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on Industrial Competition |
| By: | CRAMPES, Claude; HARITCHABALET, Carole; JULLIEN, Bruno |
| JEL: | L13 L82 |
| Date: | 2005–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:5015&r=com |
| By: | Sue Mialon |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a theoretical ratification of efficiency of internal capital markets. The efficiency of internal capital market is examined in the context of horizontal mergers. In Cournot oligopoly, merged firms often optimally select the multidivisional structure in which competition among the merging partners remains in production while the headquarters establishes strong central control over resource allocation to the divisions. Under this structure, mergers not only combine the merging partners’ capital, but also provide the merged firm with a new opportunity to reallocate that capital in an efficient way. Horizontal mergers are profitable due to the efficiency of internal capital markets. Such horizontal mergers also enhance market competition. I discuss the conditions under which the multidivisional structure (the M-form) is optimal for the merged firm while complete fusion of all the merging partners under a single authority is also feasible. |
| Date: | 2005–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:emo:wp2003:0522&r=com |
| By: | R. Preston McAfee; Hugo Mialon; Sue Mialon |
| Abstract: | The antitrust laws are intended to permit procompetitive actions by firms and deter anticompetitive actions. We consider firms’ incentives to use the antitrust lawsuits for strategic purposes, in particular to prevent procompetitive efficiency-improvement by rival firms. Our main result is that, ceteris paribus, smaller firms in more fragmented industries are more likely to use the antitrust laws strategically than larger firms in concentrated industries. |
| Date: | 2005–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:emo:wp2003:0524&r=com |
| By: | Joe Chen (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo); Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. (Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University) |
| Abstract: | Previous research exploring the effect of corporate leniency programs has modelled the oligopoly stage game as a Prisoners' Dilemma. Using numerical analysis, we consider the Bertrand price game and allow the probability of detection and penalties to be sensitive to firms' prices. Consistent with earlier results, a maximal leniency program necessarily makes collusion more difficult. However, we also find that par-tial leniency programs - such as in the U.S.- can make collusion easier compared too offering no leniency. We also show that even if cartel formation is not deterred, a leniency program can reduce the prices charged by firms. |
| Date: | 2005–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tky:fseres:2005cf358&r=com |
| By: | BONNET, Céline; DUBOIS, Pierre; SIMIONI, Michel |
| JEL: | L13 L81 C12 C33 |
| Date: | 2004–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:3553&r=com |
| By: | Edmar Almeida; Nanno Mulder |
| Abstract: | This paper assesses Brazil’s regulatory framework and agencies for several network industries (electricity, oil and gas, and water and sanitation). Private investment can be encouraged by tackling regulatory uncertainty in many areas. To this end, recent initiatives include a new regulatory model for the electricity sector, and new draft legislation on the role and structure of the regulatory agencies (currently in Congress). The overall approach to regulatory reform in network industries, particularly in electricity, is well thought out but the risk of regulatory failure should not be underestimated. Implementation will be the ultimate test of reform in this area. In natural gas, the dominance of Petrobras, the national oil company, throughout the industry has often been perceived as an obstacle to its development. Private investment in water and sanitation is constrained by a lack of clarity over the assignment of regulatory powers across different levels of government. These reforms are consistent with the government’s agenda for growth, focusing on meeting the challenge of improving the business environment. This Working Paper relates to the 2005 OECD Economic Survey of Brazil (www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/brazil). <P>Améliorer le cadre réglementaire des industries de réseau au Brésil Ce papier évalue le cadre réglementaire ainsi que les agences régulatrices pour plusieurs industries de réseau (électricité, pétrole et gaz, eau et assainissement). L’investissement privé pourrait être encouragé en réduisant l’incertitude réglementaire dans plusieurs domaines. A ce propos, des initiatives récentes incluent un nouveau modèle réglementaire pour le secteur de l’électricité et un projet de loi sur le rôle et la structure des agences régulatrices (actuellement au Congrès). L’approche générale retenue en ce qui concerne la réforme de la réglementation dans les industries de réseau, notamment dans le secteur de l’électricité, est judicieuse, mais le risque de défaillance