EP2454702A1

EP2454702A1 - Method for hsm migration

Info

Publication number: EP2454702A1
Application number: EP10730489A
Authority: EP
Inventors: Niklas Weiss
Original assignee: Bundesdruckerei GmbH
Current assignee: Bundesdruckerei GmbH
Priority date: 2009-07-15
Filing date: 2010-07-14
Publication date: 2012-05-23
Also published as: EP4250636A3; WO2011006912A1; EP4250636A2

Abstract

The invention relates to a method for migrating from a first HSM (140; 101A) to a second HSM (101B), wherein the first HSM is associated with a first asymmetrical cryptographic key pair having a first personal key (142; 142A) and a first public key (147 A) and a first certificate (144; 144A) containing the first public key, comprising the following steps: generating a second asymmetrical cryptographic key pair having a second personal key (142B) and a second public key (191B) and a second certificate (190B), which contains the second public key, by the second HSM, transmitting the second certificate (190B) with the second public key from the second HSM to the first HSM, and generating a third certificate (144B) by the first HSM by signing the second public key using the first personal key, wherein a certificate check of the second certificate can be carried out by way of a certificate chain containing the first and third certificates.

Description

Procedure for HSM migration

description

The invention relates to a method for HSM migration and to a method for reading at least one attribute from an ID token, a computer program product, an ID token and a computer system.

Various methods for managing the so-called digital identity of a user are known from the prior art: Microsoft Windows CardSpace is a client-based digital identity system designed to allow Internet users to communicate their digital identity to online services. The disadvantage here is, inter alia, that the user can manipulate his digital identity.

OPENID, on the other hand, is a server-based system. A so-called identity server stores a database with the digital identities of the registered users. One disadvantage of this is, inter alia, inadequate data protection, since the digital identities of the users are stored centrally and the user behavior can be recorded.

From US 2007/0294431 A1 a further method for the management of the digital identities is known, which likewise requires a user registration. The invention is based on the closest prior art of DE 602 19 350 T2, which in its paragraph [0009] describes a method for replacing a key set at the highest level in an HSM, wherein a use of the currently active key is not required. The invention is based on the object to provide an improved method for HSM migration, and a method for reading at least one attribute, and a corresponding computer program product, an ID token and a computer system. The objects underlying the invention are each achieved with the features of the independent claims. Embodiments of the invention are indicated in the dependent claims.

First embodiments of the invention include a method of migrating from a first HSM to a second HSM, wherein the first HSM comprises a first asymmetric cryptographic key pair having a first private HSM associated with a first public key and a first certificate containing the first public key, comprising the following steps:

Generation of a second asymmetric cryptographic key pair with a second private and a second public key and a second certificate, which contains the second public key, by the second HSM,

Sending the second certificate with the second public key from the second HSM to the first HSM, and

Generation of a third certificate by the first HSM by signing the second public key with the first private one

Key, wherein a certificate check of the second certificate by means of a certificate chain containing the first and third certificate, is feasible. According to embodiments of the invention, the first certificate and the third certificate are both part of the same certificate chain used for the certificate chain check.

The first certificate can have the function of the root certificate. The third certificate generated in this way can then be followed by e.g. be transferred to the computer system B and / or a certificate server. The third certificate must be within a certificate chain to the root certificate of the first certificate. If the certificates of this chain are not already on the computer system B or the directory server, the third certificate must therefore be sent to the destination instance, for example from the first certificate to the root certificate of the first certificate, together with a previously existing certificate chain. the computer system B or the directory server.

An "HSM", ie a hardware security module or hardware security module (HSM), is understood to mean, in particular, an (internal or external) peripheral device for the efficient and secure execution of cryptographic operations.A HSM enables the trustworthiness and integrity of To ensure data and related information, especially in IT systems. In order to ensure the trustworthiness, the cryptographic keys used are to be protected by software as well as against physical attacks or side channel attacks. A computer system can also be designed overall as HSM.

An HSM may have multiple "slots" to store cryptographic keying material, each of the slots has the functionality of a separate HSM, and the slots are also referred to as "partition".

A "certificate" is understood here to mean a digital certificate, which is also referred to as a public-key certificate, which is a structured data that serves to identify a public key of an asymmetric cryptosystem of an identity, such as a For example, the certificate may conform to the standard X.509 or another standard.

A "root certificate" is a certificate associated with a root CA of the asymmetric cryptosystem, which is also called a self-signed certificate, unlike a root certificate a "link certificate", also referred to as a so-called "cross certificate", not signed by the same entity whose identity it is associated with.

In particular, the above-mentioned method involves a migration of a hardware security module (HSM) used by a certification service provider (ZDA) or a software driving the HSM, whereby the old rolled-out certificates or identity documents remain testable, although the private one Key of the old HSM is not accessible. Essential to the functionality of an HSM is the inaccessibility of its private key, since it is used to create a trust relationship between communication partners. The protection of the private key goes so far that the HSM tries to read the private key, destroys itself or at least resets it so that the private key is irretrievably deleted. This poses problems in migrating from an existing ZDA infrastructure with HSM and associated software either to a new HSM or to a switch to another HSM and / or software vendor, as the private

Key is not readable by the administrator. For example, this issue will also occur in all countries that require biometric data in identity documents under the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) Extended Access Control (EAC) specification, and later on their HSM to another version or another Want to change vendor.

The problem solution described here describes a method for migrating an HSM without having to read out the private key of the HSM. The solution is achieved according to first embodiments of the invention in that in a single migration step, the new HSM sends a second certificate, eg a root certificate of the new HSM to the old HSM. Alternatively, the sent second certificate may also be any nth certificate, subordinate to the root certificate of the new HSM within a certificate hierarchy at the nth point of this hierarchy, which is connected by a contiguous certificate chain to the root certificate of the new HSM , The sent second certificate also includes the second public key associated with that second certificate. The old HSM receives the second certificate and signs the public key of the received second certificate with the first private key of the old HSM. As a result, a third certificate is generated, which assumes the function of a "cross certificate" or "link certificate". The third certificate thus created is transmitted back to the computer system B together with the signed public key. According to preferred embodiments, the third certificate as the issuing entity includes the issuer of the root certificate of the old HSM and, as the certificate holder, the instance associated with the new HSM. The generated third certificate thus acts as a link Certificate that references the root certificate or an mth certificate of the new HSM from the root certificate or an nth certificate of the old HSM.

Certificate chains give the trust that an instance, e.g. a user, in e.g. a root certificate ("trust anchor") passes vertically to all certificates that form a certificate chain with the root certificate, whereas link certificates create trust in the horizontal direction between two independent PKI systems or two independent root certificates Embodiments of the method according to the invention for HSM migration by means of link certificates are advantageous in several respects: First, the migration method is advantageous in order to ensure the security and availability of the PKI mediated by the old HSM, for example the lifetime of the memory of the old HSM In addition, the method described for HSM migration is also advantageous since the use of link certificates also makes it possible to change the certification algorithm without the existing certificates being exceeded or should an update or change of the software or HSM hardware be necessary invalid who The continuous increase in hardware and software performance over time reduces the security provided by various cryptographic techniques used to create the certificates. As a result, certificates usually have a limited validity period of a few years. For example, if new, improved, and more secure cryptographic certificate generation algorithms are implemented on the new HSM, using Link Certificates enables these improved techniques to be used without invalidating the existing and outstanding certificates.

If the second certificate is a root certificate, ie a self-signed root certificate, this also contains, in addition to the associated second public key, a signature created using the second private key. If the second certificate is an nth certificate within a certificate hierarchy, then this was usually signed with a private key assigned to the nth certificate. If it is the second Certificate is not a root certificate, the second certificate can be checked by means of a certificate chain in the course of a certificate chain check, whereby the certificate chain contains the root certificate of the second HSM. Depending on the length of the certificate chain, the certificate chain used to check the second certificate may also contain other certificates derived from the root certificate.

The transmission of the second certificate from the new HSM to the old HSM can be done in different ways. In addition to manually transferring the second certificate to a volume, e.g. USB stick, CD-ROM, memory of a smart card, etc. can also be transmitted over a network, e.g. the internet or an intranet. However, the security of the data transmission, in particular the integrity of the transmitted second certificate, must be ensured and so-called "man-in-the-middle attacks" must be effectively excluded The security can be done, for example, by using a shared secret of the old and new HSM, this secret, for example, on another communication channel, eg by means of a human messenger, can be transmitted Alternatively or additionally, the entry of biometric data of the operator prior to the certificate transfer may be required.According to a preferred embodiment, the second certificate in the form of a certificate file is transferred to the old HSM According to further first embodiments of the invention, the HSM

Migration method designed so that the entire certificate chain of the old HSM down to the generated third certificate, which performs the function of a cross / or link certificate, is transferred to the computer system B or a directory server. First embodiments of the method according to the invention for the migration of an HSM therefore have the prerequisite that a certificate check of the second certificate can be carried out by means of a certificate chain containing the first and third certificates. That way, the new HSM is in the Able to act against the rolled-out identity documents in the ZDA so that the checking process of the rolled-out identity documents proceeds as before the migration, without any intermediary instance being affected by the migration.

