are connected to the secondary processor via In / Out lines.

The secondary processor 39 is connected to a power source 47 which provides, for example, a 12 V DC voltage at an input 48. The power supply of the secondary electronics thus takes place via a supply voltage inductively generated in the secondary coil 20.

Furthermore, the secondary electronics SE in turn comprises a modulator 56, which converts signals provided by the sensors of the aforementioned monitoring devices via terminals 49 into serial signal packets in the same way as those of the primary electronics PE. The carrier voltage modulated in this way is applied to the second coil 20 via the line 22. The alternating voltage induced thereby in the primary coil 19 is supplied via the line 17 to the primary electronics PE and demodulated therein in a demodulator 57 and supplied via terminals 44b of the danger detection system GMA.

In order to generate the least possible interference-insensitive and low-loss signal transmission, the data to be transmitted from the primary side to the secondary side are frequency-modulated, which amplitude-modulates the data to be transmitted from the secondary to the primary side.

The thus created bidirectional data transmission takes place with an 8-bit resolution and a transmission rate of 9600 baud, for example.

To increase the sabotage protection control signals KS are transmitted at a distance of about 140 ms via the lines 22 and 17 and the secondary and primary coils 20 and 19 to the primary electronics PE of the secondary electronics SE in a repetitive time interval of about 200 ms. Since in the described embodiment, the secondary coils are supplied with the control signals and the primary electronics acknowledge the receipt of the control signals with the emission of the response control signals RKS, the secondary coil 20 forms the first coil in the sense of the operation, the primary coil 19 accordingly, the second coil , The control signals are associated with data packets containing data and / or component status information transmitted to the primary electronics. Accordingly, the response control signals RKS contain data packets that include, for example, control signals to these components. The primary electronics PE acknowledges receipt of the control signal by return transmission of a response control signal packet RKS to the secondary electronics SE within a 40 ms time interval. If the secondary electronics SE does not receive a response control signal RKS within this time interval, a control signal packet KS is sent to the primary electronics again after about 60 ms. If the primary electronics PE does not receive a response control signal packet RKS from the secondary electronics SE within the time interval of 200 ms, an interference signal is generated. The same applies if two consecutive control signal packets KS were faulty.

In order to further increase sabotage protection, a control resistor is mimicked on the wing side by the secondary electronics SE and interrogated, and compared with a reference value stored in the secondary electronics. If the transmitted measured value differs by preferably 40% from the desired value, this is interpreted as an indication of a sabotage attempt. The result of this comparison is transmitted to the primary electronics PE in this time interval.

The data and the control and response control signal packets are encrypted to further increase the security by means of a switching code that can be decrypted by the respective receiving primary electronics PE and secondary electronics SE.

The operation, which is schematically shown in Fig. 6a) and b) will be described in more concrete below.

After frame-side commissioning and mutual activation of the change-code encryption mode (FIG. 6a), the vane electronics periodically begins, at intervals of a first time interval, which is approximately 140 ms, the data packet, also called life-character packet, which encodes data to be transmitted to the frame electronics and / or state information of components such as opening, breakthrough, shutter and sabotage monitors, to send to the frame electronics. The wing electronics in this case therefore corresponds to the primary electronics, the frame electronics of the secondary electronics. The frame electronics waits for usable data and checks the incoming data packets. The decoded data stream is checked for a sign of life of the vane electronics. For positive confirmation, the frame electronics to the wing electronics a positive acknowledgment (ACK package). This positive acknowledgment also contains the data to be transmitted to the vane electronics and / or status information for the reset pulse of the glass breakage sensors and the control and / or data outputs of the vane electronics.

The wing electronics waits for usable data and status information and checks the incoming data stream. The decoded data stream is checked for a positive acknowledgment (ACK packet) of the frame electronics. In a change of state of connected to the wing electronics components of the periodic sequence described above is interrupted and the sign of life, which contains the states of the components in the wing electronics, immediately continues to send interchanged. The state changes of the components in the wing electronics are detected in the evaluation of the life sign in the frame electronics and the control and / or data outputs (for example, reporting group outputs of the danger control center GMA) are controlled accordingly.