de la réglementation ne doit pas être sous-estimé. C’est au stade de sa mise en œuvre que la réforme dans ce domaine sera mise à l’épreuve. Pour ce qui est du gaz naturel, la position dominante de la société pétrolière nationale Petrobras dans l’ensemble du secteur a souvent été perçue comme un obstacle au développement de celui-ci. L’investissement privé dans les secteurs de l’eau et de l’assainissement se heurte à un manque de clarté dans la répartition des pouvoirs de réglementation entre les différents niveaux d’administration. Ces réformes se situent dans la lignée du programme de croissance du gouvernement, en mettant l’accent sur l’amélioration de l’environnement des entreprises. Ce Document de travail se rapporte à l`Étude économique de l'OCDE du Brésil, 2005 (www.oecd.org/eco/etudes/bresil). |
| Keywords: | economics of regulation, government policy (energy), réglementation, regulations, Brazil, Brésil, electricity, gas, électricité, gaz, pipelines, oil, pétrole, regulatory agencies, sanitation, water utilities, politique publique (énergie), agence régulatrice, assainissement, eau |
| JEL: | K23 L51 L94 L95 O54 Q48 |
| Date: | 2005–04–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:425-en&r=com |
| By: | Torstein Bye and Einar Hope (Statistics Norway) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we describe the approach to, and experience of, the deregulation and liberalisation of the Norwegian electricity sector from 1991. The Norwegian electricity market was subsequently integrated with the Swedish, Finnish and Danish markets to become the Nordic electricity market: the first common, integrated, intercountry electric power market in the world. We discuss the background to electricity market reform, the analytical and legal foundations for reform, and the chosen market and regulatory design. We find that the market has performed well in terms of economic efficiency and market functionality, even when exposed to severe supply shocks because of water shortages for a power system that relies heavily on hydropower. However, we also identify issues and challenges that must be addressed to improve the performance of the Nordic electricity market and its regulatory system. |
| Keywords: | Deregulation; Market design; Electricity markets |
| JEL: | D21 D41 D42 Q4 |
| Date: | 2005–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssb:dispap:433&r=com |
| By: | Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. (Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University); Joe Chen (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo) |
| Abstract: | This paper characterizes collusive pricing patterns when buyers may detect the presence of a cartel. Buyers are assumed to become suspicious when observed prices are anomalous. We find that the cartel price path is comprised of two phases. During the transitional phase, price is generally rising and relatively unresponsive to cost shocks. During the stationary phase, price responds to cost but is much less sensitive than under non-collusion or simple monopoly; a low price variance may then be a collusive marker. Compared to when firms do not collude, cost shocks take a longer time to pass-through to price. |
| Date: | 2005–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tky:fseres:2005cf359&r=com |
| By: | Nicolas Gruyer (LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the optimal auction for a seller who is bound to sell a single item to one of two potential buyers organized in a ”well-coordinated” cartel. After discussing the way the cartel reacts to any auction mechanism, we show that if the seller has no way to deter collusion, he can still accomodate it optimally with a very simple mechanism, either having the cartel pay to get an efficient allocation or randomly allocating the item. We then discuss the way to implement this mechanism, so that it enables a fair amount of competition if the seller made a mistake and the buyers don’t collude. We find that a simple implementation using reserve prices and lotteries may yield expected revenues close to the optimum if buyers compete, while highly increasing expected revenues if they collude. Finally, we discuss the extension to the n-buyers case. |
| Keywords: | auctions; optimal auctions; collusion; cartel; mechanism design; auction theory |
| JEL: | D44 |
| Date: | 2005–10–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:enc:abcdef:auction2&r=com |
| By: | Shin-Kun Peng (Academia Sinica); Takatoshi Tabuchi (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo) |
| Abstract: | We propose location-then-variety competition for amulti-productandmulti-store oligopoly,in which the number of firms, the number of stores and their location, and the number of varieties are endogenously determined. We show that ascompared to price-then-variety competition, location-then-variety competition with multi-stores yields a much richer set of equilibrium outcomes, such as market segmentation, interlacing, sandwich and enclosure. |
| Date: | 2005–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tky:fseres:2005cf360&r=com |
| By: | R. Preston McAfee; Hugo Mialon; Sue Mialon |