The second certificate can therefore be tested by means of a first certificate chain containing the first and the third certificate. If the second certificate is not a root certificate, the second certificate can also be checked by means of a second certificate chain which contains the root certificate of the second HSM. Depending on the length of the second certificate chain, the second chain may contain additional certificates, which are derived from the root certificate of the second HSM.

In DE 602 19 350 T2 another problem is solved. It is there solved the problem that a Schlüsseipaar is used and from the point of view of the client should continue to be used, while still the HSM should be changed. Translated to the scenario described herein, this means that the ISS (Inspection System Server) would be in possession of the private root key and the identity document would check to see if the ISS owns the private key of the trust anchor in the identity document. An ISS according to the invention is also referred to as the first computer system, replacement computer system or ID provider computer system.

This makes the identity document according to the invention but not, but it requires rather that the ISS has a private key to a certificate, which is in a certificate chain to the root certificate and can be checked by the identity document on the signature checks of the individual certificates. Here the key pair of the root certificate itself is not relevant. According to embodiments of the present invention, private key information is not transferred to the other HSM by means of a transport key.

According to one embodiment of the invention, migration from the first HSM to the second HSM occurs well before the expected end of life of the first HSM. This is to ensure that, in the event of a failure of the first HSM, the service offered by the first computer system can be seamlessly continued with the second HSM on the basis of reaching its lifetime.

According to one embodiment of the invention, in addition to the first computer system with the first HSM, a replacement computer system is operated with the second HSM, wherein the replacement computer system is basically the same as the first computer system. Upon a loss of the first computer system, the replacement computer system may take over the function of the first computer system. Thus, the replacement computer system forms a "backup" for the first computer system to the creation of reliability. Preferably, the replacement computer system is established by the first computer system spatially separated. Embodiments of the invention are directed to a migration between HSM ^'s. One problem with this is in that the private key of a software, it is called a certificate authority software, in the following called CA, which first enables its certification performance, is ausweisegeschützt contained in an HSM or a chip card.Another problem is that the certification performance, the to be replaced Software with the software to be replaced with the HSM to be replaced or the chip card to be replaced must be maintained, which is only possible with the private key of the software to be replaced from the HSM to be replaced / the chip card to be replaced a continuous operation of already rolled out components. The private keys of the CA to be replaced can be safely deleted after the migration and the hardware can be put to other use.

For an HSM and / or HSM SW migration, two points are essential to embodiments of the invention: 1. Migration from an existing system with an old CA and an old HSM to a new CA with a new HSM,

2. Operation of the new CA with the new HSM at 1 .:

1. First, according to first embodiments of the invention, a new CA is set up with a new HSM. Subsequently, the migration from the old CA with the old HSM to the new CA with the new HSM is initiated by the transmission of the second certificate, which is a second public key, i. pub [HSM new], includes, to the old HSM. ,

The old HSM signs the obtained public key pub [HSM-new] of the obtained second certificate with its old private key to form a link certificate (third certificate): LinkCert = sig {pub [HSM-new]) created with the private key of the old HSM.

Finally, the old CA then sends the link certificate LinkCert = sig (pub [HSM-new]) to the new CA, whereby the private key of the old HSM is used for the signature. Furthermore, the existing certificate chain of the old HSM will be sent to the new HSM (via the respective CA software).

The old HSM can then be switched off. to 2 .:

An Inspection System Server (hereafter referred to as ISS) sends to the new HSM a certificate request with the public key of the ISS (pub [ISS]). The new CA with the new HSM then signs this public key pubflSS] with its private key priv [HSM-new] to form a certificate:

sig (pub [ISS]) using the new CA's private key with the new HSM). This signature can be from the ISS to the one from the old CA to the HSM issued link certificate (third certificate). To verify the link certificate, additional link certificates and the original root certificate may be required. These certificates also come from the old CA and the old HSM and were imported into the new CA and the new HSM as part of the migration.

Overall, the ISS then receives a certificate chain

1. the ISS certificate with the public key of the current ISS key pair signed by the new CA.

2. the modified link certificate with that of the old CA and the old one

HSM signed public key of the new CA and the new HSM

3. possibly further link certificates of the old CA and the old HSM

4. the root certificate of the old CA and the old HSM. An ID token, such as an electronic device adapted for the purposes of electronic identity confirmation according to per se known circuit technology, such as e.g. an electronic identity document, e.g. an electronic passport, against which the ISS has to authenticate, finally receives this certificate chain (with the exception of the root certificate, which was introduced as a trust anchor when personalizing the passport). During verification, the passport can determine if the ISS has a trust relationship with the new HSM and whether the new CA with the new HSM has a trust relationship with the old CA with the old HSM. If this chain of trust exists, the passport releases sensitive data, such as fingerprints, to the ISS.

According to the prior art, a change of HSM hardware z. B. not possible to another manufacturer. This infrastructure must be kept for the entire life of the passports with the root certificate of the old HSM. The manufacturers also reserve the right to delete all HSM data for larger firmware updates. Major updates may also be due to internal firmware structures changing and the data, even backed up, becoming unplayable. Advantage of the method is that old CAs with old HSMs with basically inaccessible private

Keys can be replaced without all circulating passports are suddenly invalid. Further, interoperability is such allows a vendor change between HSM ^'s can take place.

With this invention, you can switch at any time, the hardware manufacturer independent.

In particular, embodiments of the invention solve the problem of replacing already delivered CA software with which passes are also personalized at any later time by a (not yet existing) new CA software and with certificates of this new CA with To be able to continue to read certificates of the old CA personalized passports.

According to embodiments of the invention, a method is provided for reading at least one attribute stored in an ID token, wherein the ID token is assigned to a user. The method includes the following steps: authenticating the user against the ID token; Authenticating a first computer system against the ID token; after successful authentication of the user and the first computer system against the ID token, read access of the first computer system to the at least one stored in the ID token attribute for transmitting the at least one attribute to a second computer system. The first computer system includes the first or, after migration, the second HSM used for authenticating a first computer system to the ID token and for signing the at least one attribute it can also be the replacement computer system.

Embodiments of the invention allow one or more of the attributes stored in an ID token to be read by the first computer system, wherein the connection between the ID token and the first computer system may be established over a network, particularly the Internet. At least An attribute can be an indication as to the identity of the user associated with the ID token, in particular with regard to its so-called digital identity. For example, the first computer system reads the attributes name, first name, address to forward these attributes to a second computer system, for example an online service.

However, it is also possible, for example, to read only a single attribute which does not serve to establish the identity of the user, but, for example, to check the authorization of the user to use a particular online service, such as the age of the user, if this one Online service that is reserved for a particular age group, or another attribute that documents the user's affiliation to a particular group that is authorized to use the online service.

The ID token can be a portable electronic device, such as the Beckerpie! a so-called USB stick, act or a document, in particular a value or security document. According to the invention, a "document" is understood to mean paper-based and / or plastic-based documents, such as passport documents, identity cards, visas and driving licenses, vehicle registration documents, vehicle documents, company identity cards, health cards or other ID documents as well as chip cards, means of payment, in particular bank cards and Credit cards, bills of lading or other credentials in which a data store for storing the at least one attribute is integrated.

Embodiments of the invention are thus particularly advantageous since the at least one attribute is read from a particularly trustworthy document, for example an official document. Of particular advantage is further that a central storage of the attributes is not required. Embodiments of the invention therefore enable a particularly high degree of trustworthiness. the ability to communicate the attributes associated with a digital identity, combined with optimal data protection and extremely convenient handling. According to one embodiment of the invention, the first computer system has at least one certificate which is used for authentication of the first computer system to the ID token. The certificate includes an indication of those attributes for which the first computer system has read permission. The ID token uses this certificate to check whether the first computer system has the read permission to read the attribute before such read access can be performed by the first computer system.

According to one embodiment of the invention, the first computer system sends the at least one attribute issued by the ID token directly to a second computer system. The second computer system may be, for example, a server for providing an on-line service or other service, such as a banking service or ordering a product. For example, the user can open an account online, for which attributes that include the identity of the user are transferred from the first computer system to the second computer system of a bank.

According to one embodiment of the invention, the transmission of the attributes read from the ID token from the first computer system first takes place to a third computer system of the user. For example, the third computer system has a standard Internet browser with which the user can open a web page of the second computer system. The user can enter a request or order for a service or product into the web page.

The second computer system then specifies those attributes, for example the user or his ID token, which it needs for the provision of the service or the acceptance of the order. The corresponding attribute specification, which includes the specification of these attributes, is then used by the second computer. sent to the first computer system. This can be done with or without the interposition of the third computer system. In the latter case, the user may specify the desired first computer system relative to the second computer system, for example by entering the URL of the first computer system into a web page of the second computer system from the third computer system.

According to one embodiment of the invention, the service request of the user to the second computer system includes the indication of an identifier, wherein the identifier identifies the first computer system. For example, the identifier is a link, for example a URL of the first computer system.