In a state change of frame-side components, for example an access control system, this information is detected in the frame electronics and transmitted to the wing electronics at the next positive acknowledgment of the frame electronics.

If a data packet is not transmitted on the way from the wing to the frame electronics within the control interval, so after a timeout of the first time interval, typically of about 140 ms, from the last valid received data packet in the frame electronics increased error counter, a negative acknowledgment (NACK Packet) is sent to the wing electronics and within a second, defined time interval, which is shorter than the first time interval and is typically 60 ms, sent another data packet from the wing to the frame electronics. If this data packet is properly received by the frame electronics, confirmed by the ACK packet and evaluated, the error counter is reset and no alarm is triggered. Since the second signal transmission successfully within the predetermined control time interval This is not rated as an error case. If the second instantly transmitted sign of life is not received correctly or not at all, the error counter is increased by 1 to 2 and thus recognized as a fault. Since there is now an error case and possibly the control time interval has been exceeded, all the message groups are triggered in the frame electronics and thus triggered an alarm, for example, the burglar alarm system.

If a data packet changes on the way from the wing to the frame electronics, this error is detected by the frame and vane electronics with the aid of a checksum and the decoding of the change code. The electronics that detects the error increases the corresponding error counter by 1. If the error is detected in the frame electronics, a data packet with a negative acknowledgment (NACK packet) is sent from there. If the error detected in the wing electronics or receives a negative acknowledgment of the frame electronics, the data packet is sent again within the second time interval. If this data packet is properly received and evaluated by the frame electronics, the error counter is reset and no alarm is triggered. Since the second signal transmission was successful within the control time interval, this is not considered an error case. If the second data packet is not received properly or not at all, the error counter is increased by 1 to 2 and thus recognized as an error. Since there is now an error case and possibly the control time interval has been exceeded, all control and / or data outputs in the frame electronics and thus at the example burglary alarm system triggered an alarm.

FIG. 7 shows the chronological progression and the time dependence of control signals KS and response control signals RKS, which contain data and / or status information to be transmitted, and the associated states at the outputs of the signaling group MG and the watchdog WD in a first embodiment. playful operating state shown. With the help of the secondary electronics, the second coil 20, ie the wing-side secondary coil at a distance of about 140 ms with control signals KS, which may contain data and / or state information, acted upon. The induced voltage due to this signal in the frame-side primary coil 19 is generated by a signal generated by the primary electronics Response control signal RKS acknowledged at intervals of about 40 ms. Should, as in F ig. 7 after the fourth Kontrol lsignal KS dargeste l lt is a response control signal RKS fail, the second coil is applied after about 60 ms with a second control signal KS. In the case shown in FIG. 7, receipt of this second control signal has been acknowledged on the frame side by a response control signal RKS. An alarm was not triggered because the transmission of the second control signal KS has been acknowledged. In the case of the signal sequence shown in FIG. 7, the third control signal KS contains state change information of a signaling group MG that has been transmitted with the third control signal.

The operating state illustrated in FIG. 8 shows the behavior in the case of several faulty transmissions. In this case, four consecutive control signals KS are not acknowledged by response control signals RKS. After the absence of the response control signal RKS, which is expected at least after the second control signal KS, both the signaling group output MG and the watchdog output WD are set to an error state. After the fifth control signal KS has been acknowledged by a response control signal RKS, the outputs are reset. At terminal 44a, a corresponding signal is generated.

The primary electronics PE and the secondary electronics SE are housed in mechanically resistant, highly thermally conductive housings 50, 51, which are only shown schematically in FIG.

The housing 50 of the primary electronics PE is installed in a wall-side frame profile, the housing 51 of the secondary electronics SE in a sash profile. The installation takes place - as shown in FIG. 2 can be removed - from the profile sides, which are facing each other with the wing closed. By this measure, the housing 50, 51 are not visible from the outside and can be protected against manipulation by a sabotage contact, which generates an alarm and / or fault signal during a removal attempt. In order to further increase the sabotage security, nevertheless, the primary electronics PE and the secondary electronics SE are provided with means for mutual authentication, so that an unnoticed exchange of primary or secondary electronics PE, SE by a previously manipulated electronics is at least substantially lent more difficult.