| Abstract: | A simple model demonstrates that there is no theoretical connection between the extent of price discrimination and the extent of market power. |
| Date: | 2005–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:emo:wp2003:0525&r=com |
| By: | Joe Chen (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo) |
| Abstract: | The well-publicized Christie-Schultz collusion hypothesis provides an experiment for studying the determinants of market structure in Nasdaq markets. Some markets experienced substantial compression in the profit margins for market makers due to the change of quoting convention from odd-eighth avoidance to the use of the full spectrum of eighths. Contrary to what competitive theory predicts, the empirical results suggest that this change led to net entry of market makers, after controlling for a time fixed effect, trading activity, information aspects of trading, market size, volatility, and unobserved individual market effects. Moreover, the robustness and significance of this finding do not change as different estimation methods are employed to correct for possible self-selection bias of the estimated average treatment effect. Surprisingly, dealer firms entered these markets despite the compression of profit margins. An explanation is provided based on collusion and investment in entry deterrence related to the practice of ``preferencing". (JEL L11 G20 C33) |
| Date: | 2005–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tky:fseres:2005cf357&r=com |
| By: | Peter Czaga |
| Abstract: | This study examines the interconnections between domestic regulatory reform and market openness by drawing on OECD’s earlier work on the regulatory aspects of trade. Part 1 considers how domestic regulations and regulatory reform affect market openness. It shows how with the help of advanced regulatory reform tools and approaches governments can create regulations and regulatory procedures that efficiently meet their policy objectives while at the same time supporting market access. Part 2 demonstrates that international market opening can contribute to facilitating domestic regulatory reform. Trade agreements signed on the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels can promote general principles or specific elements of good regulation and help guide or drive countries' individual regulatory reform efforts. Finally, part 3 analyzes the mutual benefits of regulatory reform and an open multilateral system for trade and investment. It is argued that by increasing domestic economic efficiency, raising the international competitiveness of domestic enterprises and reducing barriers to trade and investment, traderelated regulatory reform enables countries to take better advantage of trade liberalization and of open global markets. |
| Keywords: | regulatory reforms, domestic regulation, market openness, regionalism |
| Date: | 2004–12–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:traaab:9-en&r=com |
| By: | Nora Dihel; Blanka Kalinova |
| Abstract: | This paper applies the most advanced methodologies for measuring services barriers to calculate the restrictiveness and the impact of services barriers in selected transition economies, i.e. the Baltic States, and eight South Eastern European (SEE) countries (for telecommunications and banking) and Russia (for telecommunications). Among the selected countries, the Baltic countries record the highest liberalisation scores for both telecommunications and banking services making their situation comparable to that of most developed countries. By contrast, the SEE countries have more room to improve their performance and the price level of their telecommunication services, both in fixed and cellular services by eliminating general restrictions on competition and removing barriers to foreign equity participation. With respect to banking services, the results suggest that the SEE markets are fairly contestable; policy priorities would thus appear to be broad issues of macroeconomic stability and structural reform. The telecommunications estimates put Russia in an intermediate position between the results for the Baltic States and the SEE countries. The WTO... |
| Keywords: | telecommunications, transition economies, services, banking, liberalisation, barriers, benefits, WTO |
| Date: | 2004–10–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:traaab:7-en&r=com |
| By: | Peter Thompson (Department of Economics, Florida International University); Steven Klepper (Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University) |
| Abstract: | We construct a model of industry evolution in which the central force for change is the creation and destruction of submarkets. Firms expand when they are able to exploit new opportunities that arrive in the form of submarkets; they contract and ultimately exit when the submarkets in which they operate are destroyed. This simple framework can transparently explain a wide range of well-known regularities about industry dynamics, most notably the subtle relationships between size, age, growth, and survival. Data on the laser industry, where submarkets are prominent, further illustrate the ability of the model to explain distinctive patterns in the evolution of industries and firms. |