According to one embodiment of the invention, the attribute specification is not sent directly from the second computer system to the first computer system, but first from the second computer system to the third computer system. The third computer system has a plurality of predefined configuration records, the third computer having a plurality of predefined configuration records, each of the configuration records specifying a subset of the attributes, at least one data source and a first computer system among a set of first computer systems, the attribute specification from the second computer system first the third computer system is transmitted such that by means of the third computer system at least one of the configuration data sets is selected specifying a subset of the attributes including the at least one attribute specified in the attribute specification, and wherein the third computer matches the attribute specification to the first one Computer system, and the connection is established with the ID token specified by the specification of the data source in the selected configuration record. According to one embodiment of the invention, the attributes read from the ID token are signed by the first computer system and then transmitted to the third computer system. The user of the third computer system can the Read attributes, but without being able to change them. Only after release by the user are the attributes forwarded from the third computer system to the second computer system. According to one embodiment of the invention, the user can supplement the attributes before their forwarding by further data.

According to one embodiment of the invention, the first computer system has a plurality of certificates with different read rights. Upon receiving the Attribute Specification, the first computer system selects one or more of these certificates to retrieve the corresponding attributes from the ID token or multiple different ID tokens.

According to one embodiment of the invention, the third computer system has at least one configuration data record which specifies an external data source for requesting a further attribute from the third computer system via the network.

According to one embodiment of the invention, after the at least one attribute has been read out of the ID token and after the third computer system has received the at least one attribute from the first computer system, the query of the further attribute takes place, the query comprising the at least one Attribute includes. In a further aspect, the invention relates to a computer program product, in particular a digital storage medium, with executable program instructions for carrying out a method according to the invention.

In a further aspect, the invention relates to an ID token with a protected memory area for storing at least one attribute, with means for authenticating a user assigned to the ID token with respect to the ID token, means for authenticating a first computer system with respect to the ID token, means for establishing a protected connection to the first computer system, via which the first computer system can read the at least one attribute, wherein a necessary condition for reading the at least one attribute from the ID token by the first computer system, the successful authentication of the user and the first computer system against the ID token.

In addition to the authentication of the first computer system to the ID token, as known per se as, for example, so-called extended-access control for machine-readable travel documents (MRTD) and specified by the international aviation authority ICAO, must So the user will authenticate to the ID token. For example, a successful authentication of the user against the ID token unlocks it, so that the further steps, namely the authentication of the first computer system with respect to the ID token and / or the establishment of a protected connection for reading out the attributes, can take place.

According to one embodiment of the invention, the ID token has means for end-to-end encryption. This makes it possible to establish the connection between the ID token and the first computer system via a third computer system of the user, since the user can not make any changes to the data transmitted via the connection due to the end-to-end encryption.

In a further aspect, the invention relates to a computer system having a first HSM and a second HSM, wherein the first HSM is associated with a first asymmetric cryptographic key pair having a first private and a first public key and a first certificate containing the first public key and wherein the second HSM is associated with a second asymmetric cryptographic key pair having a second private and a second public key and an associated second certificate, and wherein the second HSM is associated with a third certificate generated thereby by the first HSM, that the second public key of the second certificate was signed with the first private key by the first HSM. The first and second HSMs may be different slots of the same HSM or two separate HSMs. For example, the first HSM is located in a first computer system A and the second HSM is in a first computer system B. The first computer system B may be provided for a so-called "Coid Standby", that is to say as a replacement computer system for the first computer system A, if that fails, the computer system will include the first computer systems A and B in this case.

According to one embodiment of the invention, the computer system has means for sensing a failure of the first HSM of the first HSM and means for switching to the second HSM and the first computer system B, respectively second HSM belongs. This enables so-called "hot-standby" operation, switching over from the first

Computer system A to the first computer system B can thus within a very short time, for example in the range of milliseconds, take place after the failure of the first computer system A has been sensed. According to one embodiment of the invention, the means for sensing are designed to test a time-out condition. For example, the sensing means monitors whether the computer system A resp. The first HSM responds to a request within a predetermined time. If not the FaI! is, then the time-out condition is not met, so that the computer system B is switched, and the request is sent again to the computer system B.

According to one embodiment of the invention, the computer system has means for load distribution between at least the computer systems A and B. This has the advantage that the computer systems A and B and, if necessary, further first computer systems of the same construction are used for the processing of requests so that a corresponding large number of such requests gen per unit time by the parallel computer systems A, B, ... can be processed.

According to one embodiment of the invention, the means for distributing the load are designed to determine a load parameter for each of the computer systems A, B,.... These load parameters may be the length of a queue of requests to be processed by the particular first computer system, the current load of the processor of the particular first computer system, or other suitable load parameter. The means for distributing the load are then designed in such a way that additional requirements directed to the computer system are distributed to the first computer systems A, B,... Such that the values of the load parameters of the first computer systems are matched to one another. In a further aspect, the invention relates to a first computer system with

A computer system having means for receiving an attribute specification over a network, the attribute specification specifying at least one attribute, means for authenticating against an ID token, means for reading at least one attribute from the ID token over a secure connection, wherein reading the at least one Attribute assumes that a user associated with the ID token has authenticated against the ID token.

According to one embodiment of the invention, the first computer system may include means for generating a request to the user. For example, after the first computer system receives the attribute specification from the second computer system, it sends a request to the user's third computer system, prompting the user to authenticate against the ID token. After the user's authentication against the ID token has been successfully performed, the first computer system receives an acknowledgment from the third computer system. As a result, the first computer system authenticates against the ID token and it becomes established a secure connection between the ID token and the first computer system with end-to-end encryption.

According to one embodiment of the invention, the first computer system has a plurality of certificates each specifying different read rights. Upon receipt of the attribute specification, the first computer system selects at least one of these certificates with the read rights sufficient to read the specified attributes.

In one embodiment, the present invention solves the following problem: After a Hardware Security Module (HSM) failure that stores the private key material of a Root Certificate Authority (Root CA) for identity, value, or security documents, hereafter referred to simply as security documents is, all security documents would have to be replaced, since their authenticity can only be determined by means of the root CA. This can lead to a high cost loss in the case of nationwide issued security documents.

The background is that for this authenticity or authentication determination there is a card verifiable certificate (CV certificate) on the security documents, which ultimately depends on the root certificate authority (root CA). All manufacturers of security documents must therefore refer to the root CA when they apply CV certificates to the cards.

In addition to authentication, the root CA is also important for card insertion (revocation service). For example, public and private keys can be generated and stored by the High Security Module (HSM). It is therefore proposed according to one embodiment, set up in time for an expected failure of the HSM, for example, based on the MTBF (Mean Time Before Failure) information from the manufacturer, a backup root CA with its own HSM. This is done favorably by the public inferences! the backup root CA is signed by the productive root CA, using the private key of the productive root CA. in a certificate chain from the security document to be audited across different CA's to a root CA as well the backup root CA will be able to work as root CA. The previous productive root CA can then be switched off or the backup root CA can work as a so-called "hot standby" to provide high availability. Embodiments of the first computer system according to the invention are particularly advantageous because, in combination with the need to authenticate the user against the ID token, they provide a trust anchor for the user's unadulterated digital identity. It is of particular advantage that this does not require any prior registration of the user with respect to the computer system and also no central storage of the attributes of the users forming the digital identities.

According to one embodiment of the invention, the first computer system, together with the attribute specification, receives an identifier of the second computer system. With the aid of the identifier, the computer system identifies the second computer system that wishes to use the identification services to charge that service to the second computer system.

According to one embodiment of the invention, the first computer system is an officially certified trust center, in particular a signature center-compliant trust center.

Embodiments of the invention thus provide an advantage, particularly in the tightly regulated environment of a trust center, since the step of generating and transporting a certificate creation request (this transport must be done manually in a trust center according to the prior art) on the first HSM and return transport to the second HSM It is now sufficient to transport a certificate of the second HSM for signing by the first HSM and return transport to the second HSM, so that a significant simplification is provided and the already generated certificate of the second HSM is used directly. According to second embodiments of the invention, the second public key is not necessarily transmitted from the second HSM to the first HSM as part of a certificate. The transmission of the second key can be transmitted according to the second embodiment, for example in the form of a file containing only the second public key.

Second embodiments of the invention provide a method of migrating from a first HSM to a second HSM according to which the first HSM is assigned a first asymmetric cryptographic key pair having a first private and a first public key and a first certificate containing the first public key is, the method comprising the following steps:

Generation of a second asymmetric cryptographic key pair with a second private and a second public key by the second HSM,

Sending a request with the second public key from the second HSM to the first HSM,

- Generating a second certificate from the first HSM by signing the second public key with the first private key, wherein using the second certificate and the first certificate, a certificate chain check is feasible.

According to second embodiments of the invention, the first certificate and the second certificate are both part of the same certificate chain used for the certificate chain check. A certificate chain check can e.g. on the occasion of the verification of a digital signature.

In another aspect, second embodiments of the invention relate to

Method for reading at least one attribute stored in an ID token, wherein the ID token is assigned to a user, with the following steps:

Authentication of the user against the ID token, Authentication of a first computer system to the ID token,

After successful authentication of the user and the first computer system against the ID token, read access of the first computer system to the at least one stored in the ID token attribute for transmitting the at least one attribute after its signature to a second computer system, wherein the first computer system includes the first HSM and the second HSM, respectively, after a migration has been performed according to a second embodiment of the HSM migration method, wherein the authentication is performed using the HSM.