To further increase the sabotage security housing electronics are provided with cover and / or Abhebesensoren. If these detect an opening and / or lifting of the respective housing, this is evaluated as sabotage attempt and generates a corresponding signal at the output 44a.

LIST OF REFERENCE NUMBERS

100 device

1 band part

2, 2 'hinge parts

3 distance space

4 hinge part

5 wing part

6, 6 'wall mounting parts

7 wing attachment part

8 hinge pins

17 electrical line

18 coil spring

19 primary coil

20 secondary coil

21 coil spring

22 electrical line

38 primary processor

39 secondary processor

40 entrance

41 energy source

42 power supply

44a, 44b connections

45 connection

46 connection

47 energy supply source

48 input

49 connections

50 housings

51 housing

52 inverters

53 modulator

54 switching regulator

55 demodulator

56 modulator

57 demodulator 58 output

F sash frame

R frame

S hinge axis

PE primary electronics

GMA hazard detection system

SE secondary electronics

MG reporting group

WD watchdog

KS control signals

RKS Response Control Signals

Ü Monitoring device

Claims

claims:

Method for the non-contact transmission of electrical energy and / or electrical signals between a wall and a wing fixed to this wall, in which a wall-mounted first coil and a second coil attached to the wing are provided, which are in inductive active connection,

characterized,

in a specific, repetitive control time interval, the first coil (20) is acted upon by at least one first control signal and the at least one first signal induced thereon in the second coil (19) is detected,

in this control time interval the second coil (19) is supplied with at least one second control signal and the at least one second signal induced in the first coil is detected,

and in the event of non-application or non-detection of the or a predetermined part in the control time interval of expected control signals, a first disturbance signal is generated.

A method according to claim 1, characterized in that within the control time interval, the first coil and the second coil are each supplied with two control signals and the interference signal when not applied or not detected by both control signals of the first and / or the second coil or in the control Time interval is generated.

A method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that after acting on the first or the second coil with an initial control signal, the other coil is acted upon by a response control signal to an induced signal.

4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that the control interval between 100 ms and 500 ms, preferably about 200 ms.

5. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that two successive control signals and two successive response control signals are generated in a first time interval of 70 ms to 350 ms, preferably about 140 ms.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that a control signal and a response control signal within a second time interval of 20 ms to 100 ms, preferably generated by 40 ms.

7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that the method comprises the query of the value of a wing side in it iteration control resistor within the control time interval.

8. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that the control and response control signals are encrypted.

9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that the control and response control signals are encrypted using a change code.

10. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 9, characterized in that the method comprises the step of mutual authentication of a first coil (19) electrically connected to the primary electronics (38) and one connected to the second coil (20) secondary electronics (39). includes.

1 1. Apparatus for carrying out a method according to one of claims 1 to 10,

with a first coil (19),

with a second coil (20),

wherein the first and second coils (19, 20) are in inductive operative connection, with primary electronics (38) connected to the first coil (19), secondary electronics (39) connected to the second coil, the primary and secondary electronics comprising means for generating and detecting a control signal and a response control signal.

12. The device according to claim 1 1, characterized in that the primary and the secondary electronics (38, 39) comprise means for modulating a carrier voltage with the control and response control signals.

13. The apparatus according to claim 12, characterized in that the primary electronics comprise means for frequency modulation of the carrier voltage with the control signals and the secondary electronics means for amplitude modulation of the carrier voltage with the response control signals.

14. Device according to one of claims 1 1 to 13, characterized in that the primary and the secondary electronics (38, 39) each comprise a housing (50, 51), which at least partially made of a heat-conducting material, preferably from a heat conductive plastic.

15. Device according to one of claims 1 1 to 14, characterized in that the primary and the secondary electronics (38, 39) each comprise a housing (50, 51) which, for installation in a frame or in a wing profile, is preferably provided in profile recesses on the closed wing with each other facing sides.