| Keywords: | Spinoffs, firm growth, survival, firm age, market structure, industry evolution, technological change |
| JEL: | L1 O33 |
| Date: | 2003–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fiu:wpaper:0303&r=com |
| By: | Maria Arbatskaya |
| Abstract: | A common feature of low-price guarantees is that they allow consumers to postpone bargain-hunting until after the purchase. This paper addresses a number of questions concerning the adoption pattern of price-matching and price-beating guarantees with post-purchase search and their impacts on market prices. It is shown that low-price guarantees are o.ered by low-cost firms, and are associated with relatively low prices. All firms weakly reduce their prices in the presence of low-price guarantees, and firms o.ering low-price guarantees usually have incentives to cut their prices. These results are in sharp contrast with the traditional view on these policies as collusive practices. |
| Date: | 2005–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:emo:wp2003:0520&r=com |
| By: | Luis F Costa; Huw D Dixon |
| Abstract: | We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of imperfect competition where a sunk cost of creating a new product regulates the type of entry that dominates in the economy: new products or more competition in existing industries. Considering the process of product innovation is irreversible, introduces hysteresis in the business cycle. Expansionary shocks may lead the economy to a new 'prosperity plateau,' but contractionary shocks only affect the market power of mature industries. |
| Keywords: | Entry; hysteresis, mark-up |
| JEL: | E62 L13 L16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yor:yorken:05/30&r=com |
| By: | Martin Jørgensen |
| Abstract: | This paper discusses ways of strengthening the competitive environment in order to help boost productivity performance in various sectors of the Danish economy. It looks at a number of indicators of the strength of competition — including price levels, industrial concentration and product market regulation — and it discusses the appropriateness of the competition legislation framework. The paper then focuses on the large public sector, which has been slow to open up to competition, partly because of regulatory restrictions but also because some local governments are too small to handle tenders and provide an attractive market for private providers. The paper also looks at the process of liberalising network industries and at various regulations that still impede effective competition in a number of other sectors, including construction, housing, distribution and professional services. <P>Dynamiser la croissance en stimulant la concurrence au Danemark Le document de travail examine les moyens de renforcer le cadre concurrentiel pour stimuler la productivité dans divers secteurs de l'économie du Danemark. Il passe en revue un certain nombre d'indicateurs de la vigueur de la concurrence –– notamment le niveau des prix, la concentration industrielle et la réglementation des marchés de produits –– et évalue l'adéquation du cadre législatif de la concurrence. L'analyse se porte ensuite sur le vaste secteur public, qui a tardé à s'ouvrir à la concurrence, du fait de restrictions réglementaires mais aussi parce que certaines collectivités locales sont trop petites pour gérer des appels d'offres et offrir un marché attractif à des prestataires privés. Le document de travail examine aussi le processus de libéralisation des industries de réseau ainsi que différentes réglementations qui font encore obstacle à une concurrence efficace dans plusieurs autres secteurs, dont la construction, le logement, la distribution et les services professionnels. |
| Keywords: | network industries, réglementation, industrie de réseau, competition, privatisation, Denmark, regulations, concurrence, Danemark, privatisation, public procurement, marchés publics, product markets, retail distribution, construction, public sector, competitive neutrality, marchés de produits, grande distribution, construction, neutralité de concurrence |
| JEL: | H4 K21 L1 L32 L33 L41 L43 L44 L8 L9 O52 |
| Date: | 2005–05–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:431-en&r=com |
| By: | Maria Maher; Michael Wise |