In a further aspect, second embodiments of the invention relate to a computer program product with instructions executable by a computer system for carrying out a method according to one of the preceding second embodiments of the method according to the invention,

In a further aspect, second embodiments of the invention relate to a computer system having a first and a second HSM, wherein the first HSM is associated with a first asymmetric cryptographic key pair having a first private and a first public key and a first certificate containing the first public key, wherein the second HSM is associated with a second asymmetric cryptographic key pair having a second private and a second public key and a second certificate containing the second public key, and wherein the second certificate includes the second public key signed with the first private key ,

In the following, embodiments of the invention will be explained in more detail with reference to the drawings. Show it:

Figure 1 is a block diagram of an embodiment of the invention

Computer systems FIG. 2 shows a flowchart of an embodiment of an inventive device

process

FIG. 3 shows a block diagram of an embodiment of computer systems according to the invention with hot standby functionality,

4 shows a block diagram of an embodiment of computer systems according to the invention with a load-balancing functionality, FIG. 5 shows a block diagram of an embodiment of computer systems according to the invention,

FIG. 6 shows a flow chart of an embodiment of an inventive device

process

FIG. 7 shows a block diagram of further embodiments according to the invention

Computer systems

8 shows a UML diagram of a further embodiment of a method according to the invention, FIG.

FIG. 9 shows the transmission of the created link certificate together with the

Certificate chain of the computer system A to the computer system B. Elements of the following embodiments, which correspond to each other, are identified by the same reference numerals.

FIG. 1 shows a first computer system A, which can be designed as an ISS or as an ID provider computer system. The computer system A includes an HSM 101 A having a protected memory area 141 A in which a private key P1 is stored. The HSM 101A further has a processor 103A for executing program instructions 105A. The computer system A further has a memory 140A in which a certificate 144A may be stored. The certificate 144A includes a public key 01 associated with the private key P1. The keys P1 and 01 thus form an asymmetrical cryptographic key pair of a PKI.

The computer system A further has a processor 145A for executing program instructions 143A, by means of which, for example, an application program can be implemented.

Furthermore, a further first computer system B is made available, which in principle can have the same structure as the computer system A. The HSM 101 B of the computer system B is initially still unused and in the protected memory area 141 B of the HSM 101 B initially no key is stored ,

For migration from the computer system A with its HSM 101A to the computer system B with its HSM 101 B, according to first embodiments of the invention, the procedure is as follows: First, by executing the program instructions 105B on the part of the

HSM 101 B of the computer system B generates a new cryptographic root key pair, namely the second private key P2 and the second public key O2. In addition, HSM 101B of computer system B generates a second certificate 190B associated with the generated second key pair. The private key P2 is stored in the protected storage area 141B. The public key O2 and the associated second certificate including the second public key are transmitted from the computer system B to the computer system A. This can be done via a network 107 or other type of data connection.

The public key O2 is transferred to the HSM 101 A of the computer system A together with the second certificate. Thereupon by execution the program instructions 105A sign the public key 02 with the private key P1 to generate a corresponding third certificate 144B. This third certificate 144B is a link certificate to the first certificate 144A so that the third certificate chain check certificate 144B may be employed, the first certificate 144A being the predecessor certificate in the certificate chain to the PKI root certificate is.

The third certificate 144B is then sent e.g. transmitted over the network 107 from the computer system A to the computer system B and stored there in the memory 140B. In addition, the first certificate 144A as well as other link certificates of the certificate chain, possibly stored by the computer system A, can be transmitted to the root certificate from the computer system A to the computer system B in order to store them in the memory 140B. Alternatively or additionally, a directory server 109 may be provided for storing the certificates of the certificate chain. In this case, the first certificate 144A may be stored in the directory server 109. The third certificate 144B is, after its generation by the computer system A, for example, uploaded via the network 107 to the directory server 109, so that it is generally available there.

After the generation of the third certificate 144B and its transfer to computer system B, the computer system B is ready for operation as an ISS or ID provider computer system. The computer system B may be kept ready for so-called cold-standby operation as a replacement for the computer system A to replace the computer system A as soon as it fails. It is also possible to proceed in such a way that the computer system A is replaced by the computer system B before expiry of its expected service life. According to second embodiments of the invention, the migration from the computer system A with its HSM 101 A to the computer system B with its HSM 101 B proceeds as follows: First, by executing program instructions 105B by the HSM 101B of the computer system B, a new cryptographic key pair is generated, namely, the private key P2 and the public key 02. The private key P2 is stored in the protected storage area 141B. The public key 02 is transmitted from the computer system B to the computer system A, wherein the second computer system does not create a second certificate and wherein the second public key is not transmitted as part of the second certificate. The transmission of the second public key may be via a network 107 or other type of data connection.

The public key 02 is entered in a further step in the HSM 101 A of the computer system A. Then, by executing the program instructions 105A, the public key 02 is signed with the private key P1 to generate a second certificate. This second certificate is a link certificate to the first certificate, so the second certificate can be used for a certificate chain check, where the first certificate is the predecessor certificate in the certificate chain to the PKI root certificate. The second certificate generated according to the second embodiments of the invention is then e.g. transmitted over the network 107 from the computer system A to the computer system B and stored there in the memory 140B. In addition, the first certificate as well as other link certificates of the certificate chain, possibly stored by the computer system A, can be transmitted to the root certificate from the computer system A to the computer system B in order to store them in the memory 140B.

FIG. 2 shows a corresponding flow chart of a first embodiment of the method according to the invention. When the computer system A is put into operation, it has a first asymmetrical pair of cryptographic keys consisting of the key P1 and the public key 01, the public key 01 being included in the certificate A of the PKI (step 10). The new HSM of the computer system B creates, if not yet present on the new HSB, a second asymmetric cryptographic pair of keys consisting of the second private key P2 and the second public key 02, wherein in addition to the second asymmetric key pair and a second certificate 190B is generated, which includes the second public key 02 (step 12). In step 14, the computer system B sends the second certificate along with its second public key 02 to the computer system A. Then, in step 16, the HSM of the computer system A generates a third certificate C for the key pair P2, 02 by using the public key 02 signed with his private key P1. In step 18, the third certificate C and possibly further certificates of a certificate chain are transmitted to a root certificate of the PKI from the computer system A to the computer system B. Alternatively or additionally, these certificates are stored in a directory server. In step 20, computer system B may then take the place of computer system A and computer system A may be turned off.

Instead of migrating from computer system A to computer system B, only migration from HSM 101 A to HSM 101 B may take place, with HSM 101 A and HSM 101 B belonging to the same first computer system. For example, the HSM 101 A and the HSM 101 B are different slots of the same HSM.

The reason for a migration from the first HSM 101 A to the second HSM 101 B may also be that, for example, the program 143A is replaced by a new program that requires other data structures. The migration does not necessarily have to be accompanied by a change in the hardware. The embodiments considered here are, for example, a two-layer systems. However, embodiments with more than two layers are also possible, in particular an n-layer system, where n can be any natural number. In particular, the certificate chain may include a Document Verifying Certificate Authority (DVCA).

According to another embodiment, the computer systems A and B are formed overall as HSMs.

FIG. 3 shows an embodiment of the invention in which the computer systems A and B can be operated in a so-called hot standby mode. For this purpose, the computer systems A and B are connected via a hot standby module 172 to a network 116, via the z. For example, a request 168 for providing a cryptographic service, such as e.g. the generation of a signature, the verification of a signature or for the reading out of attributes from an ID token (see the embodiments of Figures 5 to 8) can be received.

The hot standby module 172 includes a processor 174 for executing program instructions 176 and a switch 178, which may be hardware and / or software implemented. The switch 178 may be a so-called coupling node, in particular a switch. The hot-standby module 172 can be designed so that next to the computer system A and B further corresponding computer systems can be connected thereto.

By executing the program instructions 176, the hot standby module 172 senses whether the computer system A is operating or has failed. As long as the computer system A has not failed, the switch 178 is switched so that the requests received over the network 116 are forwarded to the computer system A for processing, in particular the request 168. Once through the hot standby module 172 is sensed that computer system A has failed, execution of the program Instructions 176 generates a switching signal, so that the switch 178 switches, and so that the further received via the network 116 requests are no longer forwarded to the computer system A, but to the computer system B.

The program instructions 176 may be arranged to check a time-out condition to determine if the computer system A is still operating. For example, this is started with the forwarding of the request 168 via the switch 178 to the computer system A, a timer. If the computer system A responds to the request 168 within a predetermined time, this means that the computer system A is in operation. On the other hand, if the computer system A does not respond to the request 168 within the predetermined time interval, this means that the computer system A is no longer working correctly. It is then generated by execution of the program instructions 176, the switching signal for switching the switch 178.

The hot standby module 172 may include a buffer memory in which the requests last forwarded to the computer system A are stored in copy. Once a request stored in the buffer memory has been processed by the computer system A, that request is deleted from the buffer memory. Once a failure of the computer system A is sensed, the requests stored in the buffer memory are forwarded again, and then to the computer system B, so that these requirements are not lost.

FIG. 4 shows a further embodiment of the invention, in which the computer systems A and B of the computer system according to the invention are interconnected in a load-balancing configuration. For this purpose, a load-balancing module 182 is provided. The load balancing module 182 has a processor 184 for executing program instructions 186. Furthermore, the load balancing module 182 has a memory 180 for storing one load parameter for the computer system. A and B and possibly other connected to the load balancing module 182 computer systems to which the load is to be distributed.

By executing the program instructions 186, the requests received over the network 116, in particular the request 168, are forwarded to either the computer system A or the computer system B to distribute the overall load between the computer systems A and B. To distribute the load, a load parameter LA is computed by executing the program instructions 186 for example for the computer system A and a load parameter LB is stored for the computer system B and stored in the memory 180. The load parameter LA can be determined, for example, such that the number of requests forwarded to the computer system A in a past time interval of a predetermined length is included in the determination of the load parameter LA. In this case, the requirements may have a different weighting, depending on their content. The same applies to the load parameter LB.

When an additional request 168 is received over the network 116, the execution of the program instructions 186 accesses the load parameters LA and LB to forward the request 168 to that of the computer systems A and B with the lesser load parameter.

FIG. 5 shows a user computer system 100 of a user 102. The user computer system 100 may be a personal computer, a portable computer such as a laptop or palmtop computer, a personal digital assistant, a mobile telecommunication device , in particular a smart phone, or the like act. The user computer system 100 has an interface 104 for communicating with an ID token 106 having a corresponding interface 108. The user computer system 100 has at least one processor 110 for executing program instructions 112 and a network interface 114 for Communication over a Network 116. The network may be a computer network, such as the Internet.

The ID token 106 has an electronic memory 118 with protected memory areas 120, 122 and 124. The protected memory area 120 serves to store a reference value which is required for the authentication of the user 102 with respect to the ID token 106. This reference value is, for example, an identifier, in particular a so-called Personal Identification Number (PIN), or reference data for a biometric feature of the user 102, which can be used to authenticate the user to the ID token 106 ,

The protected area 122 serves to store a private key and the protected memory area 124 serves to store attributes, for example! of the user 102, such as its name, place of residence, date of birth, gender, and / or attributes pertaining to the ID token itself, such as the institution that created or issued the ID token, the validity period of the ID Tokens, an identifier of the ID token, such as a passport number or a credit card number.

The electronic memory 118 may further include a memory area 126 for storing a certificate. The certificate includes a public key associated with the private key stored in the protected storage area 122. The certificate may have been created according to a public key infrastructure (PKI) standard, for example according to the X.509 standard.

The certificate does not necessarily have to be stored in the electronic memory 118 of the ID token 106. Alternatively or additionally, the certificate may also be stored in a public directory server (see directory server 109 of FIG. Furthermore, a root certificate of the PKI may be stored in the memory area 123. The root certificate is stored there, for example, during a personalization of the ID token 106 there. The ID token 106 has a processor 128. The processor 128 is used to execute program instructions 130, 132 and 134. The program instructions 130 are used for user authentication, ie to authenticate the user 102 in relation to the ID token.

In a PIN embodiment, the user 102 inputs his PIN to his authentication in the ID token 106, for example via the user computer system 100. Execution of the program instructions 130 then accesses the protected memory area 120 to store the entered PIN with the PIN to compare there stored reference value of the PIN. In the event that the entered PIN matches the reference value of the PlN, the user 102 is considered authenticated. Alternatively, a biometric feature of the user 102 is detected. For example, the ID token 106 has a fingerprint sensor or a fingerprint sensor is connected to the user's computer system 100. The biometric data acquired by the user 102 is compared to the biometric reference data stored in the protected memory area 120 by execution of the program instructions 130 in this embodiment. If the biometric data acquired by the user 102 sufficiently matches the biometric reference data, the user 102 is considered authenticated.

The program instructions 134 are used to execute the steps of a cryptographic protocol relating to the ID token 106 for authenticating an ID provider computer system 136 to the ID token 106. The ID provider computer system 136 may be the first computer system 1 or to the computer systems A and B connected to the hot standby module 172 according to the embodiment of FIG. 3 or to the load balancing module 182 of the embodiment of FIG. 4. The cryptographic protocol may be a challenge Act response protocol based on a symmetric key or an asymmetrical pair of keys.

For example, the cryptographic protocol implements an Extended Access Control method as specified for machine-readable travel documents (MRTD) by the International Aviation Authority (ICAO). By successfully executing the cryptographic protocol, the I D provider computer system 136 authenticates to the ID token, thereby verifying its readability to read the attributes stored in the protected memory area 124. The authentication may also be mutually, i. also, the ID token 106 must then authenticate to the ID provider computer system 136 according to the same or another cryptographic protocol. The program instructions 132 are for end-to-end locking of data transmitted between the ID token 106 and the ID provider computer system 136, but at least the attributes read from the protected memory area 124 by the ID provider computer system 136 , For the end-to-end encryption, a symmetric key may be used, which is agreed upon, for example, during the execution of the cryptographic protocol between the ID token 106 and the ID provider computer system 136.

As an alternative to the embodiment shown in FIG. 5, the user computer system 100 with its interface 104 can not communicate directly with the interface 108, but via a reading device for the ID token 106 connected to the interface 104. Via this reading device, such as For example, a so-called class 2 smart card terminal, the PIN can also be entered. The ID provider computer system 136 has a network interface 138 for

Communication via the Network 116. The ID provider computer system 136 further has a memory 140 in which a private key 142 of the ID provider Computer system 136 and the corresponding certificate 144 is stored. The memory 140 is part of a first HSM of the ID provider computer system 136 to securely store the private key 142. This certificate can also be a certificate according to a PKI standard, for example! X.509 act.

For example, if the ID provider computer system 136 is to be backed up by an essentially identical replacement ID provider computer system, then the replacement ID provider computer system with the second HSM is sent to the network 116 is connected. For the second HSM, a second key pair with associated second certificate 190B is then generated (root key pair with certificate or certificate connected to the root certificate by a certificate chain at the nth hierarchical level) and by the replacement ID provider computer system the second certificate with the associated second public key of the second key pair is sent to the ID provider computer system 136. The first HSM

then generates a third certificate by signing the second public key with the first private key 142, wherein a certificate check of the second certificate by means of a certificate chain containing the first and third certificate is feasible. In accordance with preferred embodiments, a certificate chain check from the third certificate to the root certificate of the first certificate can be carried out. The first and third certificates are e.g. stored on a public directory server. Alternatively or additionally, the first and third certificates and possibly further certificates required for a certificate chain check are sent by the ID provider computer system 136 to the replacement 1 D provider computer system and stored there.

The ID provider computer system 136 further has at least one processor 145 for executing program instructions 146 and 148. By executing the program instructions 146, the steps of the cryptographic protocol concerning the ID provider computer system 136 are executed. Overall, therefore, the cryptographic protocol by execution of the program instructions 134th implemented by the processor 128 of the ID token 106 and by execution of the program instructions 146 by the processor 145 of the ID provider computer system 136. The program instructions 148 are used to implement the end-to-end encryption on the ID provider computer system 136 side, for example, based on the symmetric key that is present during the execution of the cryptographic protocol between the ID token 106 and the I D provider - Computer system 136 has been agreed. In principle, any method known per se for agreeing the symmetric key for end-to-end encryption, such as a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, may be used.

The I D provider computer system 136 is preferably located in a specially protected environment, in particular in a so-called trust center, so that the I D provider computer system 136 in combination with the need for authentication of the user 102 against the ID Token 106 forms the trust anchor for the authenticity of the attributes read from ID token 106.

A service computer system 150 may be configured to receive an order or order for a service or product, particularly an online service. For example, the user 102 may open an account online with a bank via the network 116, or may use other financial or banking services. The service computer system 150 may also be embodied as an online store, such that the user 102 may, for example, purchase a mobile phone or the like online. Further, the service computer system 150 may also be configured to provide digital content, such as for downloading music and / or video data.

The service computer system 150 has for this purpose a network interface 152 for connection to the network 116. Furthermore, the service computer system 150 has at least one processor 154 for executing program instructions 156. By executing the program instructions 156, for example, dynamic HTML pages are generated, via which the user 102 can enter his order or his order.

Depending on the type of product or service ordered or ordered, the service computer system 150 must review one or more attributes of the user 102 and / or its ID token 106 based on one or more predetermined criteria. Only if this check is passed will the order or order of the user 102 be accepted and / or executed.

For example, to open a bank account or purchase a mobile phone with a related contract, it is required that the user 102 reveal his identity to the service computer system 150 and that this identity be verified. In the prior art, for example, the user 102 has to present his identity card for this purpose. This process is replaced by the reading of the digital identity of the user 102 from its ID token 106.

However, depending on the application, the user 102 may not have to disclose his identity to the service computer system 150, but the message, for example, is sufficient for only one of the attributes. For example, the user 102 may provide evidence, via one of the attributes, that he belongs to a particular group of people who are authorized to access data stored on the service computer system 150. For example, such a criterion may be a minimum age of the user 102 or the affiliation of the user 102 to a group of people having access to certain confidential data.

To take advantage of the service provided by the service computer system 150, the procedure is as follows:

1. Authentication of the user 102 against the ID token 106. The user 102 authenticates himself to the ID token 106. In an implementation with a PIN, the user 102 for this purpose enters his PIN, for example via the user computer system 100 or a chip card terminal connected thereto. By executing the program instructions 130, the ID token 106 then checks the correctness of the entered PIN. If the entered PIN matches the reference value of the PIN stored in the protected memory area 120, then the user 102 is considered authenticated. An analogous procedure can be used if a biometric feature of the user 102 is used for its authentication, as described above.