| Abstract: | This paper assesses what role product market competition and reforms may have played in the performance of the Dutch economy over the past decade, and discusses what further product market reforms might contribute to enhancing growth. In general, competitive pressures appear to be relatively strong in the Netherlands, particularly in the traded goods sector. Competition in product markets has been strengthened through the creation of a competition authority (NMa) and the Competition, Deregulation and Legislative Quality project (MDW). A planned reduction in the administrative burden will also help to strengthen competition, by reducing barriers to business start-ups and the expansion of small businesses, as well as lowering business costs. However, competitive pressures and productivity growth are weaker in the Dutch services sector. Planning restrictions are inhibiting competition and productivity growth in the retail sector and there is considerable scope to eliminate practices that restrict competition in professional services, even though both are relatively liberalised in the Netherlands. Reforms in electricity, gas and telecoms are recent and market power on the part of incumbent firms remains a concern. Competitive pressures in these industries could be increased by enhancing the powers of the regulators and eliminating barriers to entry. <P>Concurrence sur les marchés de produits et performance économique aux Pays-Bas Ce document évalue le rôle que la concurrence sur les marchés de produits et les réformes ont pu jouer dans les performances de l’économie néerlandaise cette dernière décennie et débat sur l’action qui pourrait être menée pour améliorer la croissance. D’une façon générale, les pressions concurrentielles paraissent relativement fortes aux Pays-Bas en particulier dans les secteurs des biens échangés. La concurrence sur les marchés de produits a été renforcée grâce à la mise en place d’une autorité de la concurrence (la NMa) et au projet « Concurrence, déréglementation et qualité de la réglementation » (MDW). L’allégement prévu des charges administratives contribuera également à renforcer la concurrence en réduisant les obstacles à la création d’entreprises et à l’expansion des petites entreprises, tout en diminuant les coûts des activités industrielles ou commerciales. Toutefois, la concurrence et la productivité du travail sont plus faibles dans le secteur des services. Les règles d’urbanisme entravent la concurrence et la croissance de la productivité dans le commerce de détail et de vastes possibilités s’offrent d’éliminer les pratiques qui restreignent la concurrence dans les services professionnels, même si ces activités sont relativement libéralisées aux Pays- Bas. Les réformes dans les secteurs de l’électricité, du gaz et des télécommunications sont récentes et le pouvoir de marché des opérateurs historiques demeure problématique. La concurrence dans ces secteurs pourrait être intensifier, en augmentant les prérogatives des autorités de régulation et en éliminant les barrières à l’entrée. |
| Keywords: | market structure, structure de marché, network industries, industrie de réseau, competition, Netherlands, Pays-Bas, concurrence, productivity and growth, droit de la concurrence, productivité et croissance, antitrust law, regulatory policies, politique de réglementation |
| JEL: | K21 K23 L11 L16 L40 L43 O51 |
| Date: | 2005–03–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:422-en&r=com |
| By: | OECD |
| Abstract: | This paper assesses what role product market competition and regulatory reforms may have played in the performance of the British economy over the past decade. Competitive pressures appear to be relatively strong in the United Kingdom, with regulations inhibiting competition and barriers to trade amongst the lowest in the OECD. Nevertheless, there is scope for improvement and the recent overhaul of competition legislation should help to further promote competition. Much progress has been made in the professional services sector. Self-regulatory bodies are no longer exempt from competition legislation and professional bodies have undertaken a number of actions towards removing or easing restrictions that inhibit competition. In the retail sector, market power remains a problem and the competition authorities will need to remain vigilant. The government’s recent approach to planning has made new large scale entry very difficult, impeding competition and inhibiting entry. Industry regulators also need to remain vigilant in the electricity, gas and telecommunications sectors. Reforms in these sectors have led to increased productivity, though international comparisons suggest that there is scope for prices to fall. While recent steps by the government overcome the most serious weaknesses of the privatised rail system, continuing problems regarding incentives and responsibilities remain to be resolved. <P>Concurrence sur les marchés de produits et performance économique au Royaume-Uni L'objet du présent document est d'évaluer le rôle que la concurrence sur les marchés de produits et les réformes de la réglementation ont pu jouer dans les performances de l'économie britannique au cours des dix dernières années. Les pressions concurrentielles semblent relativement fortes au Royaume-Uni, où les réglementations entravant la concurrence et les obstacles aux échanges figurent parmi les plus modestes de la zone OCDE. Il existe néanmoins des marges de progression, et la récente refonte du droit de la concurrence devrait contribuer à promouvoir davantage celle-ci. Des avancées considérables ont été accomplies dans le secteur des services professionnels. Les organismes d'autoréglementation ne sont plus exclus du champ d'application du droit de la concurrence, et des organismes professionnels ont pris un certain nombre de mesures en vue de lever ou d'assouplir les restrictions à la