2. Authentication of the I D provider computer system 136 against the ID token 106.

For this purpose, a connection is established between the ID token 106 and the ID provider computer system 136 via the user computer system 100 and the network 116. For example, the I D provider computer system 136 transmits its certificate 144 over this connection to the ID token 106 or the certificate 144 is retrieved from a directory server (see Directory Server 109 of Figure 1). Accordingly, if the I D provider computer system 136 is the first computer system A, the certificate 144A is transmitted to the ID token 106, but if it is the first computer system B, the certificate 144B becomes transferred to the ID token 106. In addition, one or more further certificates for carrying out a certificate chain check can each be transmitted to the ID token 106. The program instructions 134 then generate a so-called challenge, ie, for example, a random number. This random number is encrypted with the public key of the I D provider computer system 136 contained in the certificate 144. The resulting cipher is sent from the ID token 106 over the connection to the ID provider computer system 136. The I D provider computer system 136 decrypts the ciphertext using its private key 142 and thus obtains the random number. The randomness! sends the ID provider computer system 136 back to the ID token 106 over the connection. By executing the program instructions 134, there is checked whether the random number received from the I D provider computer system 136 matches the originally generated random number, ie, the challenge. If so, the ID provider computer system 136 is deemed authenticated to the ID token 106. The Zufaliszahi can be used as a symmetric key for end-to-end encryption.

3. After the user 102 has successfully authenticated against the ID token 106, and after the ID provider computer system 136 has successfully authenticated against the ID token 106, the ID provider computer system 136 obtains read permission to read; one, several or all of the attributes stored in the protected memory area 124. On the basis of a corresponding read command, which the ID provider computer system 136 sends via the connection to the ID token 106, the requested attributes are read from the protected memory area 124 and encrypted by execution of the program instructions 132.

The encrypted attributes are transmitted via the connection to the I D provider computer system 136 and decrypted there by execution of the program instructions 148. As a result, the ID provider computer system 136 receives knowledge of the attributes read from the ID token 106.

These attributes are signed by the ID provider computer system using its certificate 144 and transmitted via the user computer system 100 or directly to the service computer system 150. This notifies the service computer system 150 of the attributes read from the ID token 106 so that the service computer system 150 can check these attributes against the predetermined one or more criteria, and thereafter, if necessary, the service requested by the user 102 to provide.

The need to authenticate the user 102 to the ID token 106 and to authenticate the ID provider computer system 136 against the ID token 106 provides the necessary trust anchor so that the service computer system 150 can be sure that it has been provided by the ID Provider computer system 136 notified attributes of the user 102 are true and not distorted.

Depending on the embodiment, the order of authentication may be different. For example, it may be provided that the user 102 first has to authenticate against the ID token 106 and subsequently the ID provider computer system 136. However, it is also fundamentally possible for the iD provider computer system 136 to be initially opposite to the ID Token 106 and only subsequently the user 102.

For example, in the first case, the ID token 106 is configured to be enabled by the user 102 only by entering a correct PIN or biometric feature. Only this activation allows the start of the program instructions 132 and 134 and thus the authentication of the I D provider computer system 136th

In the second case, a start of the program instructions 132 and 134 is already possible if the user 102 has not yet authenticated against the ID token 106. In this case, for example, the program instructions 134 are designed so that the ID provider computer system 136 can only perform a read access to the protected memory area 124 for reading one or more of the attributes, after the program instructions 130 have also successfully authenticated the user 102 has been signaled. Of particular benefit is the utilization of the ID token 106 for, for example, e-commerce and eGovernment applications, media-free and legally secure due to the need to authenticate the user 102 and the ID provider computer system 136 against the ID - Token 106 formed trust anchor. Of particular advantage is further that a central storage of the attributes of different users 102 is not required, so that the existing in the prior art privacy problems are hereby solved. As far as the ease of use of the method is concerned, it is particular advantage that a prior registration of the user 102 for claiming the I D provider computer system 136 is not required.

FIG. 6 shows an embodiment of a method according to the invention. In step 200, a service request is sent from the user computer system to the service computer system. For example, the user starts an Internet browser of the user computer system and enters a URL for calling a web page of the service computer system. The user then enters his service request into the accessed web page, for example for ordering or placing an order for a service or a product.

In step 202, the service computer system 150 then specifies one or more attributes that it needs to verify the user's entitlement to the service request. In particular, the service computer system may specify attributes that determine the digital identity of the user 102. This specification of the attributes by the service computer system 150 may be fixed or, depending on the service request, determined in each case by the service computer system 150 on the basis of predetermined rules.

In step 204, the attribute specification, i. specifying, in step 202, the one or more of the attributes transmitted by the service computer system to the ID provider computer system, either directly or through the user computer system.

To allow the ID provider computer system to read attributes from its iD token, the user authenticates to the ID token at step 206. In step 208, a connection is established between the iD token and the ID provider computer system. This is preferably a secured connection, for example by a so-called secure messaging method.

In step 210, at least one authentication of the ID provider computer system to the ID token takes place via the connection set up in step 208. In addition, authentication of the ID token against the ID provider computer system may be provided.

After both the user and the ID provider computer system have been successfully authenticated against the ID token, the! D provider computer system obtains from the ID token the access to read the attributes. In step 212, the ID provider computer system sends one or more read commands to read out the attributes required by the attribute specification from the ID token. The attributes are then transmitted via end-to-end encryption over the secure connection to the ID provider computer system and decrypted there.

The read attribute values are signed by the ID provider computer system in step 214. In step 216, the ID provider computer system sends the signed attribute values over the network. The signed attribute values reach the service computer system either directly or through the user computer system. In the latter case, the user may have the opportunity to take note of the signed attribute values and / or to supplement them with further data. It may be provided that the signed attribute values, if appropriate with the supplemented data, are forwarded by the user computer system to the service computer system only after release by the user. This provides the greatest possible level of transparency for the user with regard to the attributes sent by the ID provider computer system to the service computer system.

FIG. 7 shows further embodiments of an ID token according to the invention and computer systems according to the invention. In the embodiment of Figure 7 is the ID token 106 is formed as a document, such as a paper and / or plastic-based document with an integrated electronic circuit, through which the interface 108, the memory 118 and the processor 128 are formed. The integrated electronic circuit may be, for example, a so-called radio tag, which is also referred to as RFID tag or RFID label. The interface 108 may also be contact-based or designed as a so-called dual mode interface.

In particular, document 106 may be a value or security document, such as a machine-readable travel document (MRTD), such as an electronic passport or electronic identity card, or a means of payment, such as a credit card , In the protected memory area 124, in the embodiment considered here, the attributes i are stored, where 1 <i <n. Furthermore, it is assumed without restriction of generality that the ID token 106 exemplarily shown in FIG. 7 is an electronic identity document, for example an electronic identity card. For example, the attribute i = 1 is the name, the attribute i = 2 is the first name, the attribute i = 3 is the address, and the attribute i = 4 is the date of birth, etc.

In the embodiment considered here, the interface 104 of the user computer system 100 can be designed as an RFI D reader, which can form an integral part of the user computer system or can be connected to it as a separate component.

The user 102 has one or more other ID tokens that are basically the same, such as an ID token 106 ', which is a credit card. In the user computer system 100, a plurality of configuration records 158, 160, ... may be stored. Each of the configuration records specifies, for a particular set of attributes, a data source and an ID provider computer system that can read the specified data source. In this embodiment, the user computer system 100 can address via the network 116 various ID provider computer systems 136, 136 ', ..., each of which may belong to different so-called trust centers. For example, the [D provider computer system 136 belongs to the trust center A and the basically identical I D provider computer system 136 'to another trust center B.

In the configuration data set 158, which is also referred to as an ID container, the attribute set of the attributes i = 1 to i = 4 is defined. The data source "identity card", ie the ID token 106, and the trust center A, ie the I D provider computer system 136, are respectively assigned to these attributes. For example, this can be specified in the form of its URL in the configuration data record 158 ,

In contrast, an attribute set I, II and III are defined in the configuration data record 116. The data source for these attributes is the credit card, ie the ID token 106 '. The ID token 106 'has a protected memory area 124' in which the attributes I ₁ II, III, ... are stored. The attribute I may, for example, be the name of the holder of the credit card, the attribute Il the credit card number and the attribute III the validity period of the credit card, etc. As an ID provider computer system, in the configuration data record 160 is the ID provider computer system 136 'of the Trust Center B.

As an alternative to the embodiment shown in FIG. 7, different data sources and / or different I D provider computer systems can also be specified in the same configuration data record for different attributes. In the embodiment of Figure 7, each of the I D provider computer systems 136, 136 ', ... may each have multiple certificates.

For example, in the memory 140 of the ID provider computer system 136, which is shown by way of example in FIG. 7, a plurality of certificates, such as the certificates 144.1 and 144.2 are stored with the respectively assigned private keys 142.1 and 142.2. In the certificate 144.1, read rights of the ID provider computer system 136 are defined to the attributes i = 1 to i = 4, whereas in the certificate 144.2 reading rights to the attributes I to III are defined.

To utilize a service offered by the service computer system 150, the user 102 first places a user input 162 in the user computer system 100 to, for example, enter a request for the desired service into a web page of the service computer system 150. This service request 164 is transmitted from the user computer system 100 to the service computer system 150 via the network 116. The service computer system 150 responds thereto with an attribute specification 166, i. with a specification of those attributes which the service computer system 150 needs to process the service request 164 from the user 102. The attribute specification may be in the form of attribute names, such as "name", "first name", "address", "credit card number".

The receipt of the attribute specification 166 is signaled to the user 102 by the user computer system 100. The user 102 can then select one or, if necessary, several of the configuration data records 158, 160,..., Which respectively define attribute sets that contain the attributes according to the attribute specification 166 at least as a subset.

For example, if the attribute specification 166 only requires the communication of the name, first name, and the address of the user 102, the user 102 may select the configuration record 158. If, in contrast, the credit card number is additionally specified in the attribute specification 166, then the user can 102 additionally selects the configuration record 160. This process can also be carried out fully automatically by the user computer system 100, for example by executing the program instructions 112. It is initially assumed that only one of the configuration data records, such as the configuration data record 158, is selected on the basis of the attribute specification 166.

The user computer system 100 then sends a request 168 to the ID provider computer system (s) indicated in the selected configuration record, in the example under consideration to the ID provider computer system 136 of the trust center A. This request 168 includes an indication of attributes to be read by the ID provider computer system 136 from the data source specified in the configuration record 158 according to the attribute specification 166.

The ID provider computer system 136 then selects one or more of its certificates that have the read rights necessary to read those attributes. If, for example, the attributes ϊ = 1 to 3 are to be read from the identity card, the ID provider computer system 136 selects its certificate 144.1, which defines the reading rights required for this purpose. This selection of the certificate is performed by executing the program instructions 149.

Then the execution of the cryptographic protocol is started. For example, the ID provider computer system 136 sends a response to the user computer system 100 for this purpose. The user computer system 100 then requests the user 102 to authenticate it to the specified data source, ie here opposite to the identity card. The user 102 then brings his identity card, ie the ID token 106, into the area of the RFID reader 104 and, for example, enters his PIN for his authentication. Due to the successful authentication of the user 102 compared to the 1D token 106 this is enabled for the implementation of the cryptographic protocol, ie for the execution of the program instructions 134. Furthermore, the I D provider computer system 136 authenticates itself to the ID token 106 with the aid of the selected certificate 144.1, for example with the aid of a challenge-response method. This authentication can also be mutually exclusive. Upon successful authentication of the ID provider computer system 136 to the ID token 106, the ID provider computer system issues a read request to the user computer system 100 to read the required attributes, which it sends to the ID system via the RFI D reader 104. Forwards token 106. The ID token 106 checks on the basis of the certificate 144.1 whether the ID provider computer system 136 has the reading rights required for this purpose. If so, the desired attributes are extracted from the protected storage area 124 and transmitted to the ID provider computer system via the user computer system 100 by end-to-end encryption.

The ID provider computer system 136 then sends a response 170 containing the read attributes over the network 116 to the service computer system 150. The response 170 is digitally signed with the certificate 144.1. Alternatively, the ID provider computer system 136 sends the response 170 to the

User computer system 100. The user 102 then gets the opportunity to read the attributes included in the response 170 and decide whether or not he really wants to pass these attributes to the service computer system 150. Only after input of a release command of the user 102 in the user computer system 100 is the response 170 then forwarded to the service computer system 150. In this embodiment, it is also possible for the user 102 to supplement the response 170 with further data.

If several ID provider computer systems 136, 136 ', ... are involved, the individual responses of the iD provider computer systems by the user computer system 100 in a single response, which may include all of the attributes according to attribute specification 166 contain, which are then summarized by the user computer system 100 is sent to the service computer system 150.

According to one embodiment of the invention, the user 102 may disclose one or more of its attributes to the service computer system 150 on the occasion of the service request 164, for example, by transmitting these attributes of the user as part of the service request 164 to the service computer system via the network 116, in particular For example, the user 102 may enter these attributes into the web page of the service computer system 150. The correctness of these attributes is then confirmed by the response 170, i. the service computer system 150 may compare the attributes received from the user 102 with the attributes read from the ID token 106 by the ID provider computer system 136 and check for consistency. According to a further embodiment of the invention, at least one further attribute can also be specified in the attribute specification 166, which is not stored on one of the ID tokens of the user 102, but can be interrogated by an external data source. This may be e.g. to act on an attribute regarding the creditworthiness of the user 102. The user computer system 100 may for this purpose include a further configuration data record 161, which for the attribute A - e.g. the creditworthiness - the specification of a data source and an ID provider computer system includes. The data source may be an online credit reporting agency such as Schufa, Dun & Bradstreet or the like act. As an ID provider computer system, for example, a trust center C is specified, as in the embodiment of FIG. 3. The data source can be located here in the trust center C.

In order to query the attribute A, the user computer system 100 thus directs a corresponding request (not shown in FIG. 3) to the trust center C, ie the ID provider computer system 136 ". This then supplies the attribute A, which is the user name. Computer system 100 together with the other attributes, the are read out of the user ID (s) 102, to the service computer system 150.

The query of the attribute A preferably takes place after the attributes relating to the digital identity of the user 102 have already been interrogated from one of the ID tokens of the user 102 and have been received by the user computer system 100 as a signed response 170, for example. The query of the attribute A by the user computer system 100 from the I D provider computer system 136 "then includes the signed response 170 so that the I D provider computer system 136" has secure information regarding the identity of the user 102.

FIG. 8 shows a further embodiment of a method according to the invention. By user input of a user 102 into a user computer system 100, the user 102 specifies a service of a service computer system that he or she wishes to use. This is done, for example, by calling an Internet page of the service computer system and a selection of one of the services offered there. The service request of the user 102 is transmitted from the user computer system 100 to the service computer system 150.

The service computer system 150 responds to the service request with an attribute specification, i. for example, a list of attribute names. Upon receipt of the attribute specification, the user computer system 100 requests the user 102 to authenticate against the (D token 106, for example, by a prompt.

The user 102 then authenticates to the ID token 106, for example by entering his PlN. Upon successful authentication, the attribute specification is forwarded from the user computer system 100 to an ID provider computer system 136. This then authenticates to the ID token 106 and directs a read request to read the attributes according to the attribute specification to the ID token 106. Given the previous successful authentication of the user 102 and the iD provider computer system 136, the ID token 106 responds to the read request with the desired attributes. The ID provider computer system 136 signs the attributes and sends the signed attributes to the user computer system 100. Upon approval by the user 102, the signed attributes are then transmitted to the service computer system 150, which may then provide the service desired, if desired , FIG. 9 shows a first embodiment of the HSM migration method according to the invention. In Figure 9, the transmission of a second certificate 508 from computer system B 136B ₁ having a new or "second" HSM 101B to computer system A 136A having an old or "first" HSM 101A is shown. The first HSM 101 A creates a third certificate 506 which, together with all its predecessor certificates 507, 502, 501 in the certificate chain up to and including the root certificate 500, is transmitted from the computer system A 136A to the external component 510.

The external component may be, for example, the memory 140 B of the computer system B, a directory server 109 or other storage media or computer systems with storage media. The method described below is advantageous in one aspect from the point of view of data backup and in another aspect from the viewpoint of load balancing and performance enhancement.

If the link certificate 506 including the certificate chain 507, 502, 501, 500 is transmitted to the computer system B 136B, for example, then a load-balancing module 182 can forward certification requests to either computer system A or computer system B, depending on the utilization of certificates within this chain is now possible on both computer systems. As a result, the utilization of each individual computer system A, B can be reduced and the response times can be shortened. The first 507 and second 508 certificates of the embodiment of the invention shown in FIG. 9 are not root certificates, but certificates whose validity can be tested by means of the public keys of higher-level certificates. Each of the certificates 500-505, 507, 508 illustrated in FIG. 9 includes a public key belonging to the respective certificate, which is represented as a black circle within each certificate, and a signature which is encrypted by encrypting a data value, eg a hash value of the certificate. is formed by the private key of a certificate that is the parent of the certificate. The validity of a certificate can be attested in each case by a higher-level certificate in a certificate chain in that it decrypts and verifies the signature of the subordinate certificate to be checked with its public key. Thus, for example, a data processing system by means of the certificate ZA2 501, the authenticity of the certificate ZA3 502 by deciphering the signature of the certificate ZA3 502 by the public key of certificate ZA2 501 and testify. Each certificate includes an asymmetric key pair with private and public key, wherein the encryption of a data value of a subsequent certificate 502 by the private key of a higher-level certificate 501, the next certificate 502 is signed, creating a certificate chain. With the public key of the higher-level certificate 501, which is assigned to the certificate 501, the signature of the subordinate certificate 502 can again be decrypted and thereby verified. By signing data values of a certificate by the private key of the respective higher-level certificate, a certificate chain can be generated.

Ultimately, therefore, the validity of the certificates 507, 502, and 501 can be checked by the root certificate 500 of the old HSM 101 A. By transferring the link certificate 506 as well as all the certificates within the certificate chain up to and including the root certificate 500 from the computer system A to the external component, it is ensured that the certificates existing on the old HSM continue to be used for checking certificates and certificates for the implementation of certificate chain tests up to the root certificate 500. can be. It is not necessary to read the private keys from the old HSM 101 A.