concurrence. Dans le secteur de la distribution, la question du pouvoir de marché reste problématique et les autorités de la concurrence devront rester sur le qui-vive. L'approche adoptée récemment par le gouvernement en matière d'urbanisme a rendu très difficile l'installation de nouvelles grandes surfaces, ce qui entrave la concurrence et l'entrée de nouveaux acteurs sur le marché. Les autorités de régulation compétentes doivent également demeurer vigilantes dans les secteurs de l'électricité, du gaz et des télécommunications. Les réformes menées dans ces branches d'activité ont débouché sur des gains de productivité, mais des comparaisons internationales laissent à penser que les prix peuvent encore baisser. Si les récentes initiatives des pouvoirs publics ont permis de remédier aux défaillances les plus graves du système privatisé de transport ferroviaire, les problèmes persistants relatifs aux incitations et au partage des compétences doivent encore être résolus. |
| Keywords: | market structure, structure de marché, network industries, industrie de réseau, competition, United Kingdom, Royaume-Uni, concurrence, productivity and growth, droit de la concurrence, productivité et croissance, antitrust law, regulatory policies, politique de réglementation |
| JEL: | K21 K23 L11 L16 L40 L43 O51 |
| Date: | 2005–07–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:433-en&r=com |
| By: | Maria Maher; Jay Shaffer |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the strength of product market competition and economic performance in Canada and discusses way in which the institutional framework governing competition policy could be improved. Competitive forces are comparatively strong and administrative and economic regulations inhibiting competition are amongst the lowest in the OECD countries. However, Canada’s regulated conduct doctrine exempts anti-competitive behaviour when required by regulation, and thus significant parts of the economy remain shielded from the competition law. This is a particular problem with provincial government regulation. Restrictions on internal trade also continue to exist, and implementation of the Agreement on Internal Trade is less effective than it could be. More attention needs to be focussed on removing those regulations that restrain competition, particularly in professional services. In network industries, competition has largely been absent in the electricity sector. While it is widely recognised that reforms are necessary, those undertaken in the past have mainly been aimed at bringing in private-sector investment, while avoiding full competition in generation and in retail markets. Canada has more significant restrictions on foreign ownership than almost any other OECD country, notably in airlines, telecommunications and broadcasting, and their removal could improve performance in these sectors. <P>Concurrence sur les marchés de produits et performance économique au Canada Ce document examine la puissance de la concurrence dans les marchés de produits et de la performance économique au Canada. Il envisage aussi les moyens par lesquels pourrait être amélioré le cadre institutionnel qui gouverne les politiques de la concurrence. La vigueur des forces concurrentielles est comparativement élevée au Canada et les régulations inhibant la concurrence sont parmi les plus faibles de la zone de l’OCDE. Cependant, le code canadien de conduite réglementé exonère les comportements anticoncurrentiels lorsqu’ils sont couverts par une réglementation, de sorte que certains pans importants de l’économie restent non couverts par le droit de la concurrence. Ce problème est particulièrement aigu dans le cas des réglementations sous autorités provinciales. Des restrictions continuent de limiter les échanges provinciaux, et la mise en œuvre de l’Accord sur le commerce intérieur est moins effective qu’elle pourrait l’être. Il conviendrait de chercher plus activement à supprimer les réglementations qui freinent la concurrence dans les professions libérales. Dans les industries de réseaux, la concurrence a été pratiquement absente dans le secteur de l’électricité. S’il existe un large consensus sur la nécessité de réformes, celles qui ont été entreprises par le passé ont eu pour objectif principal d’encourager l’investissement du secteur privé, tout en évitant l’ouverture intégrale à la concurrence de secteurs comme la production d’électricité et la vente au détail. Le Canada connaît aussi un plus grand nombre de restrictions significatives concernant les intérêts étrangers que presque tous les autres pays de l’OCDE, notamment dans les domaines du transport aérien, des télécommunications et de la télédiffusion. Leur élimination pourrait stimuler les performances dans ces secteurs. |
| Keywords: | market structure, structure de marché, network industries, industrie de réseau, competition, Canada, Canada, concurrence, productivity and growth, productivité et croissance, antitrust law, loi anti-trust, regulatory policies, politique de réglementation |
| JEL: | K21 K23 L11 L16 L40 L43 O51 |
| Date: | 2005–03–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:421-en&r=com |