The steps of transferring the second certificate 508 from the new computer system B to the old computer system A are shown in Figure 9 as Roman number "I." The generation of the link certificate, ie, the "third certificate" 506 by signing the data value , eg of the public key of the certificate 506, by the private key of the first certificate 507, is the Roman key "II", the transmission of the third certificate and the entire certificate chain from the third certificate 506 to the root certificate 500 from the computer system A 136A to the external component 510 is indicated by the Roman numeral M1.

The validity of the second certificate 508 can now be determined both by a data processing system by means of the certificate 505, which belongs to the certificate chain

504,503 of the new HSM and its associated public key are acknowledged, as well as by means of the certificate 507 and associated public key belonging to the certificate chain 502, 501 and 500 of the old computer system A 136A. Thus, FIG. 9 shows the generation of a third certificate 506 by the first HSM 101A by signing the second public key 509 with the first private key of a first certificate 507. As a result, a certificate check of the second certificate 508 can be carried out by means of a certificate chain containing the first 507 and third 506 certificates. Since the link certificate 506 is assigned a second private key on the new HSM 101 B, with the second private key forming an asymmetrical key pair with the second public key 509, further certificates can now be signed with the aid of this second private key A certificate chain check up to the root certificate 500 can also be carried out for these additional certificates. LIST OF REFERENCE NUMBERS

10-20 steps

100 user computer system

101 HSM

102 users

103 processor

104 interface

10 105 program instructions

106 ID tokens

107 network

108 interface

109 directory server

15 110 processor

112 program instructions

114 network interface

116 network

118 electronic memory

20 120 protected storage area

122 protected storage area

124 protected storage area

126 memory area

128 processor

25 130 program instructions

132 program instructions

134 program instructions

136 I D Provider Computer System

138 network interface

30 140 memory

141 protected storage area

142 private key 143 program

144 certificate

144A first certificate

144B third certificate

145 processor

146 program instructions

147 public key

147A first public key

147B signed public key of the third

10 certificates

148 program instructions

149 program instructions

150 service computer system

152 network interface

15 154 processor

156 program instructions

158 Configuration Record

160 Configuration Record

161 configuration record

20 162 User input

164 service request

166 Attribute Specification

168 requirement

170 answer

25 172 Hot standby module

174 processor

176 program instructions

178 switches

180 memories

30 182 load-balancing module

184 processor

186 program instructions 190B second certificate

191 B second public key

200-216 steps

500 root certificate

503 root certificate

501-502 certificate

504-508 certificate

509 Public key

510 External component

Claims

Patent claims

A method of migrating from a first HSM (140; 101A) to a second HSM (101B) ₁ wherein the first HSM comprises a first asymmetric cryptographic key pair having a first private (142; 142A) and a first public key (147A ) and a first certificate (144; 144A) containing the first public key, with the following steps:

Generation of a second asymmetric cryptographic key pair with a second private (142B) and a second public key (191B) and a second certificate (190B) _1, which contains the second public key, by the second

HSM,

Transmitting the second certificate (190B) with the second public key from the second HSM to the first HSM, and

Generating a third certificate (144B) by the first HSM by signing the second public key with the first private one

Key, wherein a certificate check of the second certificate by means of a first certificate chain containing the first and third certificate, is feasible.

2. The method of claim 1, further comprising the step

- Transfer of the third certificate to a directory server.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein the first HSM is replaced by the second HSM for performing cryptographic operations.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein the second certificate is a self-signed root certificate comprising the second public certificate Key and signed by the associated second private key.

5. The method of claim 1 or 2, whereby a Ba-S ckup for the first HSM is created by the second HSM.

A method of reading at least one attribute stored in an ID token (106, 106 '), wherein the ID token is associated with a user (102), comprising the steps of:

0 - authentication of the user against the ID token,

Authenticating a first computer system (136) against the ID token,

after successful authentication of the user and the first computer system against the ID token, read access of the first computer system to the at least one attribute stored in the ID token for transmission of the at least one attribute after its signature to a second computer system (150), wherein the first computer system includes the first HSM and the second HSM, respectively, after a migration according to claim 1, 2 or 3 has been performed, wherein the authentication is performed using the HSM.

The method of claim 6, wherein the authentication of the first computer system to the ID token is performed using a certificate (144) of the first computer system, the certificate including an indication of the attributes stored in the ID token for which the first computer system is authorized for read access.

8. The method as claimed in claim 6, wherein the ID token checks the read authorization of the first computer system for read access to at least one of the attributes by means of the certificate.

9. The method according to any one of the preceding claims 6-8, with the following further steps:

Signing of the at least one attribute read from the ID token by the first computer system using the HSM,

- Transfer of the signed attribute from the first computer system to a second computer system.

10. The method of claim 9, further comprising the following steps:

Sending a request (164) from a third computer system (100) to the second computer system,

Specification of one or more attributes by the second computer system,

Sending the attribute specification (166) from the second computer system to the first computer system,

wherein the read access of the first computer system is performed to read the one or more attributes specified in the attribute specification from the ID token.

The method of claim 10, wherein the request (164) includes an identifier for identifying the first computer system by the second computer system, and wherein the attribute specification is transmitted from the second computer system to the first computer system without the interposition of the third computer system.

12. The method of claim 10, wherein the third computer system comprises a plurality of predefined configuration records (158, 160, ...), each of the configuration records comprising a subset of the attributes, at least one data source and a first computer system of a set of first computer systems (136, 136 ', ...), wherein the attribute specification is first transmitted from the second computer system to the third computer system, so that by means of the third computer system at least one of the configuration data records is selected, which is a subset of the attributes specifying which includes at least one attribute specified in the attribute specification, and wherein the third computer system forwards the attribute specification to the first computer system, and wherein a connection between the first computer system and the data source in the selected configuration record specified ID token is built on the third computer system.

The method of any of the preceding claims 6-12, wherein the at least one attribute read from the ID token by the first computer system is sent to the third computer system from where it is forwarded to the second computer system upon release by the user.

14. The method of claim 12, wherein the user can supplement the attributes before forwarding to the second computer system by further data.5

15. The method according to claim 6, wherein the first computer system has a plurality of the certificates (144.1, 144.2) with different read rights, wherein the first computer system selects at least one of the certificates due to the receipt of the attribute specification, that for reading the attribute specified in the attribute specification has sufficient read rights.

16. The method of claim 6, wherein the third computer system has at least one configuration data set that specifies an external data source for requesting a further attribute from the third computer system via the network.

17. The method of claim 16, wherein the requesting of the further attribute occurs after the at least one attribute has been read out of the ID token, and after the third computer system has received the at least one signed attribute from the first computer system, the query interrogating includes at least one signed attribute.

18. The method of claim 1, wherein the second certificate is not a root certificate and a certificate check of the second certificate can be carried out by means of the first certificate chain and by means of a second certificate chain, wherein the second certificate chain is the root certificate of the second certificate chain

Contains HSM.

19. Computer program product with computer system executable instructions for carrying out a method according to one of the preceding claims 1-4.

20. Computer system with

- a first HSM (140, 101 A) and

a second HSM (101B),

wherein the first HSM is associated with a first asymmetric cryptographic key pair having a first private (142; 142A) and a first public key (147A) and a first certificate (144; 144A) including the first public key,

wherein the second HSM is a second asymmetric cryptographic

Key pair having a second private (142 B) and a second public key (147 B) and a second, the second public key-containing certificate (190 B) are assigned, and

- wherein a third certificate (144B) is associated with the second HSM, and wherein the third certificate includes the second public key signed by the first private key.

21. The computer system of claim 20, including means (172, 174, 176) for sensing a failure of the first HSM and means (178) for switching to the second HSM after a failure of the first HSM has been sensed.

22. Computer system according to claim 21, wherein the means for sensing to test a time-out condition are formed.

A computer system as claimed in any of claims 20-22, including means (182) for distributing load between at least the first HSM and the second HSM.

The computer system of claim 23, wherein the means for distributing the load is configured to determine a load parameter (180) for at least the first and second HSMs, the distribution of the load being performed in dependence on the load parameters.

25. Computer system according to one of the preceding claims 20 to 24 with

Means (138) for receiving an attribute specification (166) over a network (116), the attribute specification specifying at least one attribute,

Means (142, 144, 146) for authenticating against an ID token (106), the means (142, 144, 146) for authentication comprising at least one of the first and second HSMs,

Means for reading at least one attribute from the ID token over a protected connection, wherein reading the at least one attribute requires that a user associated with the ID token and the computer system have authenticated against the ID token.

26. The computer system of claim 25, including means for generating a request to the user for authentication against the ID token based on the receipt of the attribute specification.

27. Computer system according to claim 25 or 26, wherein the means (138) for

Receiving the attribute specification from a second computer system

REPORTED SHEET (RULE 91) ISA / EP and means (138) for sending the at least one attribute read from the ID token to a third computer system (100) for forwarding to the second computer system.

The computer system of claim 25, 26 or 27, including means (144) for signing the at least one attribute, wherein the signed attribute is transmitted.

29. The computer system of claim 25, wherein the computer system is configured to select, on the basis of the receipt of the attribute specification, at least one of the certificates which is used for reading in the Attribute specification has sufficient read